Community & Reflections
进退维谷的在华外商
可以预言，Google退出中国将成为外商在华投资道路上的一个界标性事件。在Google事件发生之前的2009年11月至12月，中国美国商会( American Chamber of Commerce in China）曾做过第12年度《商务环境调查报告》，调查显示，91%的受调查企业也对中国未来五年的前景表示“谨慎乐观”或“乐观”。这次调查共有388家企业参与，调查结果迟至4月2日才发布。但Google事件发生之后，中美关系波澜迭起，外商对中国商务环境的感觉已大不如前。中国美国商会于3月下旬发布了另一项调查报告，这一报告与中国欧盟商会主席伍德克的公开文章，表明在华外商对其投资前景深感困惑。 一、在华欧美外商的困惑何在？ 美国商会在中国有两个，一个在上海，另一个在北京。北京的美国商会名为“中国美国商会”。该机构3月下旬公布的一项调查结果显示，由于中国政府陆续采取措施，将外资企业排除在中国一些蓬勃发展的市场领域之外，在华跨国公司的不满情绪日益抬头。 据称，由于担心不断恶化的投资环境和中国本土创新规定的影响，中国美国商会就中国拟议中的政府采购条例对会员进行了调查，并像往年一样询问了它们对中国总体商业环境的看法。调查结果是：感觉不被欢迎参与中国市场并进行竞争的企业激增到受访企业的38%――而仅仅就在几个月前的2009年12月公布的2009年度调查为26%， 2008年为23%。自中国美国商会开始就该问题对会员进行调查以来，这是4次调查中不满意比例最高的，表示外国在华企业对中国投资环境的评估在迅速恶化。 这些外企抱怨的内容包括中国有利于国内企业的“自主创新”新规定，以及使外企受到不公平对待的政府采购政策。在那些感觉到不受欢迎的公司中，58%提及因中国科技标准的强制实施而产生的障碍，还有50%提到了强制技术转让的问题。这都与中国政府一项新规定有关：2009年10月底，中国三部委联合发布通知，要求科技供货商在被列入《政府采购自主创新产品目录》之前必须获得产品认定。该目录将涵盖外国企业销售的数十种产品，包括服务器、移动基站、安全和财务软件及风力发电机。在被问及新政策影响的受调查科技企业中，有57%说它们认为这会对未来在华业务造成负面影响，而有37%的企业说已经产生影响了――即使条例尚未正式生效。许多外国公司在中国投入重金设立了研发业务，它们担心新的采购政策可能迫使它们将自己的创新成果与中国的竞争对手或政府机构共享。 上述担心是新调查显示的。但中国美国商会第12年度的调查所显示的一些担忧并未成为过去式。在第12年度的调查里，“法规解释相互矛盾”被列为首要挑战。除此之外，越来越多的企业对获得必要的经营许可和国家保护主义方面的担忧日益加剧，外资企业在华面临的八大挑战中，有七项与中国政府相关。这项调查中的一些担忧，也反映在美国贸易办公室提交国会的年度报告中。 二、傍徨踟蹰的在华外商 仿佛是为中国美国商会的调查做注脚，中国欧盟商会主席伍德克在英国《金融时报》发表一篇文章，标题叫做“中国正在让外企灰心”。文章谈到，“突然之间，政治上的进展和监管方面的限制汇集到一起，酿成一杯危险的‘鸡尾酒’――许多公司从中嗅到了保护主义气息。……在许多行业，外国企业的挫折感远比中国政府意识到的更为明显。我第一次听说有（外国）企业考虑完全撤离中国。它们之所以有这种想法，并非因为它们无法与本土对手竞争，而是因为它们厌倦了在一种无法预测的商业环境里苦苦挣扎，……我还听说一些大型企业准备制定战略，将未来的部分投资撤出中国，转投其它亚洲国家。” 彭博通讯社的报道证实了许多外资企业正在亚洲其它国家“筑巢”应变。通用电器、福特汽车、新百伦（New Balance）等长期在华经营的美国企业纷纷增加亚洲市场的多样化经营。福特在泰国投资10亿美元，与马自达（Mazda）合资办厂；通用电器在越南海 防市投资6100万美元，兴建风力发电机工厂；新百伦运动品牌企业计划在印尼寻找分承包商，为在中国的四座工厂和越南的一个工厂寻找新货源。新百伦亚洲经理朱迪斯·麦凯（Judith Mackay）将此称为“中国加一战略”。 分析人士指出，政治、经济因素正在促使外商扩大视野，到中国以外地方寻找发展机会。美国新兴市场战略公司总裁甘布尔分析，劳工成本不断增加与正在改变的政策法规环境，加上知识产权的剽窃与干涉行为，以及骇客攻击和造谣中伤等等，已经让中国的经营吸引力有所下降。Google就是这种环境的冰山一角，美国前任贸易代表苏珊·施瓦布（Susan Schwab）近日对香港媒体说，中国依然是最大的市场，但最近，“我看到很多美国公司正在寻找替代市场。” 三、中国政府出面安抚效果不彰 中国当局对外商日益增强的忧虑并非毫无感觉。在外商对中国投资和经营环境忧虑日益加重的时候，温家宝于3月22日出席中国发展高峰论坛，在与60多位外企负责人会面之时，代表政府向在华经营的外商释放善意。他强调，中国的发展依然需要外资，他能够增强外商的投资信心，并表示会增加与外国企业的往来。 4月13日， 中国政府发布《国务院关于进一步做好利用外资工作的若干意见》，提出中国将修订《外商投资产业指导目录》，扩大开放 领域，鼓励外资投向高端制造业、高新技术产业、现代服务业、新能源和节能环保产业。严格限制“两高一资”和低水平、过剩产能扩张类项目。所谓“两高一资”行业，即高污染、高能耗和资源性的行业。与此同时中国还将鼓励外资去西部贫穷地区，扩大劳动力密集型的工业 发展。 与此同时，中国政府还删除了有关采购新规草案中一些限制性条款。中国政府采购市场每年的交易额高达数十亿美元，根据去年发布但未正式执行的规定，供货商在被列入《政府采购自主创新产品目录》之前必须获得产品认定。所有申报的产品都要拥有中国的知识产权和自主品牌，且申报人的知识产权必须完全独立于海外机构或个人。这一限制性规定曾经引发外商强烈不满。根据外资企业的理解，这一规定意味着没有中国知识产权和自主品牌的产品就不能进入政府的采购名录。这导致北美、欧洲和亚洲的代表全球多数科技巨头的30多个行业团体向中国官方致函抗议，称这些规则属于保护主义。 最新草案中删掉了这一条款，只要求政府采购目录上的产品符合中国法律法规，申报人拥有或有权在中国使用该产品的知识产权。但美国信息技术产业理事会（Information Technology Industry Council）负责全球政策的副总裁诺弗尔（John Neuffer）称，尽管中国政府对批评作出了积极的回应，但这并未解决外商所有的担忧。外商必须全面理解这个规定，其措辞仍模糊不清。即使删除了部分引起麻烦的词句，在政府采购时使用自主创新清单仍是一个大问题。 在我看来，外资被从“神坛”上赶下来只是个时间问题，因为中国政府对外资政策从来就未脱“利用”二字。所谓“利用”，指的就是当中国羽翼未丰，有资金技术等需要时，双方合作，这时候可以给对方各种优惠；一旦中国羽翼丰满，外资利用价值下降，优惠自然取消，门也开得越来越窄。不过，这扇门并非这时才猛然关上， 中国外资政策环境变化的转折点应当追溯至2006年11月9日国家发改委出台的《十一五期间外资利用规划》，该规划提出，十一五期间（2006－2010年），要推动利用外资从“量”到“质”的根本转变。自此以后，外资在中国的优惠待遇逐渐丧失。今年3月21日，国务 院还发布了关于落实《政府工作报告》重点工作部门分工的意见，外资利用放在了重点工作的第四十四条。在外商投资持续下滑的背景下，中国政府并未强调加强吸引外资，相反强调工作中心在于优化利用外资结构。这些都是在华外资不可不注意的信息，如果忽视了这些信息的内涵，最后可能只会自找不痛快。 （原载台湾《看》杂志第61期 ⁄2010年04月29日,http://watch.secretchina.com/%E7%9C%8B%E8%AB%96%E5%A3%87/2010/2084）
何清涟2025-11-06 06:10👍 0💬 0【两会观察】：三笔糊涂帐，“解决”有妙方
何清涟 近年“两会”当中，与国库这只“钱袋子”直接相关的话题主要有三，一是反腐没收的赃款的流向，二是养老保险的缺口如何弥缝，三是地方债务这窟窿如何填。这次政府倒是非常爽快，快刀斩乱麻地“解决”了这三大问题。 大老虎赃款收归中央国库 先说腐败赃款问题。十八大以前，上亿的老虎不是特别多，因此赃款流向虽然也有人追问，但由检察院方面用官式回答敷衍一下就算完事。我曾于2014年7月在VOA发表《中国腐败赃款的流向》，对此做了分析，并指出官方回答远远不能解释疑惑。鉴于近两年揪出的大老虎动辄涉案几十亿、甚至逾百上千亿，这方面的追问就更多了。3月5日，全国政协委员、厦门大学教授田中群在会上问到这个问题：“我想知道，八项规定省下的那么多钱、反腐追回的那么多钱，都去哪里了？” “我们为什么不可以用更直接的方式，让百姓感受到反腐的好处呢?比如把反腐追回的钱投入农村教育，或用于治理农村污染，将这些贪官搜刮的民脂民膏还给百姓？” 但中国政府显然对此已做好准备，今年1月24日，中办、国办印发《关于进一步规范刑事诉讼涉案财物处置工作的意见》，下发各级政府，并于3月2日通过新华社消息广而告之。文件要点是：1、凡由最高检察院、公安部立案或者由其指定地方异地查办的重特大案件，涉案财物一律通过中央财政汇缴专户缴入中央国库（以前是上交省级国库）。2、凡中央政法机关指定地方异地查办的重特大案件，办案经费由中央财政保障，必要时提前预拨办案经费（此前，实行重特大案件异地管辖，办案单位会从涉案财物中提取部分。这种做法被业内人士称为“司法扶贫”）。 也就是说，腐败赃款去哪里的问题终于尘埃落地，中央与地方在腐败赃款上的利益关系终于理顺，但如何“将民脂民膏还给百姓”这一问题还悬在空中。 养老保险三条腿走路，不能只依靠政府 中国社保体系出现危机，这一信息已于今年1月公开发布。现行社保包括五个险种，养老与医疗占据份额最大。《中国养老金发展报告2014——向名义账户制转型》系列报告中公布了测算结果：一是隐形债务大，以2012年为基准，城镇职工基本养老保险的隐形债务为86.2万亿元，占2012年GDP的比率为166%。二是将出现收支缺口，并很快陷入枯竭。北京大学郑伟等人的测算结果是，养老保险基金将于2037年出现收支缺口，2048年养老保险基金将耗尽枯竭。 要想使社保持续，要么提高在职职工的缴费水平，要么降低退休职工的社保待遇。提高职工的缴费水平已不大可能，国务院副总理马凯承认，中国养老保险缴费水平偏高，“五险一金”已占工资总额的40%至50%。也就是说，职工拿到手的工资，还不到工资总额的60%。有人算了一笔帐：月薪1万，职工只能拿到7454.30元，而老板要付出的是14410元。这种情况下，企业觉得负担非常沉重，近年外资不断撤出中国，原因之一就是认为中国的劳务成本远远高过其他国家。据清华大学教授白重恩测算，中国的社保缴费率在全球181个国家中排名第一，约为“金砖四国”其他三国平均水平的2倍，是北欧五国的3倍，是G7国家的2.8倍，是东亚邻国的4.6倍。 专家们的一致意见是：中国未来的财政和企业要是不想被社保拖垮，社保规模缩水（低缴费低保障）是唯一可选择的改革路径，否则压垮了企业，政府、国民都没得玩。3月6日，财政部部长楼继伟在记者会上端出了改革方案，称养老保险有三个支柱，第一支柱是强制性的社会养老保险，第二支柱是企业年金和职业年金，第三支柱是个人购买的商业健康、商业养老保险。政府在加强第一支柱的管理和改革基础之上，已经推出了第二支柱的一些税收优惠政策。第三支柱不能和第一、第二支柱相比，是补充性的，将在个别地区试点，成功后再推行到全国。 楼部长的讲话很专业，在此必须译成大白话：以前，中国大多数城镇职工是依靠社会养老保险，今后这块将降低。要想日子过得好，大家还得有企业年金与职业年金，如果没有，那就自个掏钱购买商业保险。政府给你们的帮助就是提供税收优惠。 楼部长的主意虽好，但我在此得多句嘴：中国的保险业多年就是寅吃卯粮，其状况与影子银行系统差不多，弊病丛生。中国人要是嫌自己手中钱多了烧手，就去购买商业保险，当作赞助中国的金融保险事业。 不过，楼部长的坦率还是值得表扬，这比历年来政府不断向人民喂空心汤圆，即承诺“要改革、要对人民负责”务实得多，至少让人民清楚地看到了未来需要自己负责，以便未雨绸缪预做准备。 地方债务窟窿如何填？ 地方债务近三年以来一直困扰着中国政府，虽然两会时总会有政协委员出面安抚人心，称“中国债务问题虽然严重，但绝对不会发生危机”，中央政府还是比较在意。2014年曾决定发挥“父爱主义“精神，9月曾颁发“43号文”，向地方政府释放了买单的诚意。让地方政府在2015年1月5日前将债务如实上报，由中央拿出钱来，为地方偿还部分债务。原来担心头上乌纱不稳，对债务尽量瞒报少报的地方政府看到了希望，“诚实”上报，结果是地方债务瞬间爆发式增长。财政部发现这“父爱主义”不能发挥，只好于今年1月29日下发《关于开展地方政府存量债务初步清理甄别结果自查工作的通知》，宣布上报不合格，打回重报。意思是要地方政府别拿中央政府当冤大头。2015年两会上，财政部长楼继伟在新闻发布会上提出的新方法是：重整债务，开前门、堵后门，中央承认“完全公益性平台的地方有偿还责任”的债务，并负责偿还，比如最近财政部批复3万亿的存量债务置换。这就是说，在未来地方政府将在存量债务甄别的基础上，将存量债务中属于政府直接债务的部分，从短期、高息中解脱出来，变成长期、低成本的政府直接债务。其余部分就留给地方政府“重整”了。 但是，地方债务的真正解决方案不在这，而在于经济发展战略的调整。总理李克强作《政府工作报告》时提到2015年要促进房地产市场平稳健康发展。相对于往年两会中提到的“调控”、“抑制” 、“促进房价合理回归”等词，业内人士认为“支持促进”是“从来没有用过的好词”，因此预测两会后地方或将迎来第四轮房地产刺激政策，楼市将进一步回暖。而政府工作报告中提到的公租房政策，就是通过政府回购，将一些存量房转为公租房和安置房。这一政策实际是将2014年福州、四川、安徽、江苏、辽宁等多省市政府回购商品房用于充当保障房的“试点经验”予以肯定，并推广至全国。地方政府回购商品房充当保障房的缘由，一是为解决房地产库存；二是解决保障房建设筹集资金之困难。 地方政府多年来就是土地财政，依靠房地产支撑经济轻车熟路。如今中央政府松口给了政策，地方政府眼里看到的全是滚滚而来的钞票。只是这样一来，挤压房地产泡沫，调整经济结构恐怕就是一句空话了。 简言之，三笔多年来纠缠不清的糊涂帐，政府现在快刀斩乱麻，用不同的方法“解决”：腐败赃款收归中央，期盼从赃款中受惠的老百姓是否能分点蛋糕渣，得看中央政府的心情；养老保险包袱至少卸下一半让民众分担，这叫“自力更生，为政府分忧”；地方债务就给点政策，让地方政府自行解决。中央政府要办的大事多，钱袋里也没余钱，全国人民就体谅一下吧。 （原载VOA何清涟博客，2015年3月6日，http://www.voachinese.com/content/heqinglian-20150308/2672385.html）
何清涟2025-11-06 05:45👍 0💬 0奥巴马当选的正面和负面意义
美国建国二百多年以来，首次选出了黑人总统。黑人从做奴隶到成为全世界最有权力的白宫的主人，的确走过了一个漫长的道路，而这次则产生了一个飞跃。奥巴马的当选，对美国、对黑人、以及一切非白人种族群体都有著不可否认的正面意义。 对美国来说，无论是以文明自居的欧洲，还是一贯抱怨被欺负的非洲，或者要找理由诅咒美国的任何独裁国家，种族歧视是他们攻击美国的最重要武器之一。人数在美国只占13％的黑人中，有人能成为美国仅有的44个总统之一，足以封住很多抨击美国种族歧视之口。因为任何个案的歧视事件，都无法和一次集体投票所证明的结果相比。这个投票结果，等於是就美国是否接受黑人总统的一次公投。当大多数选民对黑人当他们的最高领导人都接受了，说明制度性的歧视在美国已经完全不存在，无论今後还会有多少个案发生。所以，奥巴马的当选，对美国在世界的形象，有相当的正面意义。同时在美国国内，白人也可以一了百了地摆脱（当然这是从理想的角度说）由於曾让黑人做奴隶而背负的、近乎赎不完的罪。 ●将来你可以是奥巴马 对於黑人和各种非白人种族群体来说，他们是恒久地抱怨被歧视、被压迫；很多人把在美国生活、工作中遇到的任何不顺，都归到种族歧视上。於是这些少数族裔长期被一种最不健康、最阻止人积极正向发展的受害者心态所左右。这种受害者心态使他们成为美国的边缘人。受害者心态和边缘人心理，不仅严重影响事业的顺利发展，更导致黑人和各种少数族裔无法幸福愉快地享受美国这个世界上最好的国家。奥巴马的当选，在正常的情况下，应该可以大幅度地降低黑人和其他少数族裔的受害者心态。如果真起到了这个效果，则是这次大选最有积极意义的一面。 另外，黑人比其他少数族裔更令人忧心的一面是，他们单亲家庭比例太高（达70％），导致教育水准严重落後，青少年犯罪率也远超过其他任何族裔。而奥巴马夫妇的常春藤大学学历和美满婚姻，可以成为黑人家长教育子女，年轻人发奋图强的榜样。今後，任何一个黑人父母，都可以鼓励自己的孩子∶好好念书，将来你可以像奥巴马一样，做美国总统！ 所以，从以上三个方面来讲，奥巴马的当选，是有相当正向和积极意义的。但与此同时，又不得不令人摇头的是，奥巴马是美国最左倾的政治新星；而且他不仅左倾，更甚至和反美的恐怖主义者、仇视美国的牧师等有著长久的朋友关系，他妻子在他快成为美国总统时，才第一次为美国感到骄傲。中国古语说，物以类聚，人以群分；奥巴马的这些亲友关系，令人无法不怀疑他对美国价值的认同。美国选出一个具有（起码曾经有）反美心态的人做总统，实在是荒谬到家了。 ●社会主义幽灵进白宫 奥巴马绝不是一般的左倾，而是一个清晰的社会主义者，尽管他和民主党都极力否认。他和民主党都是清清楚楚地要走社会主义道路，却由於共产主义、社会主义在全球的失败而没有胆量承认。他是高喊著共和党的要减税、要小政府的口号竞选的。但事实是，他的一系列政策都是要增税、要扩大政府开支。 奥巴马是社会主义者是颇有渊源的。他的黑人父亲和白人母亲，都是激进的左倾分子；他本人成长期间所受的影响，也主要都是左倾分子，甚至共产主义分子。在这样的背景下，奥巴马的严重左倾则是师出有名，可以理解。但是，在共产主义崩溃不到二十年，其惨痛的恶果还历历在目的情况下，几乎整个西方知识界，就好像共产主义从来没有发生过一样，没有什麽人再研究共产主义产生的原因和理论基础，他们继续像二十世纪初一样，热烈拥抱、推崇乌托邦的社会主义道路。几乎整个知识界、绝对压倒多数的媒体，都在讴歌左倾意识形态，都在为社会主义政策背书。奥巴马的当选，就是这种左倾势力占上风的结果。作为自由世界大本营、资本主义发源地的美国，居然可以如此轻易地被极左的社会主义分子夺去白宫，这才是美国的危机所在，也是整个西方的危机所在。 ●均贫富∶知识份子的「毒品」 在共产主义於全世界兴起的近三百年前，第一批从欧洲抵达美国的清教徒，就尝试了共产主义集体农庄式的生活。大家一起耕作，粮食共有、平均分配。结果不仅无法生产出足够的食品衣物，而且生产能力强的人对平均分配也非常不满。後来，这些新移民的首领决定把土地分给个人耕作，多劳多得。结果不仅产品迅速满足了需求，而且大家都很开心。这其实是一个最早的资本主义优越於共产主义的见证。但人类永恒的悲哀，是极容易抛弃从经验、历史中获得的教训，而热衷拥抱头脑中幻想的乌托邦。这点在知识份子中尤甚。 虽然共产主义已在全球崩溃，福利社会主义（相对均贫富）也在欧洲失败，「社会主义」已成为灾难的代名词，但均贫富，仍像毒品一样对知识份子有著摆脱不掉的迷魂作用。要占据拯救劳苦大众的道德高地，到底是知识份子的虚伪、虚荣心、欺骗，还是真正糊涂，完全看不见所有发生过的灾难？这实在是一个很令人困惑的问题。 这次奥巴马当选，又正值美国经济面临严重问题（这些问题不仅不是资本主义的错，恰恰是市场经济不断受到政府强烈干预而导致），更给他回头走罗斯福、约翰逊的社会主义大政府道路提供理由。美国很有可能向社会主义迈进一大步。而这一步迈出去，再回头，就难乎其难。从这个意义上说，奥巴马当选的负面意义远大於其正面意义。因为其正面意义局限於「种族问题」，而其负面意义影响整个人类。 2008年11月21日於美国（原载《开放》2008年12月号） 2008-12-03 http://www.caochangqing.com （转载请指明出处）
曹长青2025-11-01 04:19👍 0💬 0评贝拉合伙人安波舜的九大谎言
我的《贝拉的百万美元骗局》发表後，除了和这个“百万美元卖版权”骗局有关的三人——安波舜、白烨、贝拉，分别发声明、虚张声势地表示要法律起诉之外，贝拉和安波舜还各自发表了长篇充斥新的谎言的狡辩。许多读者、网友已经撰写多篇文章基本完全否定他们各自的狡辩，但最近安波舜从纽约回到北京举行记者会，不仅不对他撒下的弥天大谎向读者道歉，竟然继续编织新的谎言，於是我不得不把他的一连串谎言总结一下： 谎言之一：2003年11月安波舜在北京开记者会说：“美国某投资集团购买了《9•11生死婚礼》电影改编权，购买金额为102万美元。” 而在2003年3月，也就是安波舜上述记者会八个月之前，国内多家报纸、网站刊登的文字是：“据安波舜介绍，曾以执导《泰坦尼克号》一片而蜚声世界影坛的卡梅隆，一直在积极而审慎地选择作品，他阅读了《9•11生死婚礼》部份章节的英文稿後，认为这便是他一直要找的东西。而20世纪福克斯电影公司的董事会也一致决定，购买该作品并投拍电影。” 简评：美国“某投资集团”和20世纪福克斯电影公司、卡梅隆是一回事吗？那个宣称“20世纪福克斯电影公司和卡梅隆买版权”的安波舜是不是撒谎？ 谎言之二：当《北京青年报》记者问电影是否会由卡梅隆执导，20世纪福克斯拍摄时，安波舜说这两点在合同上写的是“潜在的”，他接著解释“版权已经卖给了对方，找谁来拍摄、谁来导演是对方的事情，他们能否谈妥我并不知道。” 安波舜承认“潜在”的含义有可能是卡梅隆执导、20世纪福克斯拍摄，但也有可能不是。 简评：那麽安波舜说“卡梅隆阅读了《9•11生死婚礼》部分章节的英文稿後，认为这便是他一直要找的东西。而20世纪福克斯电影公司的董事会也一致决定，购买该作品并投拍电影。”是不是完全是谎言？ 哪儿来的卡梅隆阅读？哪儿来的福克斯董事会一致决定？ 谎言之三：今年3月，《多维时报》报道：“沈蕾（贝拉的真名）说，与福克斯电影公司签署的合同中规定今年9月纪念911时要举行新闻发布会，发布小说英文版，并公布电影改编权交易这一消息┅┅沈蕾对《多维时报》说，这次改编权交易是福克斯电影公司通过安波舜在美国的朋友主动找到他的。” 简评：在10月14日安波舜传给多维编辑部，声称要诉讼多维和我的一份手写声明中，以及贝拉本人的声明中都指出：贝拉作品的影视版权都由安波舜代理，与贝拉无关，那麽上述贝拉这些已经“与福克斯电影公司签署的合同”之说，自然来自安波舜了（至於贝拉的又一轮谎言，我另文再论）。安波舜现在承认，只是跟某投资集团有合同，那麽“与福克斯电影公司签署的合同”、“福克斯主动找安波舜”的说法，是不是整个儿都是谎言？！ 谎言之四：安波舜（在纽约）发声明：“外界所传‘贝拉作品被好莱坞百万美元买断版权’一事，我庄严地正式宣布∶确有其事。我们有此电影版权的合同。” 简评：安波舜11月初在纽约“庄严地正式宣布：贝拉作品被好莱坞百万美元买版权，确有其事。”但他回到北京，这“好莱坞”就又变成了连名字都不敢给出的“美国某投资集团”了。从卡梅隆和福克斯，到笼统的好莱坞，再到连名字都没有的美国某投资集团，他下一步的谎言准备怎麽继续下去？ 谎言之五：据《北京青年报》报道：“安波舜称自己从美国带来了大批的档案和合同复印件，但他表示除了律师、政府相关部门等，包括记者在内的局外人是没有权利看到合同的，因为合同中涉及许多商业机密，尤其是有很多附加条款，绝对不能让合同之外的第三者看到。”“记者请求仅仅看一下合同的‘外貌’和最後的签字落款时，郜晓礼（安波舜和白烨的律师）回绝了，就这样，虽然记者与合同近在咫尺，但是却无法看到内容。” 简评：为什麽连合同的外貌都不敢给记者看？事实上，安波舜根本就没有一个卖了百万美元版权的合同！他以商业机密的名义，试图圆住那个“百万美元卖版权”的弥天大谎。在西方，图书版权的买卖根本不是什麽商业机密，《纽约时报》、《出版家周刊》、英国BBC等，都经常报道某作者和某出版社签了几位数的出书合同。如果书的电影版权已经卖给了某电影公司的话，（我在《贝拉的百万美元骗局》里已经写过）那更是公开的。因为，一是这样别的电影公司就不必费心去买了，二是因为电影厂怕同类题材撞车，有《每日通讯》公布谁买了什麽书、什麽故事的电影版权。而且好莱坞还经常有这种情形：A电影厂看到B电影厂买的故事後，认为该故事更适合跟我们厂签合同的导演或演员去拍，那麽A电影厂就去和B电影厂谈判，花更高一点的价格，把电影制作版权买过来。恰恰是这种商业透明度，而不是什麽弄神作鬼的 “伪商业机密”，促使了真正自由竞争的资本主义市场。安波舜想用故弄玄虚的“商业机密”唬过去根本没有“百万美元合同”的事实。 目前除了安波舜和他的合作者白烨，没有任何参与版权谈判的其他人士出来证明真有这麽个合同。如果合同内容是机密，那麽“有这麽个合同”不仅不是机密，而是安波舜万分想证明的，为什麽不拿出个第三者来证明？只有你俩自己说，明显根本不能服人。大概是没有第三个人（除了贝拉之外）想和这个“百万美元卖版权”的骗局连在一起吧！ 退一万步说，即使合同的内容不便被媒体公布於众，那麽“美国投资集团”的名字是最起码应该告诉读者的，因为这个公司的名字不仅不应该是秘密，而且还应该借此机会大力宣传其有花“百万美元”购买版权的实力。尤其是在安波舜已经这麽清楚地被人指出“百万美元卖版权”是骗局的情况下，如果还连这个投资公司的名字都不肯说出来的话，那就等於是告诉大众：根本就没有这麽个公司，更没有百万美元的合同！ 退二万步说，如果真有一个“投资公司”买版权，任何对书的版权生意稍有了解的人都知道，投资公司绝对不可能花102万美元买一个电影拍摄尚是未知数的版权。出高价格的，只能是将来可以把钱挣回来的电影公司本身，而绝对不可能是中间商。投资公司可能出几千块，顶多几万块美元买一个往影视公司独家“推销”的权利；推销成功以後，像经纪人那样，从卖出的版权费中抽成。而在电影公司还根本没有找到的情况下，由本身并不制作电影产品的“投资公司”出上百万给一个在美国从未出过书、毫不知名的中文作者，这天方夜谭只有安波舜有胆量编出来！ 谎言之六：安波舜在纽约的声明和在北京对记者说：“曹长青以记者的名义，探听大公司的合同机密，得到的只能是一连串的‘不知道’！然而，曹文就凭一连串的‘不知道’妄下结论。” 简评：我是以记者名义探听哪个商业公司的机密吗？我得到的是一连串的“不知道”吗？我在《贝拉的百万美元谎言》中有名有姓写得清清楚楚：第一，卡梅隆公司总裁秘书金．特洛伊小姐明确说明：卡梅隆从来没有听说过贝拉的小说，更根本没有拍摄她的小说的计划。第二，掌管20世纪福克斯公司全部合同业务的法律部副总裁马克．迈耶森正式答覆：“从来没有购买过这本书的版权。”安波舜在谎言完全被揭穿的情况下继续装糊涂地狡辩，他连自己、白烨和贝拉都骗不过去，为什麽一定要沿著谎言的道儿一头走到底？ 谎言之七：安波舜在北京对记者们说，“我在纽约，美国的报纸比国内的谨慎，但是没有一家问我看合同，因为大家知道，如果没有的话，我和公司的信誉，不是一两千万的损失！” 简评：安波舜什麽时候在纽约举行过记者会？他有胆量面对美国报纸的记者吗？如果贝拉的小说真如白烨所说“在美国引起的反响的确不小”，值得美国媒体关注，那美国记者不“逼”安波舜说出那个“某投资公司”的名字能饶过他吗？美国记者可能的确不会想到要合同看，因为在美国就绝对没有谁敢撒这麽大的谎。百万美元的谎撒完了，下一步怎麽办呵？！ 谎言之八：安波舜在纽约发的声明和在北京对记者表示：“我们手持的图书合同首版预付金和贝拉享受到的美国畅销书作家才有资格享有的15％高版税。” 简评：在这里，安波舜使用了两个拙劣的障眼法：首先，他用卖贝拉小说“英文版权”来混淆“电影版权”。我所质疑的是“百万美元的电影版权”一说，而不是英文图书版税。但在炫耀这个15％版税的同时，安波舜更证明了，贝拉根本没有拿到任何电影版税，因为作者得到的电影版税要远高於图书版税，一般都是电影版权卖出价的50％或更多，至少是30％。 第二个障眼法是，作为15％的图书版税，可以是几百万、也可能只有几千块、甚至几百块。重要的是，书的码洋是多少，也就是说，该出版社准备印多少本贝拉的书，定价总数额是多少。印一千本和印10万本，这个15％是一样的吗？为什麽和那个神秘“投资公司”一样，这个出版社的名字也不肯透露呢？只有两种可能：第一，贝拉小说的英文版连出版社还没有找到，所以说不出来；第二种可能是，终於有一家上当的出版社准备出这本注定要赔钱的书，但印刷数量极低，所以安波舜根本不敢把首版印数和出版社的预付版税（advance）公布出来。 谎言之九：但在这之前，安波舜倒是公布过贝拉小说的外文版将要出版的情形。据《金陵晚报》和《深圳新闻网》2003年9月15日的报道：“安波舜透露，目前，日本、美国、法国、韩国等多国出版社都开出各种优惠条件抢夺此书，日本承诺首印40万册，法国已付定金20万美元，美国则要首印80万册，韩国更高。” 简评：上述说法，完全是和“百万美元卖电影版权”同样的弥天大谎！知道在美国首印80万的书，得是什麽成色吗？刚刚获得2003年“全美图书奖”终身成就奖的美国最著名畅销小说家之一的斯蒂芬．金（Stephen King）和达到他那麽畅销的、在美国被称为Blockbuster（重磅炸弹）的作家，首版才能印80万册左右。中国人非常熟悉的前美国第一夫人喜莱莉的《活出历史》首版不过印了一百万册，在美国，哪个女人的名气能和喜莱莉相比？谁得到的宣传能超过她？她的书首印一百万，出版社一开始还战战兢兢地怕卖得不好，收不回预付版税。喜莱莉拿到的版税是八百万，如果贝拉的书印80万册的话，应该拿六百多万美元的版税，即使她拿的百分点比喜莱莉低，也得四、五百万吧，这不比一百万卖电影版税更值得吹？ 从中文翻译成英文的作品，别说首印80万，连首版印8万都完全没有可能，都从来没有过！迄今为止中国人写的、在海外畅销的书，全部（！）都是用英文或法文直接写的，而不是从中文翻译过去的。一个没法不令所有中文作家沮丧的事实是：由於中文本身的局限和翻译人才的极为贫乏，目前看不出任何从中文翻译成英文的作品能在美国畅销的可能性。那些对英文世界无知到登峰造极地步的安波舜们，闭著眼睛在中国一个接一个地撒弥天大谎，其全部目的就是骗中国读者兜里的钱。 安波舜说韩国的首印数更高，他在异想天开的时候，连常识都没在脑子里闪过一下。在读中文原文的、拥有13亿人的中国，贝拉的书不过印了四万册（白烨语，是不是有虚的成份都很难说），而那个只有四千多万人口的韩国，首版印刷贝拉的书，比拥有两亿八千万人口的、世界人均读书量最大的美国首版印80万的数量还要大。这个已经把天都吹破了的“中国第一出版家”安波舜，读者们该拿他怎麽办呢？ 2003年12月2日於纽约（原载多维网） 2003-12-07 http://www.caochangqing.com （转载请指明出处）
曹长青2025-11-01 11:01👍 0💬 0杨恒均∶鲁迅与胡适，缺一不可
近读曹长青先生长文《鲁迅是打不到的巨人》，觉得耳目一新，甚至有种醍醐灌顶的感觉。 鲁迅和胡适，无疑是过去一个世纪以来中国文化与公共知识领域的两个图腾，也是对整个中国文化界甚至政界影响最深的两位公共知识分子。但过去几十年里尤其最近这段，把两位巨人对立起来的倾向越来越严重。我非常认同这样的看法，虽然这两位生前身后都被对立起来，追随他们的人也选择了截然不同的道路，两人生前还有嫌隙，但从一个更大的框架看，他们其实是一块硬币的两个面，不但相辅相成，而且缺一不可。 鲁迅是投向黑暗的标枪，嫉恶如仇，战斗到最后还丢下一句“一个都不宽容”；而胡适则是引进光明的普罗米修斯，从善如流，主张“容忍比自由还更重要”。鲁迅从教育部愤而辞职后，一生都同权力保持绝对的距离，长期生活在爬格子的清贫中，直到死亡；而胡适则从一开始就同权力“勾肩搭背”，一有机会就出任他批评的独裁蒋介石政府的要职，从接受蒋介石资助到出任驻美大使，一直与权力共舞。 鲁迅在当今政治光标中无疑会被归纳为“左”，且长期得到毛泽东的推崇，但毛也好像亲口讲过，“如果他活到今天，要就是闭嘴，要就是进监狱”，更重要的是，鲁迅揭露的那些黑暗恰恰依然笼罩著“左倾思潮”占上风或者最终取胜的国家。从这一点来判断，鲁迅一直是“打不倒的巨人”，是他作为文学与思想巨匠的成gong，却同时也是民族和国家的悲哀！他一生中试图刺破的黑暗依然存在，有时甚至像雾霾一样更加浓重。他当时只塑造了一个阿Q形像，而如今，阿Q几乎都多到可以成立一个“阿Q共和国”了┅┅ 与此相反的是胡适的越来越“成gong”，被学界从新认识，拔高到至高无上的地位，这其实也是同国家、民族有关的，远非他一己之力可以做到。根源在于他一生中试图引进的“光明”终于照亮了部分中国大大地，他的思想变成了政治实践，并且避免了中国台湾地区的社会剧烈变动，完成了国民党政权平和的转型┅┅中国大陆过去二十多年来愈演愈烈的反思鲁迅、从新认识胡适风潮，都源都在于此。大多知识分子是从“成败论英雄”的∶鲁迅揭露的黑暗依然故我，胡适引进的光明部分照亮了大地。 我深受鲁迅先生影响，几乎读过他所有的文章，且不止一遍。在我的文字中，至少有一半是受他影响并被打上了烙印的。这部分文字被不少读者看出来“有鲁迅之风”，也是我最受读者欢迎的那部分。相反，我几乎没有读过多少胡适，但后来我却更加认同他的那种文字、文风、理念与处事方式。这说起来有些奇特，所以得说明一下。 我不是科班出身，一直受到中国大陆的正统教育，是读鲁迅长大的。后来学习国际政治，也几乎是只读马克思与海外政治学著作。直到上个世纪九十年代我出国的时候，还几乎连一篇胡适的文章都没有仔细读过。不过到了国外的这十几年里，（由于无聊和无书可读）我几乎读了那些影响了胡适的大多外国学者的原著（有的是节选本，有些是为了学英文），等到胡适热兴起后，我发现胡适的文字几乎全部是从西方宝贵的文库里可以找到的，而且人家都比他说的还要经典，还要透彻。所以我虽然认同胡适的思想，但读他的书始终没有给我带来任何惊喜与额外的收获。 可鲁迅就不同了。这麽多年下来，我虽然也读了不少海外文学、评论与杂文，也多次从价值理念与制度建设层面批评过鲁迅“只会批判而缺少建设性”，可我不得不承认，鲁迅是唯一的，而且是中国的！鲁迅对我们所处国家甚至当今时代的黑暗揭露至今无人超越，而胡适的大多闪光的思想都是“抄袭”自西方经典的。说到这里，我得再次强调，我更倾向于胡适的温和理性与改良思想。不过话说回来，没有鲁迅那随时冒出足能点燃革命的思想火花，改良何来动力？ 而我则无可救药的徘徊在鲁迅与胡适之间，这并不是望自己脸上贴金，而是我既受鲁迅影响，对黑暗一个也不宽恕，更受胡适的老师们影响，不但宽容，更学会妥协。从我的座右铭“嫉恶如仇、从善如流”中就可以看出我无法逆转的“悲剧人生”与矛盾心态。口号有如心灵鸡汤，朗朗上口，随处可见。“嫉恶如仇”与“从善如流”固然都很好，但世间哪里能有几个真正做到两者兼而有之的？ 如果处处“嫉恶如仇”的鲁迅动不动就去“从善如流”，他的“脱离了愤怒”哪里能够持久？随著年岁渐长，鲁迅晚年的小说与文字也试图脱离讽刺阿Q的模子，减少一些刻薄与“不妥协”，甚至开始写英雄人物，给社会来点正能量，可惜就没有多少人看了。更可惜的是，鲁迅英年早逝。不过，活不到1949年之后，看不到今天的中国，也是他作为文学与思想巨人的幸运吧？！ 胡适的处境何尝不是一样？一个处处要接受独裁蒋介石资助和等待召唤的人，要最大限度地利用自己的学术思想影响当局作出正确的政策调整，不但“嫉恶如仇”时要处处小心，甚至他绝大多数时间里都在同这些“恶”混在一起。胡适就职中华民国的各种职位时，也是蒋氏政权侵犯人权、打压异议、镇压民主人士最严厉的时期。但这并没有减少胡适作为一位文化与思想巨人令人尊重的一面。 鲁迅与胡适都是我们这个时代需要的，刺破黑暗为的是透进光明，嫉恶如仇才能从善如流。用鲁迅来打压胡适，和抬高胡适来贬低鲁迅，都是要不得的极端思维，是可叹、可悲的。但更可叹、可悲的是，由于对言论的打压与控制，我们早就没有了揭露黑暗的鲁迅；由于利益集团的“家天下”与鼠目寸光，我们也看不到生于这个时代的胡适们能起到什麽积极的作用。在一个既无鲁迅又无胡适的时代，我们凭吊文化巨人，也凭吊国家与民族的命运多艰┅┅ 2015年9月17日 原载作者（杨恒均新浪博客 http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog\_48c00fbb0102w52f.html?tj=hist） ——读者推荐 2015-09-20 http://www.caochangqing.com （转载请指明出处）
曹长青2025-11-01 11:14👍 0💬 0美国政治中的“中国因素”
最近这几天，让国际社会人权组织大跌眼镜的莫过于美中两国先后发布的人权报告。 先后问世的两份“人权报告” 3月11日，美国公布了《2007年度全球人权报告》，该报告虽然仍称中国为“独裁国家”，但已将中国从“全球十大侵害人权最严重国家”中剔除。但中国政府对此并不领情，立即于3月13日发表《2007年美国的人权记录》，其中涉及关于生命、财产和人身安全以及种族歧视、妇女儿童权利等7个方面的问题，并举例说明美国存在著严重的侵犯人权问题，以回应美国对中国的批评并“敦促美国反思其所作所为”。 中国当局批评美国人权状态所持的进攻性姿态，正好与美国的退让姿态形成鲜明对比。而两国的真实人权状态使得两国在“口水战”中的姿态更形滑稽。所有人权组织都不喜欢美国国务院发布的这份报告，认为该报告轻描淡写地放过中国，把中国严重的人权问题说成“政治和民主改革没有与经济改革同步”。3月15日我在自由亚洲电台的听众热线节目中做嘉宾时，也有中国听众表达了同样看法。 没人认真对待中国每年发布美国年度人权报告，都知道那是“舆论战”产品。但“人权卫士”美国如此低调却引人猜测。评论人士将美国此举解释成美国目前由于次贷危机面临经济衰退，在经济上需要依赖中国（因为中国持有美国大量国债，2006年底为3,496亿美元）。这样解释虽然也找到了部分原因，但显然忽视了中国对美国长期以来通过各种管道施加的政治影响。 中国的对美“调略” 上个世纪后几十年，中国当局曾将对美关系重点放在白宫，但后来随着对美国政治的逐渐熟悉，知道了好些美国政治的诀窍。 诀窍之一是知道了美国白宫之外尚有国会山，这座山上的535位议员随时都有可能给白宫、大大小小的外国政府、公司和社会团体制造一些可大可小的“麻烦”。与此同时，中国也知道在美国游说（Lobby）国会议员并不违法。一篇供内部参考的文章这样向中国当局进言：“游说早已成为众多的利益团体、外国政府在华盛顿顺利达成自己的目标，实现小至团体得失，大至国家利益的必经之路”， “游说活动在美国的兴盛，恰恰反映出对于美国这样的国家，外交并不只意味着‘外交’，它更意味着要深入美国的政治体系，去了解其政策的运作过程，知其筋骨，通其脉络，才能获取最大的国家利益。” 目前，为中国游说的公关公司已有23家，其中由中国驻美大使馆出面雇佣的有两家， 其中Jones Day主要业务是在台湾、西藏、宗教自由和经贸汇率问题上向中国提供简报，并代为联络美国国会及行政部门。 中美经贸重心转移与美国金融政治的形成 更重要的一个因素是中美经贸关系这几年正发生巨大变化。 以前中美经贸的重心是贸易（纺织品、玩具业、制衣业等），这两年随着美国相关行业受冲击及中国产品的质量问题，中国制造已受到美国产业界及市场的严重抵制，这类经贸来往已渐居次要地位，起而代之的是美中金融界之间的投资合作。对美国而言，促成中国开放金融市场已成首位要务。 美国政府对华经济战略的重点从贸易转向金融，直接促成了美国国内金融政治的出现。中国当局聪明地发现了国会内部的微妙变化：以前那些从心里厌恶中国专制体制的老牌“反华派”议员由于年事渐高逐渐退出国会，新一代国会议员对华态度主要受选区经济利益主导，一方面受惠于中国经贸关系的选区（比如金融产业集中地）在增多，另一方面因中国对美出口的增长其利益受到损害的选区数量也在变化，这些都影响到国会议员的态度。中国当局最重要的“发现”是：因选区利益受损而呈强硬态度的议员毕竟不同于以前讨厌中共意识形态的的老派“反华派”议员，可以用种种适当的手段争取其软化立场，比如与其选区的企业加强经济合作之类。 “把议员们送到中国去” 另一条管道是邀请国会议员到中国做走马看花式的互访。从2004年开始，中国全国人大与美国参议院建立了正式交流机制。根据双方签署的备忘录，双方同意每两年互访一次，并且在美国国会和中国人大之间建立固定的会议机制，每年各派遣12名资深议员参加在华盛顿和北京轮流举行的会议。现在，美国国会内已建立了3个对中国比较友好的“中国议员团”，其中跨党派的“美中工作小组”最引人注目。该小组成立于2005年6月，目前已有近40名成员。共同主席里克·拉森和马克·柯克曾在许多场合表示，“应与中国人手拉手过河”。而克·拉森的另一句名言则是：“要让议员们了解中国，最好把他们送到中国去”。 ――事实上，在中国这种实行控制媒体与思想管制的国家，没有在极权国家生活经验的人不可能凭借十来天走马观花式的访问了解真相。况且，中国共产党积几十年“检查文化”之经验，很善于向外国人与上级领导展示美好的一面，从1944年7月开始访问延安的美军观察组，以及自尼克松访华后相继访华的美国政治家们，莫不对中国印象良好，并积极影响美国对华政策。美国前驻华大使李洁明一生最感头痛的事情，就是与这类到过中国几次或曾在中国短暂停留的“中国通”们讨论中国问题。 最后再将眼光放宽至世界：今年各国政府对抵制奥运活动大都沉默以对，而美国今年是大选之年，布什领导的“看守政府”除了持盈保泰之外，还得为共和党在大选中获胜出力。政治如棋局，此情此境之中，出现美国今年这种人权报告就不值得惊讶了。 （原载《看》双周刊，第8期，2008年3月26日）
何清涟2025-11-06 06:41👍 0💬 0巴灵顿和中国教授分肥（下）
对中国的情况比较了解的人都知道，今年89岁高龄的钱伟长是中国相当有地位的人物之一，在政界，作为全国政协副主席（巴灵顿大学简报说钱伟长是中国人大常委会副委员长有误，查人大副委员长名单，没有钱伟长），已属“国家领导人”之一；在学界，作为上海大学校长（上海大学於1994年由上海工业大学、上海科技大学和原上海大学等四所院校合并组成，下辖22个学院）和中国科学院院士，已属学界领导者之一。在政界和学界有这麽高地位的人，怎麽会去给一个在美国不被任何教育机构认可的巴灵顿大学做“中国顾问”？ 巴灵顿大学的新闻简报没有解释“中国国家领导人之一”的钱伟长为什麽会给这所在美国几乎无人知晓的函授学校当顾问，但却提供了在获得了钱伟长等中国要人担任海外顾问之后，巴灵顿大学进入中国的速度增快，规模越来越大的消息。 1999年12月，巴灵顿大学校长罗伯特．贝廷格被邀请到了北京，和中国人民大学等签署了合办双学位的协议书。据巴灵顿大学的新闻简报，为了庆祝这些项目的签署和合作，罗伯特．贝廷格校长被邀请参加了“在天安门广场上的人民大会堂里举行的特殊仪式”。赵立桐赞誉这位誓言“要把中国变成我们公司的巨大资金来源”的巴灵顿校长是致力“推动中国的教育事业”。 据网络教育公司的新闻简报，巴灵顿大学和中国人民大学合办了一个名为“新千禧年”的项目，通过人民大学，把巴灵顿大学拓展到全中国。该简报介绍说，“人民大学是中华人民共和国第三个最大的学府，并在中国高校中学术地位排在前二十名之内。巴灵顿大学将通过人民大学把远程教育扩展到整个中国。” 该简报引述巴灵顿大学校长罗伯特．贝廷格的话说，“通过巴灵顿大学和人民大学的合作协议，我们的网络教育公司准备今后两年进入中国的其他42所大学。” 在巴灵顿和中国人民大学签署了协议8个月後，美国《南佛罗里达商业报》报道说（2000年10月16日），“今年早些时候，巴灵顿大学和中国的33所大学签署了双学位协议。超过70万的学生在中国各省的大学就学，巴灵顿大学期待其中会有3－4%在两年内报名该双学位课程，每人费用4,000美元。” 据网络教育公司的新闻简报，在湖北省教委批准武汉巴灵顿学院成立之初，仅湖北电大就有34名学生选择入学巴灵顿大学。如以每人学费4,000美元计算，巴灵顿因此就收入了13万美元。如果巴灵顿大学按照它期待从中国各省的70万大学生中招收3－4%的学生（取中间值是二万五千人），仅学费一项就可收入高达一亿美元。在雅虎金融网上列出的该网络教育公司执行总裁、19岁时创办巴灵顿大学的斯蒂文．贝廷格，现在年薪是25万美元。 巴灵顿大学之所以能够进入中国的多所大学，不仅由於有钱伟长这样的“重要人物”做“顾问”，还在於得到很多中国“教授”的帮助。在巴灵顿和湖北电大合办的“武汉巴灵顿学院”的教员名单上，列出了八名中国学者（名单附后）。 这八名列出的“武汉巴灵顿学院教授、副教授”是巴灵顿大学自行任命的，还是他们在中国学府获得的真正学术头衔，则不得而知。因为从他们刊出的简介来看，好几位“教授”还在大学读博士，没有毕业；有的仅在社会上一些团体担任职务，并无学历情况。 巴灵顿大学和中国人民大学合办的“巴灵顿（中国）工商管理培训项目”网页，则列出了25名中国学者作为巴灵顿的教师（详见附录）。 其中有中国人民大学的教授李宝山、马月才、王立平、吴培良、赵锡军、何晓群、李金轩、王以华；清华大学的教授金占明； 副教授包括：中国人民大学的吴维库、成栋、徐经长、李剑峰、李晓光、王化成、陆正飞、吴冠之、李先国、张金顺、朱福东、焦叔斌；南开大学的孙非；北京大学的王志伟；南京大学的陆正飞等。 这些中国学者，有的是博士生导师，有的是教研室主任，有的享受中国国务院政府专家待遇，可谓相当有学术成就和地位，怎麽会去给巴灵顿这样的大学做教师？ 而且中国人民大学的博士、硕士生指导教授李宝山、马月才、吕政等还被列为“美国巴灵顿大学中国部学术委员会成员”。巴灵顿这样在美国根本不被任何教育机构认可、毫无学术地位的网络学校，居然在中国还有了“中国部学术委员会”，而且出任“学术委员”还是中国带博士生的真教授们。 以中国人大、北大等那些为巴灵顿担任教师的教授们的外语能力，难道看不懂巴灵顿大学网页上写着的“巴灵顿没有被（美国）教育部的任何机构认可”这句英文？而且他们担任教职的“巴灵顿（中国）工商管理培训项目”的网页上是有巴灵顿大学英文网址的，他们难道从没有去上面看一眼？或者看到了但就是要这麽做？ 据美国《南佛罗里达商业报》记者达根（Ed Duggan）报道文章，那位19岁创办巴灵顿大学的网络教育公司总裁斯蒂文．贝廷格在2000年5月接受教育出版物《The Green Sheet Gazette》采访时说，“过去和现在的中国教授都通过向学生推销（巴灵顿大学）学位项目而获得回扣，可获得学费的一半。”巴灵顿的学费是4,000美元，那麽中国的教授介绍一个学生就可获得2,000美元。而一个中国学生报名巴灵顿，注册费是700美元，再加上4,000学费，等於3万7千多人民币，约是一个普通中国工人两年的工资。 巴灵顿大学的简报没有说钱伟长、赵立桐等“中国顾问”是否得到、或得到多少报酬，这只有等待国内的记者同行们去调查了。 2月1日於纽约 附录： 一、武汉巴灵顿学院列出的中国教师名单和简介： 刁兆峰，武汉巴灵顿学院工商管理系主任，教授，华中科技大学在读博士，武汉市汉阳区政府咨询委员； 王基建，武汉巴灵顿学院副教授。 白玉，武汉巴灵顿学院工商管理系副主任，中国管理科学院湖北分院、湖北软科学研究院特聘研究员。 林根祥，武汉巴灵顿学院管理工程系副教授。 张友棠，硕士学位，武汉巴灵顿学院会计学系副教授，注册会计师。 张伟琳，武汉巴灵顿学院会计学系副教授，注册会计师。 王海斌，武汉巴灵顿学院副教授，市场营销教研室主任。 赵洪中，武汉巴灵顿学院教授，华中科技大学管理学院在读博士。 二、巴灵顿大学和中国人民大学合办的“巴灵顿（中国）工商管理培训项目”指定和认定的教师名单与简介： 李宝山：巴灵顿培训项目指定教师，中国人民大学工商管理学院教授，博士生导师。美国巴灵顿大学中国部学术委员会成员。曾获国家教委国家级优秀奖，北京市爱国立功标兵奖。享受国务院政府专家待遇。 孙非：巴灵顿培训项目指定教师，南开大学国际企业管理系副教授。曾在美国明尼苏达大学和堪萨斯大学访问，後在美国多实公司工作和研究。 马月才：巴灵顿培训项目指定教师，中国人民大学工商管理学院产业经济教研室教授，硕士生导师。美国巴灵顿大学中国部学术委员会成员。 吕政：巴灵顿培训项目指定教师，经济学博士，工业经济研究所所长、研究员、博士生导师。美国巴灵顿大学中国部学术委员会成员。享受国家政府特殊津贴待遇的专家。 吴维库：巴灵顿培训项目指定教师，清华大学经济管理学院企业管理教研室副教授。清华大学博士。曾在美国宾西法尼亚大学沃顿商学院进修公司战略、竞争战略及领导学。 成栋：巴灵顿培训项目指定教师，中国人民大学工商管理学院营销系主任，副教授。西安统计学院兼职教授。 王立平：巴灵顿培训项目指定教师，中国人民大学工商管理学院教授。曾在日本福岛大学做访问学者，研究连锁商业问题。 王以华：巴灵顿培训项目指定教师，中国人民大学工商管理学院教授。 徐经长：巴灵顿培训项目指定教师，中国人民大学会计系国际会计教研室主任，博士、副教授。 李剑峰：巴灵顿培训项目指定教师，中国人民大学工商管理学院副教授，硕士生导师，中国科学院组织行为学博士，欧洲管理学院客座教授。美国管理学会、美国心理学会外籍会员。 李晓光：巴灵顿计划培训项目认证教师，中国人民大学工商管理学院副教授。 王化成：巴灵顿计划培训项目认证教师，中国人民大学会计系副主任，会计学博士，副教授。 陆正飞：巴灵顿计划培训项目认证教师，企业管理学博士，南京大学商学院教授。 吴冠之：巴灵顿计划培训项目认证教师，中国人民大学工商管理学院市场营销系副教授、博士。 李先国：巴灵顿计划培训项目认证教师，经济学硕士，中国人民大学工商管理学院市场营销系副教授，并兼任中国人民大学市场营销研究中心副主任。 吴培良：巴灵顿计划培训项目认证教师，中国人民大学工商管理学院管理学教授。北京现代企业会副理事长，兼任中管院企业发展与组织研究所所长。 张金顺：巴灵顿计划培训项目认证教师，中国人民大学财政金融学院副教授。中国人民大学国际金融专业博士。 王志伟：巴灵顿计划培训项目认证教师，经济学博士，北京大学经济学院副教授，《经济科学》杂�冶辔�。 赵锡军：巴灵顿计划培训项目认证教师，中国人民大学教授、博士、金融系主任，金融与证券研究所副所长。 何晓群：巴灵顿计划培训项目认证教师，中国人民大学统计学教授，数理统计教研室主任，中国人民大学工会副主席。 朱福东：巴灵顿计划培训项目认证教师，中国人民大学工商管理学院副教授，硕士生和MBA研究生导师。 姜旭平：巴灵顿计划培训项目认证教师，清华大学经济管理学院副教授。 李金轩：巴灵顿计划培训项目认证教师，中国人民大学工商管理学院经济系教授、博士生导师，全国高校商业经济教学研究会长。 焦叔斌：巴灵顿计划培训项目认证教师，中国人民大学工商管理学院国际商务教研室副教授。 金占明：巴灵顿计划培训项目认证教师，清华大学经济管理学院教授。 （载《多维网》2002年1月） 2002-01-21 http://www.caochangqing.com （转载请指明出处）
曹长青2025-11-01 11:02👍 0💬 0美国之音：曹长青说中国的民调不伦不类
美国之音记者杨明华盛顿报道：中国的一项问卷调查表明，毛泽东是中国当代中学生心目中的首选英雄。分析人士指出，这种民调其实是中国共产党的宣传手法，在没有真正的言论、舆论和新闻自由的中国，这类民调并不能反映真正的社会走向和民意。 \中学生心目中英雄∶毛泽东？\ 中国妇联儿童部、《中国妇女》杂志社、中国家庭教育学会联合华坤女性调查中心在北京、上海、河南、陕西、辽宁、湖南等省市对中学生进行的“谁是你心目中的英雄”的问卷调查。根据他们公布的调查结果，中学生心目的10位英雄依次为毛泽东、自己的父母、周恩来、雷锋、刘翔、成龙、任长霞、刘胡兰、董存瑞、杨利伟。 这项问卷调查收回了有效问卷1018份，其中男生443人，女生575人。这份问卷为开放式，填写不限时间和地点，也没有设定标准答案。 联合主办这次问卷调查的《中国妇女》杂志社社长韩湘景说，父母能排在10大英雄第2的位置，出乎他们的预料。韩湘景认为，这反映出当今的父母给他们的孩子人生引导、启迪、信心和勇气，因而成为学生所爱的，生命中不可缺少的人。 \现行教育决定中学生导向\ 一位不愿透露姓名的问卷调查负责人说，问卷调查显示，孩子评价英雄的标准，更向人性化、亲情化发展，而传统的英雄人物之所以有很强的生命力，跟中国现行的教育内容和体制不无关系。这位女士说∶“咱们这种教育您也知道，雷锋、董存瑞等英雄人物都出现在教科书上。虽然中学生跟他们没有生活在同一年代，但是咱们独特的教育，对他们影响还是很深的。” \调查反应中国无新闻及舆论自由\ 前《深圳青年报》副主编、旅美自由撰稿人曹长青说，中学生把父母排在心目中英雄的第2位，这种情况在毛时代，或者邓早期时代都是不可想像的，说明中国社会在某种程度上有一定的松动。但是，曹长青指出，另一方面这份10大英雄人物排名调查还反映出中国没有新闻自由和舆论自由。 曹长青说∶ “一般情况，民调都反映社会的政情、民情，是舆论变化的重要标志。这个民调反映的中国社会还是没有言论自由、新闻自由。一般来说，民主国家很难把国家政治领导人排在第一位的。中学生还把毛泽东排在第1位，说明学生对毛泽东在文化大革命中给中国带来的苦难都无从了解。这说明国家控制了媒体，控制了舆论，没有言论自由，新闻自由才会造成这个局面。这个民调是一个国家舆论被控制、青少年被洗脑的产物。而中学生评10大英雄是跟著媒体来转，媒体跟意识形态在转。” \中国民调无法反应民意\ 曹长青说，在民主自由的社会，问卷能基本反映社会的走向。但是中国中学生心目中的10大英雄，给人一种不伦不类的感觉，不仅其真实性令人怀疑，而且在没有言论自由、舆论自由和新闻自由的社会，这种民调无法反映真正的民意。 今年2月香港城市大学和香港电台对500名中学生问卷调查发现，香港中学生心目中的10大英雄人物依次是孙中山、父母、杨利伟、纪律部队、抗萨斯医护人员、董建华、陈方安生、李嘉诚、李小龙、成龙。 （VOA，May 30, 2005) 2005-05-30 http://www.caochangqing.com （转载请指明出处）
曹长青2025-11-01 11:28👍 0💬 0从北京对外放料看权斗终盘轮廓
5月11日，日本《富士晚报》发布一条惊人消息“失势中国大人物薄熙来独家专访”，报道说：4月26日，日本大和新闻社宇田川敬介在中国国安的安排监视下，与失势后的薄熙来共进晚餐。 这是薄熙来被软禁后第一次与外界见面，消息无疑具有爆炸性，凡读到这条消息的人第一反应莫不是震惊之余加上不相信，大多人都在想：1、为什么这次按常情不可能的会面会选择宇田川敬介？ 为什么这次北京会选择日本新闻业中一家并不以政治新闻报道见长的娱乐性媒体，而不是象4月中旬以前那样选择英美大媒体及港台媒体？2、为什么4月26日的见面采访，却延至半个月后的5月11日才发表？ 对于第一问，宇田川其实已经在文中回答了，那是因为他本人与薄熙来有渊源，1997年，宇田川曾在“MYCAL”大型超市集团负责法务工作。当时，MYCAL在大连投资，宇田川得以认识大连市长薄熙来，后来还与当时做律师工作的谷开来合订顾问契约，因而与薄家有联系。加上宇田川在报道中说了，本次由国安特别安排的餐叙不许拍照与录音，这等于事先说明，读者如果想要证据证明此次会面的真实性是不可能的。因此，人们只能凭借日本媒体业对他的专业信誉与《富士晚报》的媒体信誉来判断这条消息的真实性了。 因为上述原因，虽然众媒体对宇田川个人资历、目前任职的大和新闻社（Yamato Press），再到《富士晚报》的报纸发行量及其报道品味逐项考证，依然无法就此次会面的真实性做出一致判断。我本人亦搜索到他的推特帐号“宇田川敬介@udaxyz”， 用英语向他问了两个问题：见薄熙来是来自中国政府的安排，还是出自他个人的请求？他以不愿意与陌生人公开在推特上讨论这一问题为由拒绝了，尔后又说他可以接受采访，只是需要我用日文。 鉴于自从王立军事件发生后，各种耸人听闻、匪夷所思的消息纷至沓来，莫辨真假，有些已经超出常识判断范围，如薄熙来制造大连空难、王立军保存的杀人证据是一小片肉而不是通常的毛发、指甲等（通常后者取证易保管易，前者取证难保管亦难）。所以，我觉得去注目一时半会难有结果的会面之真假，还不如分析这篇报道所释放的信息。 通篇报道不长。但要传递的重要信息却有三条：一是报道中说薄熙来否认与自己有关的大多数丑闻，没有否认谷开来的犯罪行为，并声言两人感情不好，后悔没早点离婚；二是否认是权力斗争，说是在重庆打黑遭受报复；三是最后声称“我会回来”。 这三点对于解薄熙来之套实在太具有针对性，几乎可以说代表了挺薄者的重要愿望，而且也给中央A（公开化的、人们可见到的以胡温为代表的中共中央）搭了一架下台的梯子：将薄熙来与谷开来夫妻两人切割开来，可大大减轻薄要承担的罪责；说是“打黑”引致的报复，不是权力斗争，即给中央A全了面子；甚至为薄的复出埋下伏笔。高官受家属牵连不影响仕途，这在中共党内也有先例可循，根据传言，贾庆林之妻林幼芳据说曾深陷厦门远华案，贾通过离婚解套，仍然做他的全国政协主席，安享尊荣。最后那句“我会回来”的，几乎就是宣布“王者归来”，意在为挺薄者打气。 上述信息，并非宇田川敬介这位日本记者能编造出来的。据一位日本推友考证，宇田川将自己的博客评论为“C级政治界说”，其博文主要是关于日本民主党的政治评论，也写关于中国的评论，文章带有日本人少有的幽默感。但即使如此，他要编得这么对景是做不到的。最重要的是：他本人并无主动编此信息的动机，还有冒因编假新闻而被损失信誉的风险。因此，我大胆做一推论：他与薄的见面是否虚构尚待进一步证实，但该篇采访的信息要点，却是中国方面放料给他，从有利于薄这点来看，应该是中央B。 我注意到一个事实：在4月24日陈光诚出逃消息出来之前，中央A通过好几位隐身的放风者（只有一位王康愿意显露真名）向外媒喂料，全是有关薄家的一些耸人听闻的消息。陈光诚出逃事件成为各国媒体热点之后，放风者几乎同时停止行动（他们向外媒表示上面有指示不能再讲了）。从陈光诚事件的结果来看，中央B占了上风，美国经历了近年对华外交上最大的一次失败。5月8日下午河南省襄城县村民聂木妮夫妇双双闯馆事件发生。次日，美国前国家安全委员会亚洲事务主任杰弗里•贝德（Jeffrey Bader）对外公开说，美中双方都希望确保陈光诚事件不要成为未来企图在美国大使馆寻求庇护的模式。 就在媒体对陈光诚事件的关注热度消退之际，宇田川敬介却在5月11日突然将半个多月之前与薄熙来共进晚餐之事写成独家采访，时间拿捏得很准：因为就在5月10日，广州《时代周报》刊发了一篇“谷望江曲线控股喜多来的资本谱系揭秘”，此文被多家网站转载，有的已被删去。但在金羊网上干脆就以“谷开来大姐资本谱系揭秘”为题刊登（写明转自《中国新闻周刊》5月11日）。《富士晚报》发表的文章将薄、谷伉俪从政治上切割开来，正好针对这篇文章。 如我以前所说，中共这次权力斗争除了在中共内部开展之外，还借助了国际媒体。日本《富士晚报》11日登载宇田川宣示薄熙来表达“我将回来”之后，英国《金融时报》于5月13日登载“薄的同盟放弃中国安全部门的角色”（Bo ally gives up China security roles），该文的要点是：据来自三个高层党官的和外交官的消息，周永康将对国家安全机器的控制权转交给公安部长孟建柱，他不会被公开地被撤职，会任职至正式今年退休为止；如果公开剥夺周永康的权力是非常危险的，因为他作为政法委书记拥有很多其他官员多年来的阴暗秘密。该报道说，高官们透露，周永康被迫在政治局常委为自己保薄做检查，但在媒体上还保持活动。 这条消息如果没有写周虽然失势，“但在媒体上还保持活动”，也许更能取信于人。因为中国人习惯性地通过从媒体上查寻领导人行踪来判断其是否失势，这句话等于预先公示：周永康的公开活动，只是党中央从稳定大局考虑的安排，事实上周已经铁定“出局”。但事实上，开完十八大之后，周与胡温一起正常退休，目前交权给孟建柱，也只能算是退休前的正常工作交接，这算成了“大输家”吗？ 4月20日以前放出有关薄氏家族的传言，以抹黑为主，凡有利于薄不利于中共的则一律斥为谣言。这一轮放料多了一个特点：不再辟谣，而是故意搅水。结合所有的消息看，我只能得出一个判断：拥有党政军全部制度化资源的中央A与只拥有非制度化资源（即不少红二代及老太子党成员支持）的中央B在这场政治厮杀之中算打了个平手。 真正的结果，还得等着看十八大人事安排。 （宇田川敬介：《中国“失脚大物”薄煕来氏を独占インタビュー！初めて明かされる真実》，http://www.zakzak.co.jp/society/foreign/news/20120511/frn1205111124000-n1.htm） （原载何清涟VOA博客，2012年5月14日，http://voachineseblog.com/heqinglian/2012/05/powerfight-bo-xilais-interview-with-japanese-media/）
何清涟2025-11-06 05:53👍 0💬 0社会共识完全破裂：从柴静纪录片的遭遇说起
何清涟 柴静关于雾霾的专题纪录片《穹顶之下》，是一部不错的雾霾科普片，如果说数据之类让观众不能产生直观印象，那么当她谈到自己找北大实验室主动要求当实验者时，研究员告诉她这个实验没法做，因为实验时要设一个伦理安全值，结果是实验室的空气比外面要好。这个细节，足以让中国人清晰地认识到自身生存环境的危险性。 国人共享一国空气，无人能够逃避。在社会共识严重破裂的今日中国，这一问题本应最容易达成社会共识，但对柴静纪录片的相关讨论，表明中国社会已完全无法取得任何社会共识。 阴谋论与变相维稳论 各种指责很多，一条被做成图片广泛转发短文是阴谋论的代表：“柴静的纪录片表明官方已经可以熟练利用互联网舆论进行官民互动，是好事。片子传递出的价值观，也是好的。片子也是好片子。 有人为柴静的未来担心，那真是没看懂整个故事的情节： 1、新环保部长刚刚上任。 2、视频一出，人民日报等官媒力推。3、多位现任官员在片中接受采访。4、反腐矛头已经对准两桶油。5、之前网传两桶油要合并。6马上要开两会了。” 阴谋论盛行，最强烈的意见是：柴静背后有支持力量，她是当局要利用她来打击周永康的一颗棋子。中石油、中石化的产品造成污染，其实是个老问题。多年来各地民众反抗的PX项目，基本都是中石化、中石油参建的。潘岳当年批评大型国企石化所建项目不少高污染项目，且建在江河旁边，是造成水污染的元凶之一。但雾霾的出现，据说有汽车尾气、工业污染排放、冬天取暖用煤、农村燃料种类等多种原因。因此，说《穹顶之下》是对准两桶油而来，实在算是超级发挥之论。 有人进一步发挥说，从不报道污染事件的官媒这次大规模介入，足证这部片子是阴谋。这更是误会。近30年以来，中国官媒及各种市场化媒体，因身份与受限制级别不同，在政治与社会问题上取舍偏好有差别，但在环保问题上因为拥有一定程度的报道空间，几乎都比较努力。中央级媒体因为不受地方政府管辖，相对更有优势，因此在揭露地方环保缺失上能够做得更多。当年“太湖卫士”吴立红在一段时期内能够坚持下来，就是因为得到全国众多媒体的支持。还有人指责说为什么柴不报道土地污染及水污染，偏偏挑空气污染？我告诉她，土地与水污染报道很多，仅举一例，2006年中国官方投入十数亿，做了个土地调查，一直以事涉国家机密为由未公布，最后在媒体压力下，于2014年4月公布了数据，即1/5的耕地受到严重污染。财新网做了个系列报道，《大国土伤》 ；《上篇：一份迟来的报告》；《下篇：镉祸沉重》。 柴静的遭遇说明再无任何社会共识 知情权其实是民众的基本权利之一。几年前，当潘石屹将美国驻北京大使馆的空气数据在微博上公布之时，人们发现自己被骗时很愤怒，纷纷要求环保局公布空气数据真相，为此还引发了中国外交部指责美国干预中国内政，不应该公布空气数据。当时人们认为，土地污染、水污染有地域性，导致民众的关心程度不同，只有空气是人人必须呼吸之物，因而也最容易达成集体行动。几年过去，摄制雾霾纪录片的柴静遭遇“变相维稳”的评价，从社会学角度解读，只能说中国社会利益分化极端严重，已经不可能再形成任何全社会共识。尤其是被严重边缘化的社会群体，目前已经有了“张献忠意识”，即不属于我的国家，早烂早好。在统治集团与这个群体之间，已经形成“你之机会，即我之不幸；我之灾难，即你之狂欢”的极端对立局面。 至此，柴静纪录片涉及的雾霾已经退居次要地位，因为治理污染是个需要长期投入的巨大工程，被中国现代化列车甩落的群体已经不相信政府，也没耐心再等待下去。夏朝末期，君主夏桀残暴不仁，并将自己自比太阳，生存艰难的老百姓指着太阳骂：“时日曷丧，予及汝皆亡”，但这只是泄愤时的语言，因为事实是，王朝必将灭亡，人民还得继续生活。本朝的特殊问题是：新旧鼎革后，中国已经没有社会重建的资本，生存基座即生态环境已经遭受巨大破坏。 为了阐述以下的观点，我先声明，对于中国污染的政治责任问题，几乎是我每篇涉及国土生态的文章都会谈到。最近一篇是《中国污染的共犯结构 ——中国2013“经济改革”的焦点（2）》 民主化并不能让环境问题自动解决 柴静纪录片引发的维稳论，背后涉及的是一个问题：现在促使中国政府治理环境，只会延长中共统治寿命。环境继续被糟蹋，会加速中共灭亡，等民主化了再治理。 毫无疑问，中共总有一天会退出历史舞台（这一天也许在10年、20年或若干年之后来到），后中共时期的政府（假定是民主政府）如何面对这笔由中共遗留下来的巨大遗产，才是真正的问题。与权力对应的是责任，这份遗产除了统治这块土地的权力之外，还有水陆空立体污染的生态系统，污染引发的人体健康问题（每天正以8550人的速度产生癌症病人，以及各种因污染而造成的疾病），数量庞大的失业人口。这些问题并不因民主化就自动解决，能否解决好直接关系到人们对民主政治的信心。 中国的污染有制度成因，这我在《公地的悲剧（一）中国人饮水早已不再安全》里已经谈过：一项资源或财产如果有许多拥有者，他们中的每一个都有使用权，但没有权利阻止其他人使用，从而造成资源被过度使用，逐渐枯竭。过度砍伐的森林、过度捕捞的渔业资源及污染严重的河流和空气，都是“公地悲剧”的典型例子。之所以叫做“悲剧”，是因为每个当事人都知道资源将由于过度使用而枯竭，但每个人对阻止事态的继续恶化都感到无能为力，而且都抱着“及时捞一把”的心态加剧事态的恶化。 假定将来中国民主化（包括土地私有化）了，污染并不会自动消失，一是要解决污染增量，这可以通过社区自治、公众参与、法治、自由媒体及政府监管等来解决；二是清理污染存量。即使控制住污染增量与人口规模，政治稳定，经济正常发展，这也将是一个长达百年的持续投入过程。 以中国的现状而言，空气可能是最好治理的部分，APEC蓝与奥运蓝的出现，证明只要控制与改变中国人的生产方式与生活方式，如工厂停产、机动车限制进城等，是可以做到的。往好里说，将来中国可能会改变，往坏里想，中国在经历一次大的经济萧条之后，中国人的生产模式与生活方式将被迫改变。 难办的是土地污染与水污染，二者密切相关，因为水的来源一是地下水，二是地面水会通过雨水冲刷流到水里去。所以治水得先治土地。这方面的投入我曾经写过一篇文章介绍日本经验。之所以没介绍美国经验，是因为美国是通过化学作用加上自然净化，历时长达30-50年，中国没那么多土地可以闲置这么多年，也不可能投入那么多钱，所以只能学习日本的换土法。即便如此，中国学习起来也非常困难，因为污染土地的数量是日本的很多倍。这我在《土地治污：中国学日本经验之难》一文里已经说过。 民主制只保证民众享有选举权与人权，但人权之一的环境权在中国的生态环境下不可能自动实现。所谓“公地的悲剧”中，最重要的一条就是消费公地的人对污染环境都有责任，区别只是主从及责任大小问题。在此我借用刘业进【水知道我们的罪孽】做为本文结尾：“多年前汪丁丁写过一篇文章《水知道你的罪孽》，与柴静的观察如出一辙。我建议柴静下一个片子可以拍《水知道你的罪孽》。一切制度扭曲，一切价值观误导，一切信仰误导，最终可以通过我们每天呼吸的空气，每天饮用的水，我脚下的泥土，每天必需的食物，测量群体的罪孽。” （原载何清涟VOA博客，2015年3月1日，http://www.voachinese.com/content/he-qing-lian-20150302/2664163.html）
何清涟2025-11-06 05:45👍 0💬 0给欧洲写墓志铭
欧洲以其深远的历史、辉煌的遗产，一直被视为西方文明的孕育之地。人类进入科技和工业迅速发展的二十世纪以来，虽经两次世界大战、冷战时苏联的威胁，但欧洲仍和美国一起，作为自由世界的堡垒，抵抗共产主义、发展资本主义，不仅成为全球最有经济实力的洲际大陆，更给共产铁幕下的人民带来自由的希望。 但是，曾几何时的辉煌欧洲，近年却一步步走下坡路。它在世界舞台的影响力，不仅远不能与当年相比，甚至有美国学者写好了「欧洲的墓志铭」，认为它已经迈向最後寿终正寝的日子。欧洲到底得了什麽病使它迅速「衰老」？纵观其现状，并总结众多学者对它的分析，人们起码可以看到四个明显的症状： 第一，人口危机。 当今欧洲的一个严重问题是出生率太低，人口不增反降。根据「人口替代率」，平均每个女性生二点一个孩子，才能保持人口稳定。但欧洲人越来越倾向不要孩子，欧洲国家的平均生育率目前只是一点三七。这种现象导致很多国家人口萎缩，像德国、意大利、俄国、西班牙等国的生育率都不超过一点四；瑞典一点六，丹麦一点七，挪威一点八，英国一点九，也都低於人口替代率。 民调显示，二十多岁的德国人，25％的男性和20％的女性都表示，不会要孩子。按这个发展趋势，到本世纪中叶的2050年，德国将会失去相当於全部原东德的人口。 意大利的生育率更低，才一点三，男子拥有第一个孩子的平均年龄是33岁。学者预测，到本世纪中叶，60％的意大利人，由於都是一胎化，将不知道什麽是兄弟、姐妹、叔叔、舅舅等。 俄国的情况也相当严重，现有1.47亿人口的俄罗斯，到本世纪中叶，将会减少三千万，只剩1.14亿（过去13年，俄国人口减少了580万）；欧洲中、小国家也是如此，保加利亚人口届时将会减少36％；比利时会降至450万人（现近800万）；爱沙尼亚更严重，人口将会减少一半以上。 法国在二战结束後15年内，人口增长了25％。当时戴高乐政府的总理乐观地计划说，到二千年，法国将有一亿人口。但现在法国人口才6300万；因法国生育率同样低於「二点一」的替代率。按联合国预测，到本世纪中叶，法国总人口也不会超过目前的水平。而那时候，非洲一个小小的也门，其人口将会超过整个俄国；而尼日利亚和巴基斯坦的人口，将会各自超过原欧盟15国的总和。 人口多少对一个国家的生产力、国力等具有重要意义。例如从1800年到1930年，美国人口由600万增长到1.2亿；同期俄国由3700万增至近1.4亿，是强国中人口最多的两个国家（美国生育率近年多保持在二点一，去年人口增长5％，达三亿人）。 人口多，明显将增加人力、生产力、军力，以及整体国力。从经济角度，它也增加内部的消费能力。例如美国的大众消费占国民生产总值的三分之二；出口占不到美国经济的20％。即使美国不与整个世界做贸易，它在国内仍有七成多的市场，可见人口对国力的影响。 第二，年龄老化。 欧洲人口下降的直接後果，是人口老化，社会负担加重。欧洲历史以来第一次出现65岁以上的老年人数量超过了20岁以下的年轻人。目前是每六人有一人超过65岁，到本世纪中叶，老年人数量将会占三分之一。 据统计预测，今後25年，欧洲的劳动力会下降7％，同时65岁以上者增加50％。有工作能力的人口下降，同时老年人数量剧增，这一反一正，自然加重社会的负担。2001年，欧洲五国（法国、德国、比利时、丹麦、瑞典）的社会福利支出占国民生产总值（GDP）的27-29％（美国在同年才是14.7％）。 在欧洲，60岁以上者的就业率远低於美国。据2003年的统计，55到64岁之间的美国人，60％有工作；相比之下，德国是39％，法国是37％，意大利只有30％。再加上欧洲人的退休年龄较早，人的平均寿命又大幅增高（七十年代欧洲人平均寿命72岁，现男子78.5，女子81.3岁），那些老年人拿退休金的时间自然延长，还有名目繁多的庞大福利，国家全包的全民医疗保险等等，都给政府增加更大的财政压力，使本来经济就处於滞缓状态的欧洲，更是雪上加霜。 第三，穆斯林移民涌入。 在欧洲人口下降的同时，外来移民增多，目前已有两千万，其中90％来自穆斯林国家或阿拉伯世界。恐怖主义兴起後，欧洲的穆斯林社会，出现反美、反犹、反西方文明的激进风潮，甚至呼应恐怖份子，袭击自己所在国，滥杀无辜。这种现象在英、法、德、西班牙、荷兰等地更为显著。 例如英国有200万穆斯林（其中70万在伦敦），虽只占人口3％，但增长速度很快。据英国官方数字，200万穆斯林中，一万六千人参与或支持恐怖主义，三千人曾在阿富汗的盖达基地等受过训练。2005年7月伦敦被这些移民恐怖份子袭击，造成53人死亡。近年英国反恐机构破获、阻止了多起他们的恐怖袭击阴谋。 法国的情况更严重，穆斯林移民有600万，占人口近10％。而且自1999年以来，一直以每年15万穆斯林入籍，20万非法移民进入的速度增长。前年丹麦杂志刊登穆罕默德的漫画事件时，法国的穆斯林移民和阿拉伯世界反西方的疯狂举动同调，游行中高举的标语牌是：杀死侮辱伊斯兰的人。由於欧洲左派们热衷「文化多元主义」（即伊斯兰文化和西方文化之间没有先进落後之分，文化要多元），因此没有致力於把穆斯林移民融入西方文明。在英国，伊斯兰的清真寺有1700个，法国有1600个，德国有2200个。几乎全部的清真寺都只强调伊斯兰主义，而拒绝接受西方文明。不少年轻的穆斯林移民，在这样的清真寺被「洗脑」後，参加了恐怖组织；或去袭击、杀害当地的犹太人。去年巴黎有一名23岁犹太人被穆斯林帮派绑架後殴打、虐待，最後被身上喷汽油烧死。几年前一个穆斯林青年打死一个犹太人後兴奋地说，「我杀了个犹太人，可以上天堂了。」 德国的情况也好不到哪里，移民也占人口10％，其中最大群体是土耳其的穆斯林移民，约320万（德国的犹太人只有12万），他们在德国形成一个自己的社会，很多父母甚至不许他们的孩子学当地语言，只是送去清真寺学《可兰经》。 在荷兰，穆斯林有100万，占人口6％。几年前，画家梵高的後代、电影导演特奥．梵高因拍了一部揭示伊斯兰欺压女性的影片，就被当地穆斯林青年用割断喉咙的残忍方式杀害。当时荷兰的孩子吓得不敢在自家院子挂荷兰国旗，因为当地穆斯林可能认为这是「挑衅」。 根据英国一项全国性调查，26％的穆斯林表示，无论如何他们也不会忠於英国；40％支持用伊斯兰宗教法代替英国的法律；13％支持盖达恐怖活动。在有些英国城镇，穆斯林甚至讨论建立「伊斯兰议会」，为将来在英国境内建立「穆斯林省」做准备。英国的红十字会甚至把圣诞树等标志从他们办的「慈善中心」拿掉，怕冒犯当地的穆斯林。 六十年代的法国是安全的，但随著穆斯林移民的涌入，犯罪率直线上升。据「国家统计研究所」（INS）的数字，1960年法国犯罪率是12％，到2000年时增长70％；警方说，法国境内的60％罪犯，90％以上的犯罪活动主谋，都是移民。 即使在一向平静的瑞典，其第三大城市马尔摩（Malmo）因穆斯林移民涌入，强奸、抢劫、烧毁学校，反犹，伊斯兰私刑（Honor Killing）等，简直无法控制；很多当地的白人被迫搬离。 信奉真主的利比亚独裁者卡扎菲曾宣称：「已有很多迹象显示，真主将引领伊斯兰在欧洲获得胜利——不是用刀，也不是用枪，也不用征伐；在未来几十年，五千万穆斯林进入欧洲，会把它变成伊斯兰的洲际大陆。」 第四，福利社会主义捆住手脚。 在经济走向全球化，亚洲，甚至美洲的经济都在腾飞的今天，欧洲的经济却发展滞缓。被称为「旧欧洲」代表的法国和德国，失业率长期在10％左右，是美国（现为4.5％）的一倍以上；但经济增长率还不到美国的一半。 总部在巴黎的「经合与发展组织」（OECD）去年发表题为「走向发展」的160页报告指出：今後10年欧洲的发展趋势是，经济将进一步衰落；20年後，平均每个美国人的财富将比德国人和法国人多出一倍。 二千年时，欧盟元首们聚会誓言，到2010年，欧洲将成为全球最有竞争力和经济实力的；但现在看来像一个玩笑。上述报告对欧盟国家按个评分，结果主要国家的经济力全都是B-，没一个进入A等。与此同时，美国的加州如单独计算，已排为世界第八大经济体，国民生产总值相当於整个法国；新泽西州相当整个俄国（世界第15位），佛罗里达州相当南韩，马里兰州等於整个香港。 欧洲和美国的差距之所以越拉越大，主要由於哲学理念不同。美国更看重「自由」，通过减税，削减福利，减少经济规定，鼓励充分市场竞争，从而激发人的想像力、创造力，保护「个体主义」（individualism），发展资本主义。而欧洲则热衷「平等」，通过高税收、高福利，「劫富济贫」进行财产二次分配，在本质上仍是实行「集体主义」，以群体的名义（现在叫「公共利益」）剥夺个体的权利和自由，限制资本主义的发展。结果和共产主义相似，「杀鸡取蛋」的结果，鸡越来越少，蛋也自然更不够分，最後大家一起受穷；只不过由於选举制度使推崇福利社会主义的政党被淘汰，所以这个走向贫穷的过程比共产主义缓慢。 通过高税收而「劫富济贫」的做法，是高举「追求平等」的道德大旗而实施的严重不道德行为。在西方民主社会，财富是能力和努力的标�遥�「劫富济贫」就是蔑视才智、践踏勤奋；就等於是褒扬愚笨、鼓励懒惰。 用自己的智慧和勤奋创造著成绩的人们是幸福的；而不劳而获者，永远是所有社会中最不快乐的群体。2005年的美国民调显示，收入最高的5％群体，认为自己「非常幸福」的，比低收入的5％，多出50％。据「经合与发展组织」的统计，平均每个美国人每年的工时，比德国人多22％，比荷兰、挪威人各多25％；即使是英国人，也比美国少10％。但调查显示，绝大多数美国人认为，「工作是人生幸福的最主要来源」；89％的美国人满意自己的工作。 2002年全球35国《大众社会调查》（GSS）显示，56％的美国人感到他们的人生「非常幸福」，而法国才是35％，德国更低，才是31％，虽然他们有更多的付薪假期，工作时间又比美国人少很多。 美国学者布鲁克斯（Arthur Brooks）分析说，这和美国人多信奉新教伦理的「勤奋工作有利灵魂」有关；同时资本主义的激烈竞争，导致人们必须勤奋，因为美国没有欧洲那麽多的铁饭碗保护政策。 「给旧欧洲写墓�颐�」 上述这四个症状（当然不只这些）显示，欧洲确实「病了」。近年有多位英美学者撰文指出欧洲陷於危机。美国宾夕法尼亚大学教授、国际问题专家林蔚（Arthur Waldron）曾撰文「欧洲的危机」。英国作家、政治评论员普赖斯-琼斯（David Pryce-Jones）在「欧洲的灾难性变形」一文中指出，欧洲对伊斯兰主义的妥协，就像当年英相张伯伦对德国法西斯的「绥靖主义」，是可怕的历史重演。 英国当代历史学家约翰逊（Paul Johnson）在「欧洲到底需要什麽」中结论说：欧洲已是正在死亡的洲际大陆。《华盛顿邮报》专栏作家塞谬尔森（Robert Samuelson）文章的标题就是「欧洲的终结」，指出欧洲这麽高调反美，正说明他们在默认自己的衰落。美国《新闻周刊》国际版编辑扎卡拉（Fareed Zakaria）在「欧洲的衰弱和坠落」一文中论证说，欧洲已经衰落，它反美并无实力，总不能用「无」来打「有」。 86岁的资深而多产的美籍德裔历史学家拉克尔（Walter Laqueur）今年五月出版了他的第70本书，书名是《欧洲的最後日子：给旧大陆写墓志铭》，他分析了欧洲的种种病症之後感叹说：即使欧洲决心改革，也为时太晚。欧洲在世界事务上扮演主导性角色的日子已成为历史。欧洲在全球的影响力，最好的可能是维持中等，最糟的前景是，它将像恐龙般成为人们凭吊的古迹。 2007年7月20日於纽约 ——原载《开放》2007年8月号 2007-08-01 http://www.caochangqing.com （转载请指明出处）
曹长青2025-11-01 10:53👍 0💬 0维基解密的自由和责任
维基解密这个引起全球关注的网路媒体的出现，引发了很大的争议。它在网上披露了大量美国的外交文件，被称为从解秘变成泄密，导致美国有参议员提出，即使穷尽美国的法律，也要对维基解密的创办人阿桑奇（Julian Assange）绳之以法。另外，阿桑奇因涉嫌性侵两名瑞典女性被英国警方扣押（後被保释），更引起人们对这个揭秘网站的关注，也引发人们对新闻自由和媒体责任这两者平衡问题的讨论。 很多美国人对阿桑奇有意泄漏美国机密相当愤怒，以致《华盛顿邮报》知名的专栏作家查理斯.克劳汉默（Charles Krauthammer）在专栏中说，虽然他不赞成当年苏联克格勃用毒雨伞刺杀持不同政见者，但像阿桑奇这样的人在雨天出门有担心的话，那是令人惬意的事。 “维基揭秘”是通过前美军驻伊拉克情报分析员曼宁（Bradley Manning）而得到的情报。也就是说，曼宁是泄漏美国机密，相当於间谍。美国对间谍的惩罚相当严厉。像原美国海军情报分析员波拉德（Jonathan Pollard）因向以色列（还是美国盟友）提供军事机密，1987年被判无期徒刑，至今仍在狱中。根据波拉德供词，作为一个犹太人，他想提供情报，帮助以色列强大，以对付周边阿拉伯国家的威胁，主观上并不想损害他出生并热爱的美国。虽然犹太人组织多年来一直营救，以色列总理也多次呼吁，但都无效。 美国大众不原谅间谍 三月号美国保守派刊物《评论》（Commentary）刊载长文，披露现任以色列总理内塔尼亚胡今年初跟奥巴马会晤时，再次提出，希望美方从人道角度，释放波拉德，因他已服刑25年了。内塔尼亚胡甚至提出，以色列愿在有争议的巴勒斯坦地区建房计划上妥协，以换取波拉德获释。但奥巴马总统还是没有答应。 这家刊物以同情的笔调说，对波拉德的惩罚已经够了，四分之一世纪的铁窗生活，让波拉德够受了。但这种声音可能在美国犹太人中获得相当支持，但在一般美国人中可能反响不一样。因一般美国民众对泄漏美国机密等行为相当不原谅，甚至痛恨。 所以这次对已抓获的向“维基揭秘”泄密的曼宁可能会判重刑，虽不至於死刑（美国曾判处两名科学家泄漏原子弹机密给共产苏联以死刑），但很可能是无期或累计刑期（有的长达上百年，跟无期没两样）。 无法给阿桑奇定罪 但是要从法律上给“维基揭秘”的阿桑奇定罪，则无论从现实操作和美国宪法等角度，就比较不容易。首先，英国等欧洲国家能否把阿桑奇“引渡”给美国，就是未知数。其次，即使引渡过来，以美国宪法第一修正案保护言论和新闻自由的条款，以及以往美国最高法院对“泄密案”的裁决原则，也都很难给阿桑奇定罪。 美国是案例法，即以最高法院已裁决的案例，为以後类似案件的判案标准（而不是条文法）。早在1971年五角大楼告《纽约时报》泄密案时，美国最高法院就做出明显有利新闻和言论自由的裁决（原则）。当时判《纽约时报》无罪的其中一条理由是，该报把当时越战有关情报公开刊登，不是主动窃密，而是别人把拿到的越战情报送给了《纽约时报》发表。 按照这个判案原则，今天的“维基解密”作为一个网路媒体，也不是主动窃密，而是把他人拿到的机密刊登出来。根据目前检方查到的情况，是美军情报分析员曼宁主动把下载文件传给“维基解密”，而没有查到维基解密事先跟曼宁“勾结、唆使”等事实。 当时美国最高法院裁决《 纽约时报》无罪时说，保守机密以及确定什麽样的机密值得保守，是政府的责任，而不是媒体的责任。 美国判泄密案的三原则 在那次裁决中，美国最高法院提出了後来成为判泄密案的三原则∶只有报导这种机密造成“立即的、重大的、不可挽回的损失”时，才可能追究法律责任。这个三原则，等於给了媒体最大的新闻自由空间。现在用上述这三条标准衡量，即使阿桑奇被抓到美国受审，定罪也很困难。当然，对言论制定这样宽松的标准，一定会给美国的国家安全等带来一定损失，但美国大法官认为，宁可付出这麽重大的代价，也要保护新闻和言论自由。 虽然阿桑奇很难被定罪，但是，作为一个媒体（如果他认为自己是在办媒体），他仍有一个新闻责任的问题。新闻自由并不是没有底限，它同时伴随一个媒体人的责任问题。 例如在九一一事件後美国刚打响反恐战争的时候，美国新闻界就有一个争论∶见到本拉登，是先报警，还是先采访（宁可拉登跑掉）。从新闻独家角度，当然要先抓住这个难得的采访机会；但从国家安全（和保护更多人命）的角度，当然应该是先报警，抓获拉登。最後美国新闻界的倾向性意见是先“报警”。 现在阿桑奇即使可以逃脱法律责任，但仍有一个媒体的道德责任，即泄漏那些情报，会不会影响美国（还有其他一些国家）的安全问题。在今天反恐成为一个全球整体问题的时代，面对人类共同的敌人，当然存在一个应该“先报警”的媒体道德责任问题。例如“维基解密”公布的美国机密中，就有向美方提供情报的阿富汗线民的名字背景等信息，就有可能造成那些人的生命安全等问题。 “维基解密”好景不长 虽然维基解密现在很红火，但这个“媒体”可能好景不长。起码有三个原因∶ 第一，虽然美国有充分保护新闻自由的法律，无法对阿桑奇起诉定罪，但是，被维基解密涉及的其他国家，都没有美国这样有利新闻和言论自由的法律，一但那些国家给阿桑奇定罪，他就相当麻烦。另外还有像瑞士银行等私人企业起诉“维基解密”泄漏了他们的商业秘密等官司（已在旧金山市法庭起诉），也是阿桑奇们难以应对的。 第二，《纽约时报》主要不是靠披露秘密文件、而是以追求专业化新闻报导等存活（虽然现在由於过於左倾而每况愈下）。但维基解密主要靠“揭秘”，一旦被哪个国家或个人起诉，无法再揭秘下去，就很难继续存活。而且这种“秘密”是来自全球的匿名提供者，其真实性很难辨别、鉴定，几次真真假假，“媒体”就不再有信誉。例如原来网上有报导说，“维基解密”披露胡锦涛和马英九“经常用skype通电话”，後来被查明是编造的。从常识来看，对国家领导人来说skype通话不安全，而且国家元首怎麽可能为了省钱（双方免费）而用这种通话方式？ 自大狂、心理不稳定 第三，“维基解密”没有位址和公开的编辑人员等信息，虽然说是怕打官司和迫害，但也给人强烈感觉，是为了躲避真正的诽谤和泄密等法律责任。当一家媒体从一开始就想躲避任何责任，那它不可能办成真正具有信誉的媒体，更不要说“维基解密”创办人哗众取宠的风格，更难以令人相信他真的是要办一家严肃的媒体。 阿桑奇即使躲过这次的法律追究，但由於他涉嫌性侵两名瑞典女性，案子被曝光後，他的个人形象已经严重受损。全球各大报和网站都报导了这个性侵害事件，网上可以搜索到上百万关於该条目的报导。英国《卫报》和《纽约时报》都接到长达68页、详述阿桑奇性侵两名女性的警方文件。而原来跟阿桑奇共创“维基解密”的合伙人後来也反目，出书揭露阿桑奇是个心理不稳定、自大狂，又有强烈自恋和风头欲的人。这些如果属实，那麽阿桑奇和“维基解密”的前景更不看好。 ——原载《看》双周刊2011年3月 2011-03-20 http://www.caochangqing.com （转载请指明出处）
曹长青2025-11-01 10:58👍 0💬 0《断背山》和李安的反道德
李安的新片《断背山》（ Brokeback Mountain） 不仅获得金球奖 最佳影片和导 演等四个重要奖项，还得到八项美国奥斯卡提名，似乎有望成为三月初将揭晓的奥斯卡“黑马”。（注：李安五日得到最佳导演奖） 在华人世界，更是“一片欢呼”，虽然李安来自台湾，但在中国官方媒体上，却歌颂李安“领导中国团队攀登世界电影高峰”；台湾媒体更是谄媚，说“他来自台湾，征服全世界”，所有台湾人“都沾了李安的光！”海外的不少华人，也跟著起哄，说什麽这是华人的伟大成就。而李安本人也莫名其妙地对美国之音记者说，“得奖是对中国电影界一百年来努力的一种肯定”，然後他又用高行健式的“玄奥”说，《断背山》将“影响美国文化，是东方文化向西方文化回流。” 事实上，《断背山》获奖和中国电影界毫无关系。那些评委们只是评选一部美国电影而已。而李安的这种说法，等於是说好莱坞因为李安是华人，才给他这个奖；等於说美国人为了肯定什麽百年中国电影的努力，给了一个照顾奖。这种自我矮化、自我贬损，实在令人不可思议 。 虽然《断背山》获得了美国左派媒体几乎一致的赞誉，并连续地这个奖那个提名，炒得不亦乐乎，但这部电影即使成为奥斯卡的赢家，也绝不会成为“经典”，因为它除了给好莱坞留下一个“政治正确”的标本之外，没有任何经典作品中那种高扬道德、升华心灵的东西。 ●西部牛仔同性恋是“卖点” 如果说该片有什麽“创意”的话，那就是李安敢把西部牛仔拍成同性恋。因为美国虽然有过不少关於同性恋的作品，但把西部牛仔拍成同性恋，还从来没有过。不是没人打过这个主意。据CNN 报导，这个根据小说改编的电影剧本已经写出来七年了，在好莱坞的所有大电影厂转了一圈，都没人愿接，那些大牌导演们，即使左疯们，也都担心触怒中产阶级为代表的主流社会，而不敢拍这个电影。但李安为什麽却主动要拍这个题材？大概是因为在无神论社会成长过来的人，对基督社会的道德准则没有清晰的感觉，所以很“勇敢”地拍了。而好莱坞的左派们，就对李安做了他们自己想做却没胆做的事而给予极尽其能的奖励。 美国西部牛仔向来是男子汉、真正男人的象徵。名牌香烟“万宝路”那个深入人心的广告，就塑造了这种典型的西部牛仔形象∶一个潇洒的硬汉，头戴牛仔帽，手挥驯服野马的缰绳，豪气十足。而这次李安把他们拍成是阴性十足、苟苟且且、背著妻子儿女，暗中偷情的双性恋者。典型地颠倒传统审美价值观。 这部电影的剧情相当简单，是根据《纽约客》上一个短篇小说改编。写六十年代两个西部牛仔，在怀俄明州的断背山上放牧时，发生了同性关系。下山後，两人各自结了婚，有了妻子和儿女。後来两人旧情复燃，瞒著各自妻子和孩子，以钓鱼为名，偷偷约会，而且保持了二十多年这种偷情（性）关系，最後一人意外死亡，故事就结束了。这麽简单的情节，硬是拉成两个小时的电影，可想而知其节奏多麽缓慢，因为没什麽戏剧性。有评论家说，它只是靠两个西部牛仔的同性恋，才造成“卖点”；如果故事换成是男女之间，这个电影大概连拍都拍不出来，更谈不上获奖。 ● 先天“性倾向”就要被尊重？ 这部电影所以获这麽多的奖项，除了好莱坞要肯定李安反传统、反道德的“勇敢”之外，还因为那些影评家要用支持这部电影来表示对同性恋的支持，甚至是对上次总统大选时，美国绝大多数州的民众都投票反对同性恋结婚的反弹或报复，它是美国长期进行的左右派文化战争的一个插曲。事实上，这部影片获奖，和政治的关系远超过和艺术的关系。这部电影牵扯到的，不仅仅是应该怎样看待同性恋的问题，而且关系到人类基本道德准则的问题。男女相爱、成年男女之间才可以有性关系，这是人的规定性。同性恋者强调，他们的性倾向是“先天的”，由此寻求同性行为的合法性和道德根基。但迄今为止的科学研究，并无法完全证实它是先天的。 退一步说，即使它是先天的，那麽先天的倾向是不是就合乎人类的道德标准？先天的倾向是不是就等於社会要为这种倾向开“绿灯” ？比方说，大概多数异性恋的男人都有想和众多漂亮女人发生性关系的先天欲望；只是由於後天的教育、道德的约束、理性等，才控制了这种原始欲望。那麽男人们可不可以用这种“先天”的性心理作为理由，要求合法地拥有三妻六妾，大红灯笼高高挂？还有一些人，他们先天就喜欢玩弄未成年的孩子，那麽他们那种先天，要不要受到尊重，受到保护？ 在刚来美国的那些年，由於受西方左派媒体的影响，我也曾对同性恋者相当同情，并采访过多名同性恋者，写了同情甚至认同他们的那种先天观的文章。後来，随著对这个问题的深入了解，包括自己的采访经验，发现事情远不是那麽简单。我采访过的同性恋者，几乎无一例外，全部都是後天的，都是在青春期或刚成年时，被年长的同性恋者引诱的。 ●"每个人心里都有一个《断背山》"？ 李安则比这种“先天观”走得更远，他在拍完同样是认可同性恋的《喜宴》之後曾经说，如果同性恋是後天选择的，更应该支持。也就是说，他没有一个基本准则，只要是人自己的自由意志选择，就可以做，就应该支持（这是早已被西方左派都扬弃的萨特的“自由意志论”的观点）。他针对《断背山》解释说，“爱是没有界限的，不仅可以在男女之间，也可以在男人和男人之间，同性之间。”精神层面的爱当然是没有界限的，但如果包含性意识的爱也没有界限的话，人类的道德底线就会崩溃，人的规定性就没有了准则。 李安的同事，台湾的另一个知名导演蔡明亮也是宣扬这种乱伦的“爱”。一位朋友看过他拍的《河流》，其中有这样的场面，在洗澡堂的朦胧蒸汽中，同性恋的儿子竟然和同性恋的父亲发生了性爱。朋友介绍说，法国的一个男导演，还拍出儿子和母亲性爱的电影《我的母亲》，其中有这样的场面，母亲死後，这个做儿子的还在母亲尸体前手淫。这就是西方左派们宣扬和追求的“自由”；人都这样自由起来，那就和动物、畜生没有区别。 李安在香港对《断背山》还解释说，“每个人心里都有一个断背山”，也就是说，每个人心里都有一个瞒著亲人的秘密。这不等於是公开推崇这种瞒著妻子儿女进行同性恋的欺骗行为吗？《断背山》中的两个西部牛仔，既然已是同性恋，为什麽还要各自和异性结婚，然後又生儿育女，这不是人为地在给妻子、儿女带来痛苦的同时，也给自己的同性恋伴侣带来痛苦吗？李安不是在肯定这种双重的不道德吗？ 而且什麽叫双性恋？哪来的先天“双性恋”，它只不过是有些人要为所欲为、纵容和实践非分幻想的藉口而已。美国著名广播电台主持人萨维奇（Michael Savage ）评论说，李安的《断背山》实在让人“做呕”。 ●”强奸万宝路的男人形象” 一位朋友说，他邻居家十多岁的儿子去看了《断背山》。我真的替那家父母担心，在那种对道德、性都处於朦胧阶段的孩子，看了这种电影，如果出於好奇心，也去尝试一下，就可能一下子把性心理搬了道岔，影响他的一生，或者说毁了他的一生。因为我采访过的同性恋者，全都说不幸福，并表示如果再生，绝不选择做同性恋，因为不仅被歧视，性关系也不稳定；因为俗话说“男人要性，女人要情”，男女形成的家庭可以性情互补而趋向稳定；而两个要“性”的男人在一起，可想而知，是怎样“性”趣多多，即使建立“家庭”，关系也难以稳定长久，他们同样因“感情”而痛苦。而且那些男同性恋者，因为有女性心理，都希望找个真正的男人，但他们也知道，真正的男人要的是女人。 美国福克斯电视主播欧莱利（Bill O'Reilly） 批评说， 这部电影其实是为同性恋做宣传。《世界网路日报》（wnd.com）评论家库皮廉（David Kupelian ）认为，这部电影，是“强奸万宝路的男人形象”，是对三千年犹太—基督（Judeo-Christian）文明价值的攻击。电视脱口秀主持人贝内特（Stephen Bennett）则说，这部电影标志著，好莱坞已堕落到“道德最低点”。 近年来，随著经济全球化，文化事业等也越来越全球化了。许多非西方人（包括华人、西裔、非洲人等）得到西方的各种艺术奖项。以我这些年的观察，这里面有少数的确是靠作品的出类拔萃，但绝大多数却是由於迎合了西方左派的“政治正确”倾向（反战、支持同性恋、支持女权主义、支持堕胎、赞美单亲母亲，等等）；而且由非西方白人这麽喊，让西方右派很难开口批评（因为一批评就是种族歧视）。所以西方左派最喜欢做的事情，就是给非西方人施舍，奖励那些符合他们观点的作品。 李安的《喜宴》和《断背山》获奖，都因为他是标准地走在这条左派的路子上，这次更是大快“左”心。所以那些垂涎西方奖项的所谓艺术家们，如果照著李安的样子学，一定成功有望，因为西方所有文学艺术奖项的评委，十有八九都是左派。 －－原载《开放》2006年3月号 2006-03-15 http://www.caochangqing.com （转载请指明出处）
曹长青2025-11-01 11:17👍 0💬 0美国崛起是当代最伟大的事
对于美国对外使用武力，无论在西方人还是中国人中，都引起相当的争论，其中批评者的一个理由是，这是美国人为自己国家利益的行动。但这个批评根本没有力量，因为任何国家的建立，它的首要职责就是保护本国人民的安全，其次是维护本国人民的利益。 全世界没有任何一国的对外政策不是以本国利益为核心。这里唯一需要探究的是，美国对外政策核心中的“国家利益”是与本国人民和整体人类的安全、民主、自由的价值是一致的，还是有对抗性？这才是问题的关键。 从美国在二战、冷战、冷战后（至今）这三个近代历史时期中的对外政策来看，美国的国家利益与人类安全、民主、自由的价值完全在一个轨道上∶ 我们首先看二战。第二次世界大战的历史非常清楚，美国的对外政策首先是为本国安全，结果促进了世界的安全，结束了纳粹和日本军国主义。在德日意三个“邪恶轴心”侵略屠杀时，正是美国的参战，才扭转了战局。美国为此阵亡了41万官兵，伤残100多万。 没有美国的参战、没有美国人的巨大牺牲，整个欧洲都会被纳粹践踏，整个亚洲都会成为日本“大东亚共荣圈”的奴隶。据历史学者黄仁宇在其《近代中国的出路》中引述的资料，八年抗战期间，“中国军民伤亡2100万以上”。按这个比例推算，在日本侵占中国期间，平均每年有260万伤亡。如果美国晚打败日本四年，就可能还有一千万中国人丧生！正是美国打败了日本，才帮助了中国人结束了被日本殖民、屠杀的历史。 我们再看冷战。这个时期，美国对外政策的主线是遏阻共产苏联的扩张，以美国为核心的北约，主要任务是抵御以苏联为首的“华沙条约组织”。这个时期美国也是付出相当的牺牲，仅为抵抗共产北韩、北越就牺牲了近10万官兵。正是美国付出巨大的人力、物力和军费，才遏阻了共产主义的蔓延；才促使了共产主义在全球崩溃，才有了东欧和俄国人民走向民主自由的今天。 如果今天“华沙条约组织”是世界最大的军事集团，共产苏联是全球唯一的超级强国，这个世界会是多可怕！正是美国作为旗手，领导与保障自由世界不被共产主义的奴役。这个期间的美国对外政策与人类安全、民主、自由的价值也是一致的。 我们再来看冷战之后。这个时期美国受到最多非议的是对外军事干预，但从美国对索马里的人道救援、对海地的军事干预（帮助民选总统阿瑞斯蒂复位）、捉拿巴拿马独裁者诺瑞加（使巴拿马走向民主稳定）、结束塞尔维亚人对波斯尼亚人的屠杀（使穆斯林人为主体的波斯尼亚获得独立和自由）、制止南斯拉夫对科索沃的种族清洗（使80％为穆斯林人的科索沃获得自治），干预印尼军队对东蒂汶人的屠杀（使东蒂汶获得独立），两次对伊拉克动武（使科威特从伊拉克的占领中获得解放；最后结束萨达姆统治）、铲除塔列班政权（使阿富汗人民从炸毁千年佛像的中世纪统治下获得自由）等等，都可以看出两点，第一，美国的军事干预，不是以占领、殖民、掠夺那个国家和土地为目的；第二，美国的军事干预全部都受到那些国家的人民和新政府的欢迎。 有人说美国是“新的帝国”，但它与以往的罗马帝国等性质完全不同，它没有在所干预的任何国家建立殖民地，而是促使那些国家走向自由经济和民主政治！ 且不说在上述干预中大多数都属于人道性质，美国并没有多少利益可图，即使有，美国这种国家利益，也仍然和人类安全、民主、自由的价值在一个方向。 美国对外政策中，第二个最重要的组成部份，是它极力推销市场经济、自由贸易、全球化。 市场经济是美式民主的最重要基础，它的根本价值还不在经济层面，而是保障人的自由。我们每一个人生存的资本是自己的智慧和创造能力。人和人最基本、最健康、最正当的交往是trade（交易、交换），通过交换，人们可以互享劳动成果，提高生活水平，丰富生命。正是由于智慧的交换，才有了今天巨大的物质文明。所以，自由贸易是人类赖以生存的最重要价值之一。正是为了保护这个价值，美国才致力在全球推广市场经济。 中国现在人民生活水平比过去大幅提高，毫无疑问的原因是中国走向了市场经济，人们的经济自由度远比毛时代大。所以美国为了自己的国家利益（扩大进出口贸易）而推行全球市场经济的外交政策，同样和人类自由、民主、安全、繁荣的共同价值在一个轨道上；它不仅对美国本身，也对其他国家走向繁荣和稳定有重大益处。今天中美之间的巨额贸易，给两国都带来了巨大经济利益。 所以说，美国的两个最基本、最重大的外交政策——推广民主政治和自由经济——在保护美国自身利益的同时，都和人类共同的安全、自由、民主价值有一致性。 除此之外，美国是全世界最慷慨、最具同情心的国家。在过去半个世纪以来，美国向世界各国，尤其是第三世界国家，提供了大量经济援助，总数已超过一万亿美元，是全球捐献最多的国家。 美国政府设有专门的“对外援助署”。像在布什政府时期，每年对外援助额都高达近三百亿美元。在曼德拉去世之际，世人瞩目南非，更发现那里的艾滋病猖狂、犯罪率高攀（世界数一数二），而布什政府时，美国仅向南非提供的艾滋病基金就达150亿美元！这个数字有多大？911恐怖袭击后，美国联邦政府给纽约世贸大厦等经济损失补助款才是60亿美元。 据统计，美国已援助过全球150多个国家（联合国成员国才190多个）！2013年，美国对外援助总额预算已增至516亿美元。 除了直接援助，很多来自联合国的救援，也因美国承担联合国会费最多，而提供了最多援助。联合国虽有193个成员，但美国曾长期承担三分之一的费用，直到近年才减至22％，但仍近四分之一（日本承担10.8%，中国承担5.15%）。 美国远没有富裕到有钱没地方花的地步，美国有太多的领域需要资金。仅以纽约为例，很多中国人抱怨，纽约地铁太破旧，根本不如上海、香港、台北的地铁干净、高级。纽约地铁一年收入约20亿美元，上面提到的2013年美国对外援助517亿美元，相等于纽约地铁25年的收入，这笔钱可以改造、提升整个纽约市的地铁系统。但这就是美国人的慷慨！它宁可不花钱改造提升纽约的地铁等很多急需资金的项目，而向其他国家提供经济援助。 美国除了政府外援，还有无数民间组织向世界提供巨额援助。这和美国人的慈善文化（当然还和捐款额免税）有密切关系。据施惠美国基金会（GUSAF）的数字，过去四十年，美国的慈善捐款额一直上升∶1970年不足250亿美元，到1991年就增至1108亿美元，翻了一番。2001年则达2120亿美元，又翻了一番。十年后的2010年，增至2909亿美元。2012年则达到3160亿美元。南韩和印度的外汇存底，各是3000亿美元（并列世界第七位），而美国人一年的乐捐就达3000多亿！ 美国的庞大捐款额，只有5%来自大公司，大部分来自个人捐献（占75%）。美国人口三亿多点，年捐款三千多亿，等于平均每人捐款1000美元。 美国人的巨额捐款，其中40%以上用于了国际援助（从教育到文学艺术到妇女儿童健康等等项目）。像电脑软件大王比尔盖茨和他妻子的基金会，2010年度的拨款中，约80%用于了世界发展和全球健康（只有15%用于了美国国内的教育、图书馆和其他项目）。更不要说，每年有超过100万美国人到国外从事志愿工作。 美国的立国之本（独立宣言与美国宪法）是个人自由和权利。美国人的对外援助，也是基于这种原则精神。信奉和高扬这样一种普世价值的美国的崛起与强大，实在是人类的福音和幸运！ 所以，诺贝尔经济学奖得主罗伯特.蒙代尔（Robert Mundell）2001年底在北京大学中国经济研究中心演讲时引述说，“从政治与经济上看，美国的崛起确实是当代最伟大的事，它改变了世界的政治历史。” 而意大利前总理贝卢斯科尼的话，则传递出所有因美国帮助而获得自由的国家与人民的心声∶“我们永远不会忘记，我们欠美国一笔巨大的债∶我们的自由，我们的繁荣，我们的民主┅┅美国不仅是我们的朋友，他们是民主、自由的保护人┅┅每当我看到美国星条旗，我看到的不只是那个国家的代表，而是民主和自由的像征。” 2014年1月6日修改于美国 2015-03-05 http://www.caochangqing.com （转载请指明出处）
曹长青2025-11-01 04:26👍 0💬 0谁希望拜登继续担任美国总统？
何清涟 美国安，天下安；美国不安，世界到处都是燃点。今年全球将有超过50个国家和地区上演选举大戏，其中美国大选最受关注。如今，川普、拜登代表美国两党竞逐2024年大选基本已成定局，谁更希望拜登继续留在白宫？2月14日俄罗斯总统普京在接受访谈时被问及，上述两人当中谁当选对俄罗斯更有利时，普京毫不含糊地笑着给出自己的答案：“拜登，他是一个更有经验且可以预测的人，是一位老派政治家”。因此，梳理一下盼望拜登继续当选的“谁”们，是哪些国家与美国国内哪些群体，是一件极有意思的事情。 西方盟国需要愿意薅本国羊毛为他国御寒的“领头羊” 按照《华尔街日报》1月29日那篇《世界领导人为川普重返白宫做准备》所述，世界各国领导人正在仔细分析川普的政治演讲，并为他可能重返白宫未雨绸缪，有的已暗中与川普竞选团队接触。但从内在愿望观之，西方盟国绝大多数都希望拜登赢，拜登亦于去年12月20日宣布：“我接触过的每一位国家元首都说‘你必须赢’，否则民主就保不住了”。这种态度，已被事实证明，川普2月24日在南卡一次竞选集会上发表“北约不付费美国将不会保护北约国家”的讲话，引发北约国家毫不含糊的反对。 在团结盟友问题上，川普败在“小气”二字上。川普在2017年初入主白宫后，一直呼吁欧洲北约成员国增加国防开支，他在2018年11月30日出席阿根廷G20峰会的间歇接受VOA专访时称：“我们有很多威胁，但美国被这么多的国家坑了”。在川普看来，“坑”美国的国家，首当其冲是中国，北约国家不按本国GDP总量2%的比例提供国防经费，也是“坑”的一种形式。当时，北约29个成员国中只有9个达到了2%的目标。尤其是德国，成为川普抱怨的重点，他不止一次批评德国在花美国的钱保护自己。2017年3月下旬，德国总理默克尔访美时与川普见面，川普直接递给了默克尔一张3000亿英镑（约合3750亿美元）的纸面账单，说这是德国累计欠美国在北约的军费债。 时过七年，北约的成员国已经从29个增加到31个，其中国防开支达标的国家从9个增至11个成员国。其中，德国多年来一边态度坚定地表达要增加国防预算，终于从2017年的1.24%增至2023年的1.57%；一边不断通告世界，离开美国，欧洲无法保护自己（2019年11月26日德国外长海科·马斯，2021年4月28日德国国防部长卡伦鲍尔、今年1月23日德国外长贝尔伯克都有类似表述）。 也就是说，盟国不关心美国国债爆表，平均每个人负债10万美元左右；也不关心美国退休者正为养老发愁，他们只关心自家门前有无美国军队站岗。这与“民主”一毛钱关系也没有，只与美国这只“领头羊”是否愿意薅纳税人羊毛给盟友御寒有关。这与普京不同，普京希望拜登当选则是对手越弱越好。 当年的一些拥护者正在弃拜登而去 拜登不受共和党选民与中间选民欢迎并不奇怪，但连本党选民也不欢迎，这是被左派媒体连续性的民调证明的。本文就挑选《纽约时报》的Poll为例加以说明，这家媒体在2019年大选前一年就持续将拜登夸赞成富有政治经验尤其是外交经验、且与多国元首保持良好私人关系的超级合格总统候选人。在对拜登关爱有加的同时，这家媒体对川普的恨意也非常有名。早在2016年大选过后，著名的左派主持人克里斯·华莱士就承认：当年7月的共和党大会之后，很多媒体机构一致认为，对川普的报道，不用再遵守新闻业的一般规则和客观性，《纽约时报》就是破坏规则的罪魁祸首之一。（ 《预测希拉里获胜的美国媒体，你们错哪儿了？JIM RUTENBERG，2016年11月11日） 《纽约时报》和锡耶纳学院联合进行的民调是#Times/Siena Poll。2022年7月11日的调查表明，64%的民主党人希望换人参加2024年总统竞选，只有26%的民主党人在民调中表示，该党应提名拜登竞选连任。该民调显示，对经济前景和高通胀的高度担忧让美国人对拜登和国家发展前景都持负面观感，对其工作满意度只有33%；3/4的选民认为美国正朝错误的方向前进，认为美国正朝正确的方向前进的选民只有13%，是该民调自2008年金融危机以来录得的最低值。 2024年3月2日，Times/Siena Poll公布的调查结果显示，四年前支持拜登的选民现在对拜登的看法发生根本性转变。61%的人认为他“太老了”，无法胜任总统职务。但选民们对只比拜登小四岁的川普（77岁）没有表现出同样的焦虑。尽管这一调查设问集中在年龄，但还是提到一位居住在巴尔的摩的小企业主谢尔曼·埃尔莫尔，这位民主党铁粉表示：在川普执政期间，他赚的钱更多，由于拜登执政期间的通货膨胀和汽油价格，他的企业亏损，因此他计划今年投票给川普。即算如此偏袒拜登，这一民调还不得不公布这个结果：川普的支持率为48%，略高于拜登的43%。 美国的社会主义者钟情拜登 我在2018年就写过《美国民主党的国内“颜色革命”》一文。该党筹谋多年的颜色革命包含两个层面：一是肤色。人口结构多元化，随着外来移民的增加及少数族裔尤其是拉丁裔的高生育率，美国人口结构发生变化。但这场“颜色革命”更重要的含义则是指改变美国青年的思想颜色，让他们成为社会主义信仰者。欧美左派自1968年之后开始“体制内新长征”（ The long march through the institutions），逐渐占据大学讲台与研究机构，培养出一代比一代更为左倾的青年。这些信仰社会主义的青年是民主党的基本盘。2018年年7月3日，《纽约时报》在《民主党正在社会主义化吗？》中引述一项调查，在18~34岁的民主党人当中，61%的人对社会主义持正面肯定态度。2020年，哈佛-哈里斯民意调查（Harris Poll）在8月17日至22日民主党全国代表大会期间进行一项在线调查，收集了来自约2263名民主党选民以及无党派人士选民的回答，结果发现，在18岁至39岁的受访者中，59%的人表示他们宁愿生活在社会主义国家。 支持民主党的社会群体，我概括为无（无产者，指福利族，包括非移）、知（大学、媒体、NGO）、少（青少年、性少数群体、少数民族）、女（女权主义者）。美国左派教育则将他们排列为DEI“受害者”序列：犹太人、BLM为代表的有色人种、lgbtqi+、穆斯林族群、女权主义者。但根据媒体报道，美国犹太富人因以巴冲突后出现的反犹情绪发生变化，青年一代已经出现拜登反对者，拉丁裔等支持川普的人数上升。 拜登能被美国民主党不惜一切代价选成总统，是美国社会严重分裂的结果；他执政三年以来的各项内政外交举措，更是加剧了这种分裂。尽管目前美国的主流媒体极度左倾，对拜登的评价不是基于事实的所谓“公共辩论与舆论”（Public Debate and Public Opinion），属于“控制叙事”(controlled narratives)，但对拜登的评价也已呈极度分裂状态。 （原载《联合早报》，2024年3月12日，https://www.zaobao.com.sg/forum/views/story20240312-3140578）
何清涟2025-11-06 06:15👍 0💬 0埃及变天的意义比天大！
埃及总统穆巴拉克辞职下台！仅仅只有18天与独裁者的直面较量，埃及人民就赢得了这场抗衡的最後胜利！ 坦率地说，我对这个结果的激动超过对亚洲民主的变化。为什麽？绝不是因为我更爱那个我从未去过的地方，而是因为，埃及的变天预示著整个中东的变化——多米诺骨牌效应会很快出现∶埃及是中东人口最多的国家，有八千万，超过法国。埃及的变化，连同不久之前的突尼斯变革，将向叙利亚、沙特阿拉伯、约旦、黎巴嫩，尤其是伊朗，等所有中东国家和人民传递一个清晰的信号，是采取行动、结束所有独裁者的时刻了！人民要主宰自己的命运，而不是那些君主、国王，和穆巴拉克这样的世俗独裁者！ 而整个中东的民主化，不仅将结束中东政教合一、中世纪般落後的独裁制度，结束恐怖主义，结束持续了两千多年的、暴力的宗教战争，而且它也必定带来中国的变天！因为连那种强烈宗教背景的独裁都如此迅速地被自由的力量摧毁的话，中国那种世俗的独裁更不可能长久。 所以，埃及变天的意义，不亚於当年柏林墙倒塌对整个东欧以至苏联垮台的重要意义！他不仅为整个中东的民主变革，提供了开端，提供了榜样，鼓舞人民起来反抗的勇气，它传递给中国人民的信号，也是一股不可估量的力量！ 虽然穆巴拉克下台之後，埃及的民主之路还有很长要走，但迈出了这历史性的第一步，新的生命就从里开始！ 这场全球瞩目的埃及革命，可谓一波三澜。昨晚（10号）有了戏剧性变化，穆巴拉克总统发表全国电视讲话，成千上万的示威者聚集开罗广场，载歌载舞，甚至有人打开香槟，准备迎接和庆祝穆巴拉克下台。美国的主要媒体，也是预料穆巴拉克可能宣布下台，否则不会再次发表电视讲话。而且美国中央情报局局长，事先也预料穆巴拉克下台，这更增加了人们的确信。但是，让所有人跌破眼镜的是，穆巴拉克的讲话完全没有提到他下台，还是老一套，对自己评gong摆好，并说他绝不离开埃及，等於摆名了，他拒绝下台。 开罗广场上的示威群众，还没等穆巴拉克讲完，就是一片潮水般的怒吼！无论是开罗广场上的愤怒民众，还是美国CNN、福克斯的评论员，几乎异口同声，都说穆巴拉克头脑坏掉了，根本不知道埃及正在发生什麽。《华盛顿邮报》专栏作家，也是福克斯电视新闻评论员的查理斯.克劳翰默（Charles Krauthammer）说，穆巴拉克的讲话证明，他简直愚蠢到疯癫了，完全在状况外。 因为按照常理，如果穆巴拉克拒绝下台，就不用再出来讲话，他前两天已经这样讲过了，说今年九月份埃及大选时，他不再参选等等。现在他煞有介事地宣布要全国讲话，而且事先埃及总理表示，穆巴拉克会满足抗议者的要求，所以大家都理解是他要宣布下台。可是，天下的独裁者，都是这麽愚蠢，简直蠢死了。他们完全不知道人民的心声，不知道周围的真实世界，活在周围奴才们的恭维和奉承之中，好像自己的权力大无边。 愤怒的埃及抗议民众当然绝不会甘休，昨天夜里，成千上万的埃及人涌向总统府，涌向埃及全国电视台，他们愤怒至极，高喊穆巴拉克下台、滚蛋！整个开罗解放广场，震荡著“打倒穆巴拉克”的怒吼！一位埃及示威者对CNN记者说，在这种时候，穆巴拉克还出来发表这样的讲话，“他简直没有了大脑，或者脑袋长在了别的地方！” 虽然穆巴拉克在讲话中再次煽动民族主义，说什麽他会像以往一样，绝不屈服任何外国压力等等，但是，这次好像根本不起作用。示威民众说，这不是外国干涉的问题，而是我们埃及人民自己，要穆巴拉克下台，埃及需要民主，需要自由！ 距离昨晚穆巴拉克拒绝下台的讲话才12个小时，埃及政局就发生了戏剧性的变化，穆巴拉克辞职下台。现在还不清楚背後的推动因素，但有一点是肯定的，那就是昨天晚上开罗广场那潮水般的抗议人民，那震天动地的愤怒呐喊，那绝不屈服、妥协的抗争精神，震撼、感染了整个埃及！正如埃及反对派领袖、诺贝尔奖得主巴拉迪（M. Baradei）所说，埃及要爆炸了！这个埃及人民被穆巴拉克拒绝下台激怒的场面，不仅通过国际媒体的现场报导传向整个世界，更传到埃及的家家户户！整个埃及动起来了！这个力量，是穆巴拉克根本无法阻挡的！ 很多高层军官是从美国西点军校毕业的埃及军队，一直拒绝开枪镇压。在这种局势下，穆巴拉克实际上已经没有了其他选择。 二十四年前，美国总统里根在德国喊出“推倒柏林墙”，等於是吹响了推翻专制的号角！只有二十多年的时光，人们目睹了柏林墙倒塌，苏联帝国解体，原东欧的共产国家全部结束了共产党统治，使整个欧洲，成为人类第一个全是民主选举的洲际大陆！民主的潮流浩浩荡荡，不可阻挡！从欧洲到亚洲，从美洲到非洲，最後又到了中东，在伊拉克和阿富汗，在那个连女人都不许露脸的死水之地，也有了民主选举！ 现在，突尼斯打出第一枪，埃及人民群起响应，一举结束了长达三十年的穆巴拉克统治！埃及的这场革命，也是给中国人作出了一个漂亮的榜样！ 二十年前，中国人利用胡耀邦去世这个“突发事件”，发起了一场震撼世界的八九民运！我当年曾写文章说，因为共产党控制了所有媒体，扼杀了一切公民团体，所以，只有靠“突发事件”起到的任何一场运动必需的“通知、号召、组织”等条件，才能起事、成事。现在，埃及的这场革命，靠的不再是偶然发生的“事件”，而是电脑、互联网，尤其是手机，这些现代科技，突破了当局的信息控制，可以起到一场运动所需要的通知、发动、组织、号召，包括调动民众情绪等效能。埃及的“手机们”获胜了，中国已有一亿多人上网，大人小孩几乎人手一机，中国的条件也已经具备，中国，已经“山雨欲来风满楼”！ 我绝不相信，中国人是“东亚病夫”，是不如埃及和突尼斯人的“劣等人”，正如支持埃及抗议民众的前以色列副总理夏兰斯基（Natan Sharansky）所说的，不管什麽文化和宗教背景，哪里的人民都渴望自由！中国人也绝不会是例外！ 今天，我们没有任何理由怀疑，中国的变天就在可见的明天！ 2011年2月11日中午於美国 2011-02-11 http://www.caochangqing.com （转载请指明出处）
曹长青2025-11-01 10:56👍 0💬 0曹长青∶委内瑞拉告诉台湾 5 件事
委内瑞拉正发生巨变，国会议长宣布马杜罗当选「总统」无效，按委国宪法，议长出任「临时总统」直至全国大选。美国立即承认了临时总统，随後加拿大，以色列，澳大利亚，巴西，阿根廷，哥伦比亚，智利，包括台湾在南美洲唯一邦交国巴拉圭，都相继承认临时总统；英国，德国，西班牙也跟进。欧盟也倾向美国立场。 为什麽委内瑞拉发生这样动荡？它有经济、政治两大原因。经济上，委内瑞拉强人查韦斯和他钦定接班人马杜罗都热衷社会主义，结果导致经济每况愈下，成为南美洲最差的，而上世纪70年代委内瑞拉的经济是南美洲最好的，四十年，社会主义毁了这个国家。目前委国物价飞涨，货币暴跌，通膨率政府承认170万%，国际货币基金预测高达1千万%！该国已有300万人逃离，占总人口近10%！成为严重的政治和人道危机！委内瑞拉发生这一切，对台湾至少有5个启示或说是警讯∶ 第一，痞子掌权害国。 查韦斯当年是个政变失败的低阶军官，但他有一种痞子气，敢夸口，煽动民粹，能侃善骗，掌权後推行社会主义及亲中国等政策。这一点，高雄的韩国瑜，台北的柯文哲，都有相似之处。这种人敢不择手段、出尔反尔，撒谎欺骗，一旦进入「权力中心」就带来灾难。所以台湾人民要警惕韩国瑜、柯文哲式的边缘人。柯文哲崇拜毛泽东，背诵毛语录，不是没原因的。韩柯只是当市长还权力有限，如果柯文哲当上总统，台湾不是没可能成为第二个委内瑞拉。 第二，亲中国引进腐败模式。 查韦斯和马杜罗都亲中国，跟北京独裁政权「两地一家亲」。中国输血委内瑞拉500亿美元援助，习近平慷国家之慨，乱撒中国纳税人的血汗钱。但靠中国输血，委国仍陷入灾难，因为输入的是腐败，是中国模式。委国的教训是，靠外部，不能真正经济发展，必须要靠自身改革、市场经济、政治民主。柯文哲韩国瑜都想靠中国，那就是靠细菌，靠腐败，传染并毒害自己和台湾。 第三，国营化社会主义就是灾难。 中国近年经济严重下滑，去年增长率美国智库评估只有4.1%，远低於官方宣布的6.6%。北京学者据中国官方内部报告，去年增长率只有1.67%，甚至可能是负增长。中国经济这种「断崖式暴跌」，与习近平支持国有化、打击民营企业有关。国营化，国家控制，就是灾难，这是世界通律。委内瑞拉全面国家控制，所有石油公司收归国有，结果效率低下，产油下降，官僚和腐败横行。这点对台湾是警讯∶国民党热衷国有化，因政府拥有，就是党有，有利党天下。民进党在改革国营企业方面几乎没什麽动作，需要被敲一下警钟∶委内瑞拉化就是经济灾难化。 第四，反美亲中死路一条。 从查韦斯到马杜罗都是反美。美国代表什麽？经济上，是市场经济，民营化，保护私有财产；政治上是民主化，宪政体制，美国没有动乱夺权；文化的主体价值是强调道德、自律、尊重他人权利。所以，反美亲中，就是反民主，站专制一边。在这点上，台湾也必须做出选择，应站在美国一边，旗帜鲜明与美国结盟，而不是在中美之间选择中立。所谓「中立」不仅策略上行不通，价值上也是错误的。在对错之间，是非之间，民主与专制之间，没有中立，没有灰色地带。 第五，自己先发声才赢得外部声援。 这次美国等全球多个民主国家承认委国议长临时总统，首先是因为委内瑞拉反对派和人民不折不挠、过去十多年一直抗争、反抗查维兹和继任者马杜罗的专权、要求真正民主和自由。虽然主要反对派领袖都被逮捕入狱，很多流亡，但人民仍在坚持。因物价飞涨，食品奇缺，很多人每天只能吃上一顿饭（有报导说委国人民80%体重下降），但成千上万的委内瑞拉人民仍是勇敢走上街头，抗议马杜罗们，争取自己的权利。这个抗争声音，传到了国际社会，告诉了美国等民主国家，委内瑞拉人民要的是什麽！所以才有了美国的政策改变，开始力挺委国人民，立即承认临时总统，并呼吁世界各国跟进。这点也给台湾启示，与其等待美国政策改变，不如像委内瑞拉人民那样自己首先起来抗争，发出声音，让美国和世界听到，才会引起注意，获得外部世界声援！只要是真实的声音，只要是民意，都会在世界良知的回音壁上获得回响！委内瑞拉就是一个摆在眼前的例子。 而且从川普总统执政之後，美国对台湾更加友好，川普签署的《台湾旅行法》，《2019国防授权法案》（其中条款），《亚洲再保证倡议法案》等都非常有利台湾。更不要说美国正在跟中国打贸易战，美国要在全球遏阻中共扩张（包括反制一带一路）。面对这样一个千载难逢的有利台湾的国际环境和独立建国的机会，民进党何去何从，不仅关系到其自身的政治前途，更关系到台湾迫在眉睫的命运。 2019年1月28日於美国 2019-01-28 http://www.caochangqing.com （转载请指明出处）
曹长青2025-11-01 10:54👍 0💬 0美资回流：中美友好的重要纽带开始松动 - 中美关系变化之回溯（二）
如前所述，中美关系发生变化的一个重要原因，是诸多美国跨国公司巨头相继从中国市场撤出。中国方面只承认美资有撤出的，但不承认撤资“成潮”。美国波士顿企管顾问公司（BCG）发布的研究报告《美国制造归来》（Made in the USA, Again）指出，中美生产成本差距缩小，美资企业已从大陆撤离回流到美国，中国制造（Made In China）已变身成为美国制造（Made In America）。 中国市场已成美资眼中“鸡肋” 这里需要先对中国商务部公布的外商投资增加的数据作一解析。北京一直宣称外资还在持续增加，2011年1-9月，全国新批设立外商投资企业20407家，同比增长6.24%；合同外资金额1778.67亿美元，同比增长16.85%；实际使用外资金额866.79亿美元，同比增长16.6%。如果仅看这些数据定会产生误解，即中国还被世界跨国公司视为投资宝域。但实际情况并非如此，因为上述数据包括来自维尔京、开曼群岛、萨摩亚、毛里求斯和巴巴多斯等自由港的对华投资。维尔京、开曼群岛、萨摩亚等地正好是中国资本外逃的中转站和洗钱天堂。来自这些地方的所谓“新增对华投资”，其实只不过是中国人和中国公司在这些洗钱天堂漂白的资本回流。 早在四、五年前，美欧众多跨国公司就已经公开表露对中国投资环境恶化的严重不满。中国美国商会与中国欧盟商会连续三年发布的调查报告，都表示欧美商界对中国的保护性政策越发感到担心，认为它们在华工作的环境在未来几年将会更加恶化。外资的不满集中在三点：一是知识产权得不到保护，新规定迫使外资企业将业务和技术诀窍转让给中资公司，以换取市场准入。二是政府采购规定有失公平，在华经营的外资公司“期望在公开招标中获得平等对待”。三是中国对外资企业并购采取的限制。要成立合资企业，外资方面必须寻找中国公司作为合作伙伴，双方的股权分配只能是一半对一半。在中国知识产权保护力度严重不足，这给外资企业造成了巨大的损失。 美国政府与欧盟领导层与中国就投资环境进行多轮磋商，但未能有所改变。加之中国大陆近两年面临员工薪资上涨，土地成本增加，以及人民币不断升值等因素，造成整体生产成本大增。美资企业盘算成本之后，认为大陆廉价劳动力的优势已不复存在，于是将企业回迁美国。BCG在《美国制造归来》中预测，到2020年将有15%针对北美市场的美国企业从中国回流到美国。前不久，福特汽车公司宣布把1.2万个工作机会迁回美国，并将在美国投资160亿美元，包括62亿美元用于购买和升级在美工厂的配备。BGG高级合夥人希尔金（Harold L. Sirkin）指出，未来五年在美国一些地区制造的商品，生产成本将只比大陆沿海城市略高5%至10%。成本缩小的同时，美国的生产效率更超过大陆。 高盛从急欲联姻到绝袂离婚 撤资的不止产业界，还有金融业。最近几个月，美国银行（Bank of America）和高盛先后结束与中资银行的联姻。在它们采取行动之前，美银（Bank of America）和美林（Merrill Lynch）将其拥有的中国建设银行的10%的股份出售了大约一半。在所有美资的撤资当中，高盛的退出具有标志性意义。就我所知，高盛曾绞尽脑汁希望在中国扎根，为此充当了中国金融业最踊跃的战略投资者。为了获得北京青睐，高盛曾投入巨额公关费用进行巧妙的公关。这些公关手段当中包括采用北京最喜欢的手段：即帮助中国在国际社会宣传。那本罔顾事实、竭尽吹捧之能事的《北京共识》（2005年），就是美国高盛公司的资深顾问乔舒亚•库珀•雷默 （Joshua Cooper Ramo）执笔写成。这个报告不仅将中国这种罔顾社会公正与人权、严重透支生态环境的经济模式，说成“以平等与高质量的发展为其特点”，是“寻求公正与高质增长的发展途径”的发展模式；还说“北京共识”包含的许多“非经济理念”（即“专制极权政治＋市场经济”的政治理念与价值观）不仅值得发展中国家仿效，还将在全球范围内取代“华盛顿共识”。这种有点无耻但很有效的“公关”方式其它外资银行亦曾广泛采用，2004年在英文世界里发行并获得关注的《他改变了中国：江泽民传》，作者就是一句中国话都不会说的花旗（银行）集团的执行董事库恩。这位既非传记作家，也非记者，更不是中国问题专家的金融界从业者，亲自捉笔写就这本传记，其公关意义自不待言。 花费如此投入公关而进入的市场居然被舍弃，只有傻瓜才会将这一信息解读成是出自于自身的困难。只能说，这些银行已经看到一点：中国市场的前景晦暗，该是全身而退之时了。 跨国公司：北京游说美国的重要盟友 这些对美国政界有着举足轻重影响的跨国公司退出中国，意味着联系中美政治经济关系的重要纽带已经松动。以往的岁月里，由于在华投资的广泛利益，这些跨国公司一直力主中美友好，是美国政商两界“拥抱熊猫派”的主要社会基础。 多年来，跨国公司为了实现和保障在华投资利润，对国会进行了大量游说。它们在华盛顿有专门的游说人员，还结成了同盟。在中国加入世贸组织之前，他们热衷于呼吁美国政府无条件延长对华最惠国待遇。面对中国恶劣的人权状态与专制政治，他们游说国会的主要理由是，“中国正行进在接近西方民主的改良之路上”、“经济发展将会促进中国的政治改革”、“网路普及将给中国带来新闻自由”等等。这些游说活动中有几项让中国政府受益匪浅。例如，2000 年美国国会对中国最惠国待遇表决之前，波音等美国数百家跨国公司结成团体，发动了声势浩大的游说行动。参与人员包括各公司的政府关系专家、行业联合会的游说机构以及共同雇佣的专门游说公司。在近一年时间里，他们举办大量讲座和会谈，向国会灌输开放对华贸易将会给美国企业带来的巨大商机的理念，最终获得成功。这次集体游说总共花费1.12亿美元－－此前，美国商界集体行动的最高纪录是建立北美自由贸易区的游说，总额也不过3,000万美元。2007年美国出台《对华出口和再出口管制政策的修改和澄清及新的授权合格最终用户制度》，增加了47项出口管制产品，但最后促使美国减少管制产品的不是中国政府的抗议，而是美国的跨国公司波音、联合技术等企业的游说。 美国跨国公司对中美友好所做的贡献，中国政府基本不会公开承认。但北京心知肚明，尽管北京曾聘请20多家专业公关公司为其在美国游说，其效果却远不如这些在美国本土政界拥有盘根错节关系网络的跨国公司。当美国金融产业界与中国的紧密联系松动之后，中国与美国在地缘政治上的矛盾、以及中国与国际体系、中共价值观与普世价值的内在冲突等各种因经贸利益而被强行压制下去的摩擦性因素就会日益突显。 无疑，中美关系面临新变局。从目前的状况来看，美国对此似乎已有心理准备，中国方面明显准备不足。 （原载作者的美国之音博客，http://voachineseblog.com/heqinglian/2011/11/us-china-part2/）。
何清涟2025-11-06 06:38👍 0💬 0On Systemic Corruption in China and its Influence
The international community is fully cognizant of the seriousness of government corruption in China. China remains one of the few countries that continue to employ strict control of media and the Internet, and the organization Transparency International has still not been able to obtain permission to open an office in the country. As a consequence, it should not surprise us that the international community lacks a clear picture of the actual extent and nature of corruption and its negative influence on the country’s future development. This paper will attempt to clarify and address the following problems: The relationship between political corruption and the social system; The areas where there is a high occurrence of corruption and its forms; The unfavorable influence of corruption on social development; The methods employed by the Chinese government to strengthen social control. The paper concludes that, under the current social system, the government is incapable of finding a solution to a problem that it has itself created. As a Chinese saying puts it, even the sharpest blade cannot be used on itself! The government’s measures against corruption in China are comparable to a surgeon performing an operation on himself. Serious corruption has devastated the very foundations of Chinese society and enveloped the country in a state of crisis—a volcanic landscape dotted with underground fires—and on the brink of erupting. In response, a number of academics have put their faith in the government’s capacity to maintain stability through its “fire brigade” approach to the problem. This includes increasingly widespread and violent political oppression, a reliance on informers and espionage, and tight control of the country’s media and the Internet. Important too has been the Party’s recent willingness to open a narrow door to power and authority to China’s economic and intellectual elites, allowing them to share in society’s wealth. The author’s opinion is that while this unstinting willingness to throw money around in order to survive will lengthen the ruling life of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it will fall short of overcoming the corruption crisis. 1\. The Special Characteristics of Phases of Corruption in China Early in 1999, the author wrote an essay expounding the argument that from the mid-90s onwards, China had entered a stage of systemic corruption. Beginning with the \[economic\] reforms, governmental corruption has gone through the following stages of evolution: From 1980 until the early 1990s, corruption was chiefly limited to the venal behavior of individuals. Yan Jianhong, General Manager of the Guizhou China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC), Gao Senxiang, President of the Shenzhen Branch of CITIC Industrial Bank and Wang Jianye, head of the Planning Department of the Shenzhen Planning Bureau are typical examples. From 1995 onwards, corruption developed from individual acts into an organized pattern of behavior. Organized corruption includes: 1. Corrupt behavior by leading figures and subordinates in social organizations—including government departments—becoming the norm within the organization; 2. Exchange of power for money or other liquid assets by members of an institution; 3 Use, by relatively low-level government organizations and enterprises, of public resources at their disposal in order to bribe higher officials. These bribes are aimed at obtaining increased levels of public finance, favorable policies or more opportunities in general. The case of Deng Bin in Wuxi of Jiangsu province displayed the typical characteristics of “organized corruption”. Another prime illustration of such activity was the notorious Zhanjiang smuggling case, which led to the “collapse” of the Party Secretariat, Mayor and leading officials from, among others, the departments of Finance and Customs, as well as the exposure of smuggling operations organized by military authorities. Beginning in 1998, the organized corruption described above began the transition to systemic corruption. Evidence of this transition can be seen from the following: Firstly, corruption has permeated into the political system itself and was now dominant throughout the government apparatus. The departments of Industry and Commerce, Customs and Excise, Finance, Land, Education and Public Health have been particularly prone to systemic corruption over the years. Secondly, corruption has become a system of resource allocation in itself. Society’s political, economic and cultural resources are thus a principal target. Each case of the sale of official posts and titles represents an example of systemic corruption.\[1\] Thirdly, the campaign against corruption has itself—on one level—become a tool for obtaining gain or prosecuting a political struggle. For example, part of the political and economic life of the city of Rui’an in the Wenzhou area of Zhejiang fell under the control of a local village gangster after he used the corrupt behavior of the officials as a lever to gain influence over official appointments.\[2\] In recent years, the Organization Department of the CCP’s Central Committee has even used information on the private affairs of its cadres—matters that they would rather keep quiet—to control their behavior. The so-called “struggle against corruption” has been stained by its use as a weapon to attack political rivals. For example, the purging of Zhu Xiaohua and Wang Xuebing from Zhu Rongji’s team of officials was allegedly on the grounds of corruption, but this was, in fact, simply a case of using the campaign against corruption to purge them from office.\[3\] Because corruption has seeped into the daily life of the majority of government departments, officials who try to maintain an honest approach to their work are often squeezed out by others, who are fearful that such honesty will block their own route to riches. In what is surely testament to how low public values and social consciousness in China have sunk, it is now the case that all officials are taking kickbacks. This is how ‘things gets done’ and the size of the kickback is the measure of “success.” At times, government departments have actually been known to strike deals with criminals in order to protect higher-level officials and avoid exposure of their corruption. The case concerning the business activities of the Huachen Group’s Managing Director, Yang Rong, in August 2002 is a good example.\[4\] The reliance on what amounts to blackmail to restrain the behavior of officials and the use of the campaign against corruption to liquidate political rivals, has now become the glue that unites political elites together. In these circumstances, regulations against corruption will not act as deterrents. Instead, they will encourage political elites to guard against any divisions in their ranks and adopt various new measures to prevent the emergence of a strong and influential opposition faction. In recent years, universal recognition of corruption and widespread exchange of power for money has reduced previously audible appeals from China’s political elite for political reform to a muffled whisper. Friction within the political system has diminished. On the issue of corruption, all the established political power holders are in agreement: the upholding of the current political system and status quo is in the interests of those who have already acquired riches. In fact, “corruption with Chinese characteristics” is almost identical to the forms of corruption in Latin America and South Asia. Although there are differences between China’s political system and those of the nations of these two continents, the supremacy of power over law is common to all these systems. In China, those who have become rich through corruption and have power and wealth at their disposal are situated at the very top of the social hierarchy. Because the source of their wealth is unclear, the vast majority of ordinary people are highly suspicious of the legitimacy of their prosperity, and, from a moral perspective, hold such people in low esteem. In 1997 and the first half of 1998, a number of social and political commentators welcomed Jiang Zemin’s “Theory of the Three Represents”, and the “July 1 Speech” recommending “the entry of private entrepreneurs into Party.” The so-called theory is employed as an attempt to justify the current social order in China and to open up an institutionalized route for the integration of China’s political and economic elites. 2\. Causes of Systemic Corruption in China The point is that corruption in present-day China is not a transitional phenomenon, nor is it the product of capitalism as Chinese official media proclaims. The structure of political power in Chinese society determines the inseparable relationship between corruption and the country’s social system itself. Relying on anti-corruption measures and posturing from the CCP government will yield no real results on institutionalized corruption. To begin with, the CCP formulates the Constitution and all laws, as well as industrial and commercial regulations. The latter are especially important as they ensure that the powerful interest groups within each sector are also those that take part in the government and Party’s legislative process. In the process of formulating laws, a clear systemic bias emerges. It becomes even more pronounced as the CCP government simultaneously performs the three roles of formulating, implementing and monitoring all laws. Apart from the CCP, there is no other existing power that can perform any monitoring of the government. And unsupervised power is the breeding ground of corruption. Secondly, the CCP is not simply the allocator of resources in China, it is also the chief beneficiary of this allocation. Such a system gives pole position to government officials, who are able to use their posts to get the first bite of society’s cake. Thirdly, in the “market economy with Chinese characteristics”, the CCP government not only fixes the rules, it takes part in the competition and acts as referee as well. A great deal of attention has been focused on the two most important changes to the Chinese economic system since 1978, namely the dissolution of the command economy and the expansion of the non-state sector. Faced with this transformation, many researchers have employed the “planned economy or free market economy” either/or formula to arrive—with alarming alacrity—at the reductionist conclusion that the market already occupies the dominant position in the Chinese economic system. Such a simplistic conclusion misses a key point. That is, following the dissolution of the command economy in China, the system that filled the vacuum wasn’t necessarily a market economy. To be sure, there is no doubting the disintegration of the command economy, but this has not led to a reduction of interference in economic life by the government or monopolistic state institutions. It has simply rendered it a random, as opposed to, systemized intervention. It is not the market that dominates the economic process in China. Rather, there exists a “twin-track system”, which relies on the interplay of more or less equal measures of market forces and random government intervention. This is not the same as the classical market systems we see in Western Europe, and is also different from the market systems that have evolved in the non-socialist countries of East Asia. It is instead a hybrid that blocks the efficient allocation of resources, and provides an increasingly fertile breeding ground for corruption. Political expedience dictates that the government restricts its definition of reform to a “reform of the planned command economy and adjustment to the ideology that rejected private economic activity.” Over the course of time, academic custom and practice has led even respected scholars to accept the government’s limited definition of reform, and allow its propaganda to permeate into their thinking. In other words, intellectuals “accept” that the formation of a market economy in China is thus reduced to the turning of various ideological and macro-economic levers. The ideological room required for a market economy to operate is duly provided; controls over prices, production, the money supply, and labor are removed, to a greater or lesser degree. More decision-making power is permitted to devolve from the center to local governments. But in fact a socialist system is not simply a matter of “a command economy plus ideology.” A mature socialist system gives rise to and nurtures its own social structures and institutionalized norms and culture. It is simply not possible for China’s lame duck reforms—which have excluded any political progress or reform—to “disappear” these socialist social structures and their cultural appendages. Far from it in fact. They have clung tenaciously to their own existence while ensuring their familiar “traces” have remained well-hidden throughout the economic transformation. The result is an economic system that acknowledges the original power structures, and accepts the market—as a method of exchange—being grafting on to existing political and social foundations. The two foundations of the former planned economy that have remained in place despite the disappearance of its form are: 1.The huge Party-state machinery and monopolistic state organizations that constitute its organizational pillars, running from the center down to local village government, that have not yet been disbanded. Some of these have merged while others have just changed their names. The power of these organizations to involve themselves at any time in daily economic activity has in no way diminished, let alone been cancelled out. 2.The high political and social status still enjoyed by China’s ten million CCP cadres and the twenty million staff members employed by monopolistic state institutions. While the environment in which these powerful groups exist has undergone tremendous changes, their capacity to act in their own interest is even greater than it was in the pre-reform era. The changes include, firstly, the significant weakening of the top-down disciplinary restraints that were a feature of the former, highly centralized system. This weakening has allowed organizations and individuals within them much more room to manoeuvre. Secondly, the goals and objectives of individuals and organizations have changed. In the past, the goals were to work hard at ensuring that orders from above were fully implemented, in order to secure and expand an organization’s power and gain personal promotion in the process. Since the reforms, these aims have modified into striving to establish “income opportunities” for an organization, which in turn transforms the goals of individuals, from seeking promotion and status, to the exclusive pursuit of money, legal or illegal. The disintegration of the planned economy resulted in the government treasury no longer being able to hold on to total control of the country’s resources. With the decline in the dimensions of public finance, the higher authorities have been left unable to fully finance the normal activities of the lower levels of their organizations and state institutions. They are thus incapable of meeting the continual demands for better wages and benefits issuing from the people who staff these institutions. In this context, the behavior of institutions and the cadres who staff them has naturally undergone considerable modification. While they are no longer the docile tools of central government, simply carrying out orders of the latter, they are certainly not civil servants subject to the checks and balances of genuine civil society. Moreover, they are no more disposed to abandon their social-political status than they are to accept a drop in their economic standing. Hence, on the one hand they represent the government by carrying out public duties and, on the other, make use of the power this gives them to obtain personal economic gain. Familiarity with the “job” has rendered them highly adept at identifying and seizing opportunities for advancement. From a moral perspective, their motives could best be described as driven by a determination to make use of the power at their disposal before it reaches a “sell-by date”. To put it crudely, “get it—and spend it—while you can.” The widespread administrative interference in economic activity by the government or its monopolistic institutions has also manifested itself in the trend of commercialization of state administration organs and public services that emerged during the nineties. Because the organs of state administration were originally dependent solely on public finance for their existence, they could not avoid falling into a state of “semi-starvation”. In order to ensure their membership of Deng’s vanguard class of nouveau riche, the overwhelming majority of public or government officers spend their time in office meticulously calculating how to make the best use of their power for the greatest possible personal gain. This process has produced a unique systematized culture: the capitalization of political power and corporatization of government behavior. The results manifest themselves in a myriad of ever present “wealth creation” activities. This was originally regarded as an inevitable makeshift and stop-gap phenomenon, but the term “wealth creation” has since become a specialist term that appears regularly in official documents. The most common concrete expression of this scenario is the exchange of the power and opportunities possessed by state institutions for direct or indirect economic gain. Administrative institutions and departments brazenly use their power to apportion or allocate wealth by various means: “compensated reports” in the news media, short-term “training courses” in educational institutions and universities, the concoction of various pretexts to sell educational diplomas, the sale of places in primary and middle schools, the enrolment of “high-price students,” the sale of publication permits by publishing houses and hospitals forcing the recipients of publicly-funded medical services to buy expensive and unnecessary medication when they are being treated for illness. The authority to check tax evasion and smuggling, broadcast and publish news, bestow academic qualifications, publish materials etc. which in the past had no connection with commercial activity, have become the essential tools of “wealth creation”. “Market exchanges” have expanded into government organizations and public services, and the parameters of this so-called “market economics” are far wider than those in any of the developed countries, greatly enlarging the space available for “rent seeking” as state institutions, organizations and work units continuously seek and create opportunities to interfere in social and economic life in search of financial gain. This interference has become increasingly lawless and random—a direct result of the lame duck reform process. With public finances under increasing pressure and no corresponding reduction in the size or budgets of state organizations and institutions, this kind of activity can, in the short term, reduce financial burdens on the government and simultaneously increase the income of the officers of these institutions and government departments, while bringing a measure of stability and continuity. It is for this reason that the central government has largely turned a blind eye to “rent seeking” and has at no point seriously attempted to curtail it. Yet the social consequences are real enough. The current situation not only brings chaos to society’s economic activity. It also profoundly weakens moral standards and even corrodes the fabric of society itself. When work units indulge in this kind of activity it is, more often than not, explained away in terms of “revitalizing ‘income-creation’ economics”. In contrast, if an individual officer is caught out and convicted of using a public office for private gain, his or her activities are invariably labelled as “corruption.”\[5\] For example, when institutions of higher education auction off diplomas and academic places, it is deemed to be “income-creation” and receives the endorsement of staff and teachers alike. If, on the other hand, an individual teacher is discovered to be selling marks to students, the teacher is condemned, and their reputation is left in tatters. When a top level lecturer at a medical school in the city of Urumqi in Xinjiang was found to be selling marks to students for a few hundred dollars in exchange for successful examination grades, he was condemned as corrupt. 5 But in reality, there is no difference between an institutional engaging in organized “income creation” and an individual doing the same thing by using the name of an institution. The term “income creation” and “corruption” are entirely interchangeable and provide a mutual shield. Many of the individual victims in the resulting chaos are the same people who create the disorder in the first place and are capable of presenting one of two public faces according to particular situations. When evaluating their own behavior, they will unashamedly start by looking to their own interests, and conduct a bold, high-sounding defense of inappropriate activities. In evaluating the same kind of behavior by others, they will swiftly climb to the moral high ground, and sternly censure those who have been caught with their fingers in the proverbial till. The blackmail and extortion case involving Shang Meiying, a Deputy Director of the Trademark and Advertising Administration House, and an officer in the Xianyang City Bureau of Commerce and Industry in Shaanxi province, is a good example. In June 1997, Shang deemed that the Buzhang Company was adopting irregular trademark and advertising policies in the area under her jurisdiction, and proceeded to blackmail the person responsible at the company by threatening to send letters to all 151 of the company’s clients, besmirching its reputation. Despite pleas from the Buzhang Company to lower the amount, Shang Meiying insisted that the price tag for not sending an individual letter was 10,000 yuan, a total of 1.5 million yuan. The company was left with no option but to report Shang to the police who detained her for a number of days before ordering her release on bail. On her emergence from prison, the Xianyang Commerce and Industry Bureau went so far as to formally organize a grand ceremony to welcome her back. The clearly corrupt Deputy Director of a government department was feted as a returning heroine.\[6\] As mentioned above, what has emerged in China in the long period since the dissolution of the command economy is a “twin track economy” that has little in common with the former system. In other words, China’s developing market system exists alongside administrative interference. By the latter, I do not refer to the normal macro-economic management of the economy by government, but chiefly to two sets of circumstances: firstly the implementation of policies aimed at satisfying influential sectors in society. This includes, for example, the continued willingness of the banks to follow orders and issue new loans to loss-making state owned enterprises already way behind on instalments from previous loans. Secondly, the improper interference in society’s regular economic activity by powerful institutions and individuals bent on economic advantage for themselves. By its nature, this kind of interference is not subject to regulatory supervision, and consequently the central government cannot effectively control it. The government’s response is limited to occasional anti-sleaze and anti-graft campaigns to try and restrain improper interference. In fact, the plague currently afflicting China’s “twin track” system of random administrative interference and market economics cannot be cured from within. Propaganda campaigns that rely on heavy punishments and the example of designated individual people as “models” of morality will not have any genuine effect. The current “twin track” may well last into the foreseeable future as it does partially fulfil the functions of a market economy by bringing market regulation to exchanges between producers, and between producers and consumers, thereby ensuring continued economic activity. Another factor ensuring its continuing existence is that the “twin track” not only acknowledges and retains the original structure and organization of power, but, moreover, it has actually injected the original structure with a new lease of life that has consolidated its existence. Consequently, the overwhelming majority of civil servants, government officials and staff of various public institutions have emerged as the big winners in the “reform” process, and their support for the process is thus ensured. As a result, the Chinese government will definitely not launch any political reforms that will even slightly touch this present power structure in the short-term future. Hot Spots of Corruption A.Government Departments Table 4~1: Statistics on Corruption Cases Investigated by Inspection Bodies Year No. of Cases No. of Officials involved (county level and above) 1988 36,500 1989 58,926 742 1990 51,373 1,188 1991 46,219 924 1992 98,876 915 1993 56,491 1,037 1994 60,312 1,827 1995 63,953 2,262 1996 61,099 2,699 1999 38,382 2,200 2000 45,113 2,680 2001 54,367 2,670 Note: These statistics are from annual reports compiled by China’s Supreme Procuratorate. However, there are two peculiarities to the figures that need to be noted. Firstly, there are inconsistencies in the annual specifications (or: annual statistical presentation); and secondly there are inconsistencies in the methodology. For example, the cases covered in the four-year period from 1988-1991 are presented as annual totals, but the figure for 1992—compiled in 1993—is presented as a sum of the five-year period from 1988 to 1992. In other words, the figure of 98,876 cases for 1992, was arrived at by subtracting the accumulated figure of 115,422 for the four-year period 1988-1991 from the total figure 214,318 for the five-year period 1988-1992. The 1998 Procuratorate report states the total number of cases for the five-year period 1993 to 1997, and shows different statistical specifications than in previous reports. The 1999 report has different specifications, and so the previous two years (1997-1998) are left blank. Beginning in the 1990s, the following trends began to emerge in corruption: The number of Party and government officials implicated in cases of economic corruption rose continuously. There was also a marked rise in the number of high-level officials involved in corruption. Among those sentenced for corruption and bribery were former Vice Chairman of the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee, Cheng Kejie; former Deputy Governor of Jiangxi province, Hu Changqing; former deputy minister of the Ministry of Public Security, Li Jizhou; Vice Governor of Liaoning province and mayor of Shenyang city, Mu Suixin; former Governor of Yunnan province, Li Jiating, and former Anhui province Vice Governor, Wang Huizhong. The tentacles of corruption have also reached out to officials of the Procuratorate (Chinese prosecution service) and officers of the government’s civil and legal administration bureaucracy. Criminal behavior by staff members includes extortion, blackmail, acceptance of bribes, perverting the course of justice and the use of public office to protect illegal business of their family and relatives. As the scale of corruption has grown, so has the incidence of people absconding with large amounts of ill-gotten cash. Criminals have forged links across provinces and countries in order to facillitate their activities. This phenomenon of widespread organized corruption is causing enormous harm to the reputation of the reforms and, to a degree, the political and economic stability of the country itself. The corruption so far highlighted and exposed is limited to venal officials who have been publicly exposed. According to data gathered, only 42.7 of every 100 cadres who have been subjected to Party and government disciplinary punishment were formally investigated, and only 6.6 of them were actually sentenced by the courts. With a punishment rate of just 6.6 percent, the benefits clearly outweigh the risks, and it is hardly surprising that no sooner is one corrupt Chinese official caught another steps in to take their place. In the latter half of the 1990s, direct economic losses and losses to consumers—in the form of welfare and benefits—amounted to an annual average of between 987.5 billion and 1.257 trillion yuan – 13.2 and 16.8 percent of GDP! \[7\] B.The Government Offices in Charge of Resource Allocation The so-called “market economy” established during the course of the reforms is in fact little more than mimicry of the real thing. The power to allocate and distribute resources is still basically in the hands of the government and its officials, who, at all levels, remain the ultimate arbiters of who gets what. This reality gives appointed officials in ministries with control over resources, such as the State Bureau of Land Administration, the State Planning Bureau and financial organizations and institutions (state banks and securities companies, for example), considerable opportunities for rent-seeking activity. The methods these people resort to in order to gain advantage are hardly subtle and crystallized in the acceptance of bribes and the diversion of public funds. In 1995, there were a number of cases that serve as typical examples of this kind of corruption: Yan Jianhong, who served first as the Deputy Director of the Guizhou province Planning Committee and later as the Managing Director of the Guizhou CITIC, and Wang Jianye, head of the Shenzhen Planning Bureau’s Department for Finance and Trade. These government departments are in a position to approve or deny the use of materials and resources designated in government plans, as well as control the use of capital and various funds, which, in the particular environment of China’s “twin track” pricing system, amounts to nothing less than possessing the Midas touch. It is not rare for a single authorized “approval note” to immediately transform such people into millionaires.\[8\] During the 1990s the China Procuratorate Publishing House published the “Records on the Elimination of Corruption in Modern China,” along with a publication entitled “Justice and Evil—Records of the Latest Important Cases in the Punishment of Corruption” compiled by the CCP’s Central Commission for Discipline and Inspection.” The cases featured in these two books clearly revealed that corruption existed at all levels of government, state and Party activity, from the Central Committee down to the county level, and even lower. The State Bureau of Land Administration, which, as its name suggests, allocates land resources, is where corruption is especially severe, and it appears in the majority of cases that come to light. The investigation into the activities of Wang Ju, Deputy Mayor responsible for urban construction in the city of Shenzhen, ended with prosecution in 2001. The case found that 32 officials were involved in corrupt activities and the affair enveloped almost all officials working at the city’s Land and Urban Construction departments. The sheer amount of cash involved left the public—already accustomed to large-scale corruption—in a state of shock. The Wang clan, via Wang Ju’s daughter Wang Tao and her control of the project, harvested 120 million yuan in profits from the Windsor Square real estate development alone. According to government regulations, the plot was worth 150 million yuan, but Wang Ju ordered his subordinate, the Deputy Director at the Shenzhen Land Planning Bureau, Pang Chenghong, not to go through official land value procedures when dealing with the Windsor project. The price was subsequently valued at 27.6 million yuan, 122 million yuan less than its real value.\[9\] The city of Beihai in Guangxi province has been hit particularly hard by the phenomenon of “land speculation”, a problem exacerbated by the even more common occurrence of insider trading. Following a two-year investigation by the Central Investigation Group, 123 people were implicated in the Beihai “land enclosures” scandal, involving embezzlement and bribery. Five provincial-level cadres and 20 department-level cadres were caught up in the case, which involved a sum of 110 million yuan. Three standing committee members of the Beihai city Party Committee were punished for the large sums garnered via embezzlement and the acceptance of bribes. They were the Beihai Deputy Mayor in charge of day-to-day affairs, Wang Fangchun, the Secretary for the Committee of Politics and Law, Peng Fuqin, as well as the Director of the Department of Organization, He Youxue.\[10\] The corruption case against Deputy Governor of Anhui province and Secretary of the Fuyang city Party Committee, Wang Huaizhong, involved 100 million yuan, the bulk of which appeared to come from profits from the resale of state land. According to the data that was made public, Wang Huaizhong oversaw the disappearance of state assets worth up to one billion yuan by approving various land sales beginning in 1996. In fact, at least ten tycoons have emerged in China whose wealth is rooted in the continuous flow of profits from the sale of state land.\[11\] The province of Guangdong has been a hotspot for corruption arising from improper land transactions. Between 1992 and 1994, there were 13,894 cases involving ratification of various forms of land use that violated the relevant laws and regulations. The total land put to illegal use came to 152,000 mu of which 80 per cent was government-owned. In 1996, Guangdong province underwent a “find waste, eliminate waste” inspection and campaign, which revealed that out of the 238,000 mu of non-agricultural construction land lying idle, 70 per cent was rendered idle by the government.\[12\] In 1998, there were 287,000 cases of illegal sale or use of land on the public record alone. Of the 1.2 million mu of land involved, 387,000 mu was arable land.\[13\] On June 10 2001, Meng Xianlai, the Director of the Executive and Supervision Bureau of the Ministry of Land Resources, announced that there were 170,000 cases of land use violation in 2000, leading to an annual loss of 10 billion yuan in state-owned land. Despite this extraordinarily large number of violations, the ratio of cases thoroughly investigated remained small, and those successfully concluded even less.\[14\] Financial institutions in China have become known as “cash captains” and are enveloped in similar corrupt work practices as the departments responsible for land, public security industry and commerce and taxation. If ordinary citizens need to acquire loans or mortgages, they have no choice but to resort to bribery. This practice is so widespread that it has been dubbed the “All Chinese People’s Banking and Loan Service”, meaning that the people serve as an improper source of funds for the institutions. This kind of scandal is frequently reported in the press and other media channels. However, the underlying reason why this behavior is difficult to investigate and punish is because it is collective. A veritable sea of bribe-taking was exposed in the district of Linfen in Shanxi province in 1995. The manager of the Linfen Construction Bank, Liang Tianrong, and more than sixty colleagues working in the local financial system and enterprises were directly implicated in the case.\[15\] For many years the Puqi city branch of the Bank of China in Hubei province enjoyed a golden reputation as a “model advanced enterprise,” and was frequently the focus of attention as news media vied to report on the bank’s successful management. Almost out of the blue, the branch was revealed as a nest of maggots who, headed by its Director, Xiong Xuebin, were worming their way at will through the bank’s finances. The scale of graft and misuse of funds was so great that the bank’s operations resembled those of an independent kingdom. More than ten people, including the Deputy Bank Manager, Liu Shaoqin, Credit Department Manager Wei Jianxin, and Chief Accountant Li Junfeng, were involved in the operation. It was described locally as an organized mafia led by a ‘triumvirate of chariot-drivers to carry out the daily routine of graft’. From 1988 onwards, the bank’s accounts were distorted to a point that in 1995, when the gang’s activities were brought to a halt, the figures bore absolutely no relation to the real financial situation of the bank.\[16\] Cases of meticulously planned scams by bank directors are a common occurrence. In April 2002, a massive case involving the theft and misappropriation of assets came to light in Kaiping, Guangdong province. Beginning in 1993, three successive bank managers made use of a mutually beneficial relationship to obtain personal financial gain. The criminal activities of Xu Chaofan,Yu Zhendong and Xu Guojun spanned nine years, during which they stole a total of US$483 million. The theft was carried out via the financial system of the Bank of China itself, and apart from a few token investment loans in Kaiping, the vast majority of cash was diverted out of the country into private bank accounts – and subsequently spent. Following the success of this criminal activity, the three crooks left the country in October 2001, and disappeared. At the same time, the Guangdong branch of the Bank of China was enveloped in a mushroom cloud of graft, as fresh financial scandals emerged in all areas of its activities. The crisis was worsened by the Wang Xuebing case at its New York branch, and the Bank of China (Hong Kong) had no option but to abandon plans to list on the US (New York) and Hong Kong stock exchanges.\[17\] At present, the percentage of bad debts at the Bank of China is 30 per cent,\[18\] a figure directly related to the corrosive activities of corrupt officials. Although there are serious limits on the reporting of their activities in the media, the cases already revealed demonstrate a scale of corruption in administrative and law enforcement departments. These include the Public Security Bureau, the Procuratorate, the Department of Industry and Commerce, as well as Customs and Taxation, a revelation that has caused genuine alarm—even a sense of dread and foreboding—among the ordinary citizens of China. C: Public Utilities Many of the sectors responsible for the provision of public services in China such as housing, electricity, communications, health and education, have their monopolies. Consequently, Chinese people come into frequent contact with the officials running these monopolies—they have no choice. The often-voracious behavior of the staff and administrative personnel has led to various utilities being dubbed “tigers.” People refer to the “housing tiger” or the “electricity tiger” in reference to the way these officials make use of their “power” to line their own pockets. If someone needs an operation, then the doctor must be given lai see, or New Year gifts of cash. Headmasters and teachers receive gifts when a child starts school, and parents must meet the myriad and unreasonable demands made on them by schools. The effect is that people are left seething with anger, as they are forced to go along with what amounts to institutionalized bribery in order to obtain the relevant stamp of approval from various state-run monopolies. At first sight, these issues appear to be rooted in a culture of unethical behavior in the working practices of various public utility services. While this explanation has some credibility, it does not explain the absolute nature of the graft, responsibility for which ultimately lies within the political system itself. During the mid-90s, when the Chinese people still retained some confidence in the system, articles frequently appeared in the media criticizing the immoral work practices among staff working in public utility sectors. Among them was an article published in China Youth Daily entitled “Survey Regarding Work Practices in Public Sectors.” The article was based on a survey highlighting the eight most despised practices: use of public funds for lavish banquets and entertainment; refusing to deal with enquiries from the public; superficial responses to enquiries followed by chaotic and inefficient work performances; the chaotic and opportunistic charging of fees; the abuse of authority for personal gain; opportunistic levying of fines and penalties; abuse of expense accounts; and the seizure of assets by government and Party administrative organizations and their staff from work units and enterprises under their authority.\[19\] The entrenched behavior of officials in public utilities is frequently dubbed as being “even worse than a whore.” At least a whore, so the logic goes, provides a service in return for her money, and as such adheres to a “code of practice”. This is in stark contrast to the staff of public utility services who take money without so much as a nod to any form of code of practice, in the process destroying all legitimacy. The salaries of these government officials are from taxes people pay, and the established motto of “serving the people” is nonsense in the face of this spreading corruption that undermines the very foundations of government, destroys its integrity, weakens its operation and even degrades the aims of social policy. By the latter half of the 1990s, when corruption had already completed the transformation from organized graft to systemic corruption, ordinary people were left with no option but to “accept” reality and manifest a high degree of tolerance. Public servants notwithstanding, it is the behavior of doctors and teachers in their respective sectors where the total lack of occupational ethics has the most damaging impact on society. The lack of medical ethics is a prime example. Revelations of serious corruption and poor work practices by the director of a top-notch triple prize-winning hospital, owned by the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corporation, caused enormous consternation among the public. The director exposed senior hospital administrators for basing their duties purely on the grounds of profit, rather than health. If a department or ward was able to earn money, it was judged as efficient, regardless of its medical results. An entrenched form of rent-seeking established by nurses provided myriad opportunities for obtaining money from patients, by fair means or foul. The main modus operandi included: 1\. Every time a doctor referred a patient for a CT scan, he or she would receive a kickback of 4.5 yuan from the CT department. According to statistics made available by the whistle-blowing director, each doctor made 60 such referrals every month, but only 20 percent of these were for patients who genuinely required a CT scan. 2\. Between three and four overnight stay forms were registered for each hospital bed, in a practise that became know as “phantom beds”. Each one of these was worth five yuan to the department. In reality, there would be only one patient per bed, and the patients named on the bogus forms were diagnosed and treated at home, even though they had to pay the fees for hospital accommodation. Extra charges: A 16-year-old youth named Hu went to the same hospital with the same compliant three times in the latter half of 1997, and was diagnosed differently each time. The cost of treatment totalled over 5,000 yuan, of which 1,000 yuan was for fictitious diagnosis and treatment. This included being charged for the use of medical equipment that was not used and injections that were never given. On top of these charges, the teenager’s parents also had to pay for the nights they stayed in the hospital with their child, as well as for nursing costs. The hospital director stressed that this was simply a randomly picked case, and was not a typical example of extra charges. He explained that the vast majority of nurses were simply concerned with money, receiving cash gifts and getting their share of kickbacks, all of which were common phenomena. In order to safeguard the reputation of the hospital, protect the position of the leaders and ensure the continuous supply of departmental and individual bonuses, the director stated that staff at all levels lied about the problems, testament to the absence of any sense of professional pride or morality. The total annual income of the hospital was 80 million yuan, a fair proportion of which ended up in the coffers of the local government’s Department of Health. Members of the public wrote letters of complaint about the hospital to the Department of Health on many occasions, but these were simply passed on untouched to the hospital authorities by officers from the Health and other Departments. As a result, those who complained were often the targets of revenge meted out by hospital staff.\[20\] The lack of medical ethics was also an underlying cause behind the spread of HIV/ AIDS in the province of Henan, now a notorious and ongoing scandal. Poor needle management, including the use of dirty needles on people who were selling their blood, resulted in widespread HIV infection. This kind of practice is common throughout China. Hospitals in the city of Jinan, Shandong province—among them some well-known medical establishments—made a great deal of money by substituting industrial oxygen for higher-grade hospital quality oxygen, and charging patients requiring oxygen for the latter. Ignoring the safety of their patients, this scam was worth over 300,000 yuan a year.\[21\] The practice of hospitals forcing patients to buy expensive medicine and taking a kickback on each sale is extremely common in China. Over 60 doctors at the Wuhan city Number One Hospital in Hubei province made between 100 to 200 yuan per day from kickbacks obtained by forcing patients to buy expensive drugs.\[22\] In this overwhelmingly “sellers’ market”, patients have no bargaining power, and little choice but to go along with the medical staff’s flagrant exploitation of their position. Rarely in civilized societies do occupational ethics sink to such a terrible status. A “sense of responsibility” is an important moral base for any market economy, and the source of this must be the willingness of all individuals to accept moral responsibility for all the results of their own actions. Without moral responsibility, an occupational sector will quickly lose its social value. As far as society is concerned, it will be unable to efficiently realize its full professional functions, establish a beneficial service and organize itself as a social structure that can stabilize social values. And for individuals, a lack of ethics means that the sector cannot offer a long-term career path or allow staff and workers to accumulate personal skills. As such, the sector cannot make a contribution, or provide or serve society in any meaningful manner. Simply speaking, by losing people with a sense of responsibility, the conduct of the sector as a whole will degenerate into criminal behavior. I have concentrated on medical ethics for precisely this reason. The problems in the medical sector are no longer simply a question of occupational ethics, but of criminality. 4.The Influence of Corruption on Chinese Society The large amount of hard evidence I have researched has led me to the observation that the starting point for the redistribution of wealth that we have witnessed during the reform process has been the commodification of political power. The essence of the process of primitive capital accumulation in contemporary China can be found in the ‘power for money’ exchange, and parallel activities such as rent seeking, that has distinguished the behavior of political and economic elites and their hangers-on in contemporary Chinese society. These two elites are carving up the country’s wealth between them. The main target of this profoundly predatory form of primitive accumulation are the public assets that have been built from more than forty years of hard work, sweat and blood by the people as a whole. The chief technique for this plunder is to rely on power. And the consequences of this pillage – and I count systemic corruption among them – have now descended on China. And they are dire in the extreme. A.Large-Scale Capital Flight Because modern China’s process of primitive capital accumulation is racked with immoral and criminal behavior, the country’s new rich have two chief considerations. The first is the enormous wealth gap that has emerged. The extremely sharp social contradictions of this fact have rendered China a high-risk society. The second is that an overwhelming proportion of the income and wealth of the aforementioned elites comes from the “gray area” between legitimate entrepreneurial activity and criminality. This renders them sitting ducks for the inherently unstable “struggle against corruption.” Consequently, the majority of China’s nouveau riche combines their questionable economic activities with a ready passport and preparations for departure. Once enough money has been accumulated, many leave the country permanently. As of January 2001, China had over 4,000 individuals categorised as “corrupt” people who had succeeded in spiriting away over five billion yuan out of the country.\[23\] But this figure represents only a tiny portion of the capital that has left – and is leaving – China. Modern technology has presented unprecedented opportunities for the movement of capital, and it has reached new levels as a result. The trend of capital flight from China is upward. According to one researcher the total capital flight since 1985 amounts to 52.3% of the increase in foreign debt. This is higher than the average capital flight figure notched up by the world’s 15 most heavily indebted nations during the 1980s.\[24\] As we entered the 1990s, capital flight was close to, or even surpassed, annual increases in foreign debt. In other words, at the same time as China borrowed heavily from foreign sources, over half of the capital borrowed was leaving China via various channels. Some of this cash then “disappeared”, never to return. Mr Wool, a consultant for the Royal Commission on International Questions in the UK, pointed out in a report presented to the Organization for Economic Cooperation that between 1989 and 1995, overall levels of capital flowing out of China had probably surpassed US$100 billion. Approximately half was not approved by the government.\[25\] According to research data from the general office of the Ministry of Finance published in “A Positive Financial Policy,” capital flight in 1997 and 1998 reached US$36.5 billion and US$38.6 billion respectively. The situation was partially brought under control in 1999, but the level was still at US$23.8 billion. In 2000 capital flight again spiralled to approximately US$48.billion more than actual foreign investment, which stood at US$40.7 billion.\[26\] The fact is that only a portion of this capital flight comes from private entrepreneurs who are shifting capital abroad due to anxieties about China’s political instability. Corrupt officials involved in money laundering activity make use of all the methods at their disposal to give a respectable veneer to their ill-gotten gains so as to be able to spend the loot as freely as possible. Much of it is used as investment and continues to appreciate in value. The most devastating effects caused by the recent spate of corrupt officials fleeing overseas have been felt by finance departments and state-owned enterprises. The four top managers of the aforementioned Kaiping Branch of Bank of China successfully carried out their scheme to abscond with stolen funds. In 2001, of the 120-odd individuals charged with fleeing the country in cases filed by Beijing prosecutors, 70% were presidents, vice presidents or financial officers at state-owned enterprises. Many of the fugitives were also government office holders. One such example is the case of Cheng Sanchang, briefly hailed as a “model of SOE restructuring.” While jointly holding the positions of Mayor and Municipal Party Secretary of Luohe city in Henan province, Cheng sold off 27 state-owned enterprises, earning the nickname “Cheng Sell-off.” Via murky deals, “Cheng Sell-off” lined his pockets with funds embezzled from his sales of state-owned enterprises. In 1999, finding that the assets of the city’s public enterprises had largely been sold, he quit his official positions and moved to Hong Kong, where he served as CEO of the Yugang Corporation, a “window company” for the Henan Provincial Government. In May 2001, Cheng decided that the time was right to abscond, and he fled to New Zealand, taking with him his mistress and a sizable fortune.\[27\] The government officials and heads of SOEs who flee the country with vast sums of embezzled funds, typically lay their plans carefully. Rather than waiting for their malfeasance to be exposed before taking action, they start the process of arranging family members, funds and property abroad and making mental preparations from an early date. Each element of their plans is set in motion at the appropriate time. A typical plan involves making seemingly innocuous arrangements, such as having their wives and children take residency abroad, while they use a variety of means to transfer large amounts of illegal assets overseas. During this time, the officials remain in China, continuing to engage in corruption and amassing wealth. There they bide their time until, at the first sign of danger, they run. With these methods, most of the corrupt officials who flee China get away scot-free – only one in six are tracked down and brought back. According to an official in the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, in recent years, the Bureau has actively pursued between 20 and 30 cases annually involving fugitive officials, but only approximately five cases resulted in extradition. The official went on to say, “But this could be just the tip of the iceberg, because a portion of the cases are not handled by us.”\[28\] Since the 1990’s, the scale of capital flight in China expressed as a percentage of GDP has ranked second only to Russia, surpassing both Mexico and South Korea. In 1997, China’s capital flight as a percentage of GDP far exceeded that of Mexico in 1994-95, during the Mexican financial crisis, as well as that of South Korea in 1997, which was then experiencing its own financial crisis. Taking into account the possibility that, under China’s strict currency exchange policy, capital flows hidden in fraudulent trade reports and other kinds of hidden capital outflows may far exceed those of Mexico and Korea, one can conclude that the overall situation concerning capital flight from China may be much more severe than those two countries.\[29\] Between 1979 and 1997, China received a total of US$348.3 billion in actual foreign direct investment. Beginning in 1993, China ranked second in the world behind the US as a recipient of foreign direct investment for five years running. Meanwhile, according to IMF statistics, capital leaving China accounted for 2% of the total volume of international capital flows in 1995, making China the eighth largest supplier of capital in the world, and the top-ranked developing nation in terms of foreign investment. The kind of threat that capital flight poses to China is easy to see – the financial crises in Mexico and Thailand are evidence enough of this. It is reasonable to claim that China might well have encountered a financial crisis of its own long ago, were it not for the large amounts of foreign investment capital that have flowed into China since the 1990’s to replace the departing capital. One aim of this paper is to emphasize the political significance of large-scale capital flight. In actuality, the flight of capital out of China demonstrates the ever-increasing sense of crisis among China’s bureaucratic class. To the corrupt officials who have secretly prepared their foreign passports, China is nothing more than a good place to enrich them. B. The Influence of Organized Crime on Local Governments and the Gradual Merging of Crime and Authority Perhaps the most foul-tasting fruit from the tree of widespread illegal land transactions by local governments has been the growing influence of organized crime syndicates – known in Asia as Triads – on local government. In fact, it is often hard to draw a line between government and Triad authority. Data gathered from investigations and cases where a crime ring has been successfully broken show that these Mafia-type organizations have rapidly risen to prominence over a very short period of time. The social chaos they cause cannot be underestimated. One of the major reasons behind the rise of the Triads has been their links with local government officials – especially the PSB – with whom they collude very closely in an exchange of services and favours that are nothing more than protection rackets. China’s Triads differ from their Western counterparts in one important aspect. In the West, the basis for most crime syndicates’ power and influence is their contact with the police departments and judiciary ministries. But the antennae of China’s criminal gangs are even longer, with cadres serving as a reliable source of power and influence for the gangs and a number of crime bosses also working as leading officials, donning what we call the “red cap.” In the city of Wenling in Zhejiang province, syndicate boss Zhang Wei also held eight separate official posts stretching way beyond the borders of Zhejiang province. Zhang’s posts included Deputy Chairperson of the Yidu city Political Consultative Conference in Hubei, a member of Youth Federation’s Standing Committee and Deputy Director of the Young Entrepreneurs Association in Suizhou city, Director of a well-known news agency in Zhejiang, and four more leading official positions. Zhang Wei’s case implicated 69 members of the government and Party members, including the Wenling city Mayor, Chief of Police (PSB), 42 government or Party cadres, 15 members of the judiciary, and ten people from financial organizations. A copper plate hanging on the gate of Zhang’s residence announced “Key Protection Unit of the Wenling PSB”, encouraging local people to dub him “the red gang boss.”\[30\] The execution of Jilin’s most important crime boss, Liang Xudong,\[31\] Liaoning’s notorious Liu Tong,\[32\] and Guangxi’s Zhou Shounan,\[33\] are all reminiscent of the Zhang Wei case. The evidence revealed during these trials proved beyond all doubt the existence of an “alternative” authority operating under the protection of powerful officials and their networks, and causing untold social damage. Even worse, a recent report by the Ministry of Public Security has revealed that Triad forces had permeated into government offices at county and city level. They were succeeding in getting chosen as government “representatives”, and taking leading roles in local Congresses. As such, corrupt officials are transforming organs of public power into channels for Triad activity. The overall picture is of a merging or blurring of the lines between the police and criminal gangs, who rule society between them. This is possibly the worst-case scenario for any given society. One result of these developments that should not be ignored has been the spread of criminal behavior and values into society at large. The pernicious values of Triads and organized crime have had a serious influence on the daily behavior of Chinese people since the 1990s. This trend has shown itself particularly clearly in power struggles that frequently involve the activities of Triad groups, and it is against this background that the phenomenon of “officials killing officials” has emerged in recent years. Some of the more notorious cases include: the hiring of a contract killer by Chen Jinyun, the Anyi County Magistrate in Jiangxi province, to murder the county Party Secretary Hu Cigan and his deputy Wan Xianyong in 1995; the March 1997 conspiracy to murder the former mayor of Yangchun city in Guangdong province and his associates, hatched by Yangchun Party Secretary Yang Wenyao, Deputy Mayor Yang Qizhou, Deputy Director of the City Finance Office Lin Qiju and others; the June 28, 1999 murder of Lu Jingyi, leader of a nearby Batai town, and his wife by former Party secretary of Wugang city, Li Changhe; the March 16, 1999, murder of a public prosecutor named Huang Conghua by an official at the national tax bureau on Hainan island; the killing of a local county head by the leader of the Fushin city judiciary on March 26, 1999, There are over ten cases of government officials resorting to criminal methods that are normally the terrain of organized crime. The contract killers themselves are either Triad “gophers”, or extremely poor and marginalized members of society. It is true that competition for posts between officials in China was not previously conducted by relying on more commonplace criteria such as an individual’s moral integrity, skills, diligence and ability to get results. Chinese society has already been heavily punished for its preferred method of cadre selection. The recent added ingredient of organized crime will only serve to aggravate a system that is already devoid of procedure. Worse still, the entry of organized crime and its evil methods into political life will encourage other sections of society to imitate their methods. Cases of kidnap and ransom and murder have already become a common feature of everyday life over recent years. Ordinary people in China suffer from a profound lack of security as a result of living under an authoritarian and dictatorial system. The addition of alternative power structures dominated by a casual use of violence and Triad activity will do nothing but add to their insecurity and fear. C. A Widening Wealth Gap Gives Rise to Acute Social Tensions One result of rampant rent-seeking activities is that the income gap that has been steadily widening since the 1990s has begun to show a clear trend towards “polarization”, where the rich get richer while the poor become even poorer. China’s income gap can be measured using two methods: Gini coefficients and the distribution of bank deposits. According to calculations by the World Bank, in 1978, before China embarked on the policy of “reform and opening”, the Gini coefficient for personal income distribution in cities and towns was just 0.15. This was essentially the lowest in the world at the time, and reflected the effects of China’s egalitarian ideology and the “big rice bowl” system. From the mid-1980s onwards, however, the income gap grew rapidly, as the following table of Gini coefficients illustrates: Table: Changing Gini Coefficients Year Individual income of urban residents Individual income of rural residents Survey by Renmin University of China,PPS sampling 1978 0.15 1982 0.22 1986 0.19 0.30 1988 0.34 1990 0,23 0.31 1994 0.370 0.411 0.434 2001 0.458 Note: The Gini coefficient for 2001, as reported by the National Bureau of Statistics, does not distinguish between urban and rural incomes. See Economic Daily, 29 October 2001: page 7. It should be noted that the Gini coefficients reported by the Chinese government do not entirely coincide with the perceptions of ordinary people. For, while the statistics for middle and lower income families presented in these surveys are fairly reliable owing to the relative transparency of these families’ incomes, the figures for the upper income brackets should be viewed with skepticism, as these families tend to have hidden sources of income. Nevertheless, even going by these vastly under-reported official government figures, it is undeniable that in the brief span of 20 odd years, China has changed from an egalitarian society into one in which the gap between rich and poor causes social unrest. In 1998, those in the top 20% of the urban income scale earned 9.6 times the income of the bottom 20%; the top 10% earned 38.4% of total income; while the bottom 20% earned a meager 5.5% of total income.\[34\] According to a 1998 report by the World Bank, China has already overtaken Eastern Europe and many of its Asian neighbors with its steadily rising levels of income inequality. Unless China’s current taxation policies are changed and increasing levels of official corruption reigned in, China’s income gap will continue to widen. The distribution of banking deposits reveals the “inverted pyramid” structure of wealth distribution in China. Data on personal bank deposits show that in 2000, just 1.26 per cent of depositors owned 27 per cent of the 7 trillion yuan of total bank deposits, and 7.8 per cent of depositors owned 65 per cent of the total. Other data shows that currently in China, 15per cent of the population owns 85 per cent of society’s wealth, with the remaining 85per cent controlling just 15 per cent of the wealth\[35\] – a perfect inverted pyramid. As the data cited in this paper show, we can depict income distribution in China as an inverted pyramid and the following observations can be made: The top 10 per cent of income earners, who occupy a place at the very top of the pyramid, save most of their income and control more than half of China’s private wealth. The villas, upscale apartments, fancy imported cars and luxury boutiques – so far beyond the reach of ordinary Chinese – are for their consumption only. In the race to accumulate wealth, these individuals have become rich not, in most instances, as a result of merit, but because of their personal connections and the positions they hold. Evidence of their “success” might be measured in the observation that the food these people give to their pets is of a higher quality than the food the poor have to feed their children. At the bottom of the pyramid are the 20 per cent of the population who live in poverty, the vast majority of whom are accumulating debt. Their circumstances are described above. At the middle of the pyramid sits the vast wage-earning class. They are able to save only a small portion of their hard-earned salaries. Judging from the urban living conditions of the 1990s, the “wealth” of the wage-earning class primarily consists of furniture, other household articles and a meager amount of cash savings, government bonds, stocks and the like. In coastal regions such as Shenzhen, the typical “wealth” of the wage earning class might consist of a “welfare apartment” (i.e. a state-subsidized home) that cannot be resold on the housing market. A portion of these families (those falling below the middle line of the pyramid) must constantly struggle lest they fall to the bottom. The speed at which they are able to increase their savings is far outpaced by the rate with which the government introduces new measures aimed at emptying out their pocketbooks. This group makes up more than 80 per cent of the population and bears the “costs of reform”, while the per cent in positions of power enjoy the “fruits of reform”. This pattern of wealth distribution will eventually lead to a scenario in which those at the bottom, unable to make a living, resort to violence to seize back the wealth that was taken from them. D. Barriers to the Free Flow of Information in Society The most direct threat that official corruption poses to China’s government does not come from a decline in public trust. China’s government is not elected and, ever since the Mao era, has followed the violent political doctrine that “power issues from the barrel of a gun,” though it always proclaims that it represents the will of the people. Rather, the greatest threat to the Chinese government is the softening of political power, where the pursuit of individual interests on the part of government officials is based overwhelmingly on the contravention of laws and the flouting of ethical standards. Such a “softening” of political power will inevitably put the Communist regime’s hold on power in jeopardy. In the process of this gradual dissipation of government authority, the aspect that is most damaging to the government’s functioning is the habitual falsification of information by corrupt officials. Time and time again, the Chinese government has fallen into traps created by the reporting of bogus figures by officials, where policy decisions made using faulty information often exacerbated the very problems they were designed to address. Falsification of information is hardly a new problem for China’s government. Indeed, there is a longstanding tradition of fabrication in the political culture of the Communist Party. During the notorious “Great Leap Forward” period, official fabrications reached new peaks of absurdity. Although the problem receded in the early Deng Xiaoping era (the 1980s), the Chinese government’s accustomed practice of falsifying information returned in full force during the administration of Jiang Zemin, when official appointments and compensation for cadres became tied to a handful of economic development indicators, encouraging fraudulent reporting by officials on a large scale. The public’s take on the illegitimate use of statistics is vividly captured by such sayings as, “The village cheats the township, the township cheats the county, each level cheats the next level up,” and “Officials make the numbers, numbers make the officials.” The Chinese government has publicized a number of cases where punishments were imposed for the falsification of data. In the second half of 1997, a nationwide investigation into the implementation of statistical regulations was jointly conducted by the State Bureau of Statistics, the Ministry of Supervision and the Bureau of Legislative Affairs of the State Council. The investigation uncovered more than 60,000 violations of statistical regulations, 56.7% of which involved the misreporting, concealment, fabrication, or doctoring of statistical data. According to Ye Changlin, director of the Department of Policies and Legislation of State Bureau of Statistics, these were relatively minor infractions, hence the name “violations of statistical regulations”; an additional 15,000 cases nationwide, involving more serious statistical illegalities, were investigated, and those responsible punished. One such case provides a good illustration of the problem: Since assuming the post of Magistrate of Xichong County in Sichuan Province in 1993, Liu Rongzhi repeatedly forced data collectors to report fraudulent statistical data to suit his own purposes. For instance, in 1995, the actual countywide gross industrial product was 179.21m yuan, but the reported figure was 289.55m yuan – an overstatement of 110.34m yuan, or 61.57 per cent of the actual measured value. The worst instances of over-reporting involved township enterprises, where reported numbers were 1.18 times the actual figures.\[36\] In 2001, China’s national statistical system saw more than 62,000 violations of statistical regulations were investigated and punished.\[37\] Falsification of data is not confined to government. The practice of issuing falsified financial reports in conjunction with fraudulent accounting practices on the part of accounting firms – which are entrusted to uphold the interests of society – has grown into a chronic and intractable disease in Chinese society. In 2000, China’s Ministry of Finance instructed various local financial supervisory offices to investigate the quality of accounting data for the 1999 financial year from a sample of 159 companies. The investigation included companies doing business in the sectors of foreign trade (import-export of foodstuffs and chemicals), telecommunications, automobiles and machinery, along with the 117 accounting firms who had prepared the companies’ audit reports. It was found that 147 of the 159 companies under investigation had misreported their assets: asset value totaling 1.848 billion yuan had been over-reported, and 2.475 billion yuan in the value of actual assets had gone unreported, representing a 0.95 per cent rate of misreporting on assets. The investigation found misreporting of owners’ equity in 155 of the companies. The amount over-reported totaled 1.936 billion yuan, and 1.817 billion yuan of equity went unreported, representing a 1.82 per cent rate of misreporting. And 157 of the companies had misrepresented their earnings figures. Altogether, 1.472 billion yuan was over-reported and 1.943 billion yuan was under-reported, representing a 33.4 per cent rate of false reporting of earnings.\[38\] Accounting irregularities are commonplace among the state-owned enterprises in Shanghai. Falsification of balance sheets is rampant, many enterprises engage in bogus financial record keeping and reporting, and there are major inaccuracies in profit and loss accounts. In 1998 an audit of 22 enterprises under municipal administration and 202 of their subsidiaries conducted by the Shanghai Municipal Audit Office found that 114 companies had overstated their profits by a total of 2.269 billion yuan, and that 65 companies had underreported profits by a total of 493 million yuan. These discrepancies balance out to 1.776 billion yuan in overstated earnings, representing 67.15 per cent of the 2.645 billion yuan in pre-audit reported earnings.\[39\] In 1998, the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants took disciplinary action against accounting firms and individual accountants in various cities. Incomplete statistics show that the Institute imposed various sanctions against 478 firms with relatively poor records. The penalties included dissolution, warnings, suspensions and fines, and confiscation of illegal earnings. One hundred and three firms were dissolved along with nearly 1,000 branch offices. Other firms that failed to meet professional standards were given deadlines for reforming themselves.\[40\] China’s stock markets are rife with illegalities and rule-breaking, including sham business offers, fraudulent packaging for share listings, phony listings, fake restructurings, inflated earnings reports and fraudulent accounting. When the scams are investigated, it is inevitably the case that the company in question was colluding with an accounting firm. Notary agencies whose wrongdoing has been exposed include the Zhongtianqin Accounting Firm, Hualun Accounting Firm, Lihua Accounting Firm and Huapeng Accounting Firm. In response to the revelations that have emerged in recent years about China, one foreign observer wrote an essay entitled “People’s Republic of Cheats,”\[41\] describing the alarming collapse of China’s institutions of economic trust. E. Links between Corruption, the Plundering of Natural Resources and Wholesale Environmental Degradation Because of corruption, the policy making process for China’s officials is no longer based on the long-term interests of the people, but rather on a calculation of how each decision will benefit the officials personally. The result of these calculations is the plundering of China’s natural resources and rapidly progressing environmental devastation. Internationally, China suffers the highest rate of mining accidents of any country. The high frequency of mining accidents is a direct result of the predatory exploitation of mineral resources, which in turn relates directly to the way that officials pursue their own self interest alongside the interests of their social group or elite. Annual fatalities from mining accidents nationwide numbered 10,435 in 1990, 9,777 in 1991, 9,683 in 1992,\[42\] 10,572 in 1995, and 9,974 in 1996.\[43\] Between March 4 and April 11 of 1997, 98 migrant workers from Baihe County in Shanxi Province were killed in three different coal mining accidents. According to Baihe County government figures, up to 22,000 rural residents have left home each year for work in the years since 1994. Each year, more than 80 die in accidents of various kinds, and approximately 20 suffer crippling injuries.\[44\] Only after the 2001 accident in the Nandan mine in Guangxi Province did it become publicly known that the actual numbers of yearly fatalities far exceeded the numbers reported by the mine: In 2000, 259 people were killed in mining accidents, but only 57 deaths were reported; and from January to July, 2001, 264 people died, but only 94 deaths were reported.\[45\] This kind of underreporting of accident-related fatalities is extremely common throughout China. Mine operators can willfully engage in this kind of fraud because they have the backing of local officials and top managers of large state-run mining companies. There is ample data to show that the reason small-scale, accident-prone mining operations are able to exist in large numbers is because they provide lucrative sources of income for local governments. In Jiao town in Yongxin County, Hunan Province, township cadres take turns going to the township’s small-scale coal mine for a “duty shift.” In reality, they go to collect a daily “fee” of 1200 yuan.\[46\] Some small coal mines are started by the heads of large state owned mining companies who either contract them out or sell them to operators of other small-scale mines for their own personal gain. The above-mentioned individuals form a group with common interests, so whenever an accident occurs at a small mining operation, local governments and the managers at the big state-owned mines typically cover up for one another.\[47\] At present, half of China’s more than 7000 mines have either halted operations completely or have partially shut down production. Over the past 20 years, China’s public works have been a graft-generating machine. Consider the Three Gorges Dam project, which almost certainly destined to be judged harshly by history. The project owes its existence to the endless machinations of powerful hydropower interests. Construction on the project has also provided rent-seeking opportunities for a large number of corrupt officials. For example, much of the land set aside for the construction of resettlement communities for displaced people was illegally seized by agencies and local governments hoping to profit from the resettlement efforts, and then transferred at a profit. In one such case, the government of Shibao town in Zhong County, Sichuan, took land that it had expropriated and traded at an inflated price to development companies and individuals. A land transfer fee of over 90,000 yuan per mu was charged in 1997; that price has increased to more than 200,000 yuan per mu today. While officials reaped staggering profits, the farmers who had lost their land and their livelihoods were denied the compensation to which they were entitled by law.\[48\] Since construction began on the Three Gorges Dam project, more than 97 government officials involved in the project have been convicted of corruption-related crimes; one was sentenced to death. According to officials at the National Audit Office, funds totaling US$52 million earmarked for resident resettlement have vanished without a trace. Faced with corruption on such a massive scale, one of the government’s responses has been to prohibit the victims from petitioning for redress. When He Kechang, Wen Dingchun, Jiang Qingshan and Ran Congxin, four farmers from Gaoyang Township in Yunyang County, Chongqing Municipality, reported the embezzlement of relocation funds by local officials to the government, they were arrested and charged with “inciting the public to disrupt social order” and “leaking state secrets.” While in prison, the petitioners were tortured, and He Kechang, already in his sixties, nearly died.\[49\] Despite a strict ban on public discussion inside China about the serious environmental pollution generated by the Three Gorges Dam project, the situation is commonly known outside of China. The kinds of environmental harm caused by the project include damage to air and water quality\[50\] as well as an unremitting series of geological calamities. In the eight years since construction began on the project, there have been 3,465 landslides and more than 1,190 instances of collapses and deformations.\[51\] While the environmental changes brought on by the project are relatively indirect and slow, cases of pollution coming directly from the project have also been reported. For instance, there is a mountain of garbage in Fengjie county, Sichuan, from which more than 2000 tons of waste are dumped into the Yangtze River annually;\[52\] and the city of Chongqing pumps more than 400 million tons of residential wastewater straight into the Yangtze each year.\[53\] 5.The Overall Strategy for Maintaining Communist Party Rule during the Nineties With corruption wreaking havoc, robbers roaming the streets, the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer, unemployment stalking both the towns and countryside, and organized crime rapidly extending its power, one might assume that China was on the verge of disintegration. In fact it is only the government’s adoption of tyrannical measures that has prevented such a collapse. In reality, it has already abandoned any serious efforts to bring corruption back under control. The government is profoundly aware of the absurd dialectic that has accompanied the arrival of systemic corruption. Namely that “to kill corruption will kill the Party, not to kill it will kill the country.” To be sure, they can buy more time, fill their pockets and then disappear abroad by maintaining the current state of affairs. Any reform to the current system that protects their corrupt practices would very possibly mean losing the gains these people have already made. It is with an eye to this reality that the government has adopted a series of heavy -handed measures since 1999. Firstly the government has strengthened its various means of social control and resorted to measures that are now rarely used by civilized countries such as political violence and the widespread use of secret police. These forces strangle at birth any group that has the potential to develop into an organized entity, thereby ensuring that Chinese people are left in a state of permanent disunity – like grains of sand on piece of paper – and with no means of developing organized resistance. Secondly, the government has adopted somewhat inglorious methods to control its own officials, such as using the campaigns against corruption as a check on their behavior. The aim is not to stamp out corruption, but rather to carry out an internal cleansing operation that serves to remind officials that they are far from indispensable. Chinese officials are well aware of the seriousness of China’s situation, and also that ordinary people are fully conscious of their shenanigans in this violent world of “money and power politics.” But they also know that as individuals, they are no more than tiny cogs in an enormous wheel of a still-operational state machine. If they don’t play their part, they’re finished. But more important than all this has been the government’s timely adoption of a new ideological strategy, it’s centralizing of control over public life, and the construction of an alliance between economic and intellectual elites. Thus, in a relatively short period of time, it has successfully upheld so-called “social stability”. a. Ideological Strategy In implementing its new ideological strategy and strengthening control over the public domain, Jiang’s government has been far more rigorous and effective than anything we endured in the Deng Xiaoping era. The government has entirely concurred with Jiang Zemin’s intention to “pull up by the roots all factors with the potential to cause instability,” and no truly independent non-government organization has been able to emerge in such an oppressive environment. Looking at the results of the Jiang government’s adoption of the “hard cop soft cop” approach, it is clear that it has proved even more effective than the straightforward jackboot-style political oppression that distinguished the Mao era. Jiang’s approach also enjoys the happy coincidence of avoiding international attention and condemnation. The mutually supportive pincer strategy of on the one hand placing vilification of Western democratic political systems at the core of the Party’s ideological tactics, and increased control of public life on the other, has worked well for the Party. This is achieved, for example, through: Intensifying ideological education in schools and colleges through the subjects of literature, history and politics, young people have been imbued with countless political lies and fantasies. This helps to explain the contradictory attitude of alternately loathing and worshipping all things American that Chinese youth hold towards the US. The “loathing” is rooted in the compulsory ideological education; and the “worshipping” is the result of an accumulation of information from non-official sources. Thorough control of the media. The Chinese government exercises a monopoly over almost all media outlets and, compared to the Mao era, has “moved with the times” in improving its management and administration of this monopoly. Journalists are also targeted and are continually reminded, in no uncertain terms, who is paying their wages and on which side their daily bread is buttered. Even the reporters themselves acknowledge that they are merely “Party mouthpieces,” a fact that leaves those members of the intellectual elite who still entertain a conscience with no reliable outlet through which they can truthfully express their opinions. From 1999 onwards, the government has continually channelled large amounts of investment into enlisting the services of university educated computer specialists who are appointed as “Internet cops.” It has also formulated regulations aimed at management of the Internet, in the hope that it can tame this “wild horse.” The tactics of either “buying off” or “beating down” intellectuals. Following the violent suppression of the “1989 Democracy Movement,” members of the intellectual elite faced a new and puzzling environment. Throughout the 1990s the government used every order of academic honour and rank, along with material gain, as bait to lure the majority of intellectuals into lining up with the status quo. As for the few intellectuals who maintained a critical approach to their research, the government adopted a much less conciliatory approach that included ordering media outlets not to publish an individual’s research or written articles, and instructing employers to find a suitable non-political excuse to fire him or her, forcing them into financial difficulties. Intellectuals that have succeeded in amassing a degree of influence are subject to even more sinister measures, such as being trailed by members of the secret police, who also search their apartments and subject them to general personal persecution, usually with the aim of forcing them to flee abroad. The application of this hard-soft policy has effectively neutralized the critical capacities of China’s intellectual elites. Most are prepared to tailor the political direction of their work to fit their personal financial resources and adopt a cynical and perfunctory attitude to political and social issues. b. The Formation of Alliances Among Elites At the beginning of the last decade, the Chinese government was still clinging on to the notion that it represented the working class – even as its officials established intimate and profitable private relations with the economic elite. Between them they have bagged 85 per cent of all wealth in China, and constitute China’s super-rich. In light of this reality, the government had no choice but to make a strategic adjustment to its class allegiances, and so Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents Theory” was wheeled out, giving political and economic elites much greater room to cooperate and expand. His call to “allow private capitalists to join the Party” was nothing more than a device awarding economic elites a stake in the system and a legal political voice. Without doubt the most serious delusion among China’s intellectual circles during the eighties was that a mature middle class would demand democratic rights. The following decade extinguished this daydream forever. The Party’s political tactics have consisted of allowing the economic elite, along with appropriately submissive intellectuals, to take a stake in the system and jointly share some of its power – a far cry from the creation of a new democratic politics. As for unrest and turmoil from the poor and dispossessed, the government has had to rely on increasingly violent repression. Extinguishing small-scale local protests has already become part of the normal working day for China’s local government officials who have consequently accumulated a wealth of experience in this field. The “carrot and stick” approach has proved easily the most effective response to collective protests by peasants and unemployed workers. The “carrot” usually consists of a small pay off – one or two months’ worth of livelihood subsidies – aimed at dispersing the unemployed workers’ protests and getting them off the streets. The “stick” is invariably aimed at worker or peasant leaders. The government, without exception, comes down hard on such “trouble makers” whenever it gets its hands on them. Mostly it is happy just to break their spirit and dignity. But it does not shirk from killing them if it is deemed necessary. This is usually enough to frighten off potential leaders from becoming the “sacrificial lamb” whose “slaughter” usually signals the end of this or that collective protest. Sure enough, the response of the poor to the increasingly dominant and powerful alliances forming among the nation’s various elites has been to protest – and even riot. But these incidents have been successfully confined to their immediate localities by the authorities’ sealing off whole areas and towns. Effective suppression has meant that none of these protests have had the opportunity to develop into a force that might constitute a real threat to society as a whole. As far as this hooligan government is concerned, the concept of “human rights” has been deliberately distorted into the “right to exist,” reducing Chinese people to the level of animals at the trough – which is exactly how the government and its sycophants interpret the concept of the “right to exist.” C. Future Options for China’s Elites Generally speaking the international community has adopted an optimistic assessment of China’s future, chiefly relying on two gorgeous myths to console itself. The first is that entry into the WTO will encourage the democratization of Chinese politics; the second is that technical progress will bring about the rapid and free exchange of information helping to penetrate the “firewalls” and fences surrounding China’s news reporting system. Regarding the former, I can only say that this is no more than “wishful thinking” – albeit highly attractive. The WTO is basically an organization that regulates the international economy and we cannot expect or hope that it can change a country’s political system. The second myth is being dismantled by the Chinese government even as I write. It has invested billions of dollars in developing the “Golden Shield” project, the aim of which is to use technology to increase the government’s vice-like grip on society as a whole. Multinationals with dollar signs in front of their eyes have fallen over themselves to get in on the act. But how do the Chinese elites themselves see the future? Chinese society currently resembles a volcano laced with raging underground fires and on the verge of a major eruption. Practically the entire Chinese people can feel these fires raging under the earth’s crust, but perhaps none are more aware of the heat than China’s various elites. Collectively, they have arrived at a common understanding that their most profitable option is the maintenance of prevailing social-economic arrangements through a high degree of political oppression and domestic espionage. In practice, this means that all social disturbances must be dealt with via indiscriminate oppression as soon as they break out. This has been the starting point for the Party and government’s prevention of, and defence against, turmoil from below throughout the last decade. Within these elite alliances, it is the bureaucrats that have a much keener sense of crisis than the intellectuals. Beginning in the 1990s, large-scale capital flight became a widespread trend, with a considerable number of officials shifting their ill-gotten and new-found wealth to bank accounts outside China,-usually in countries where their relatives had already settled into comfortable and affluent lifestyles. In the eyes of these people, China has been reduced to a giant cash cow, where the pickings are both abundant and easily got at. Over recent years, countries in Europe as well as the US, Canada and Australia have moved to attract Chinese students going abroad, in order to develop their domestic economies. They have rightly recognized that demand for these places in China is enormous. According to the relevant statistics, the outward flow of funds related to Chinese students studying abroad is more than US$4 billion per annum. Judging by the arrangements they are making on behalf of their children and family members, China’s elites have already made their view of the future very clear and are using hard currency to vote with their feet. Within China, there is no great divergence among those with a grasp of the situation concerning the damage that government and Party corruption is wreaking. But faced with the prospect of a possible collapse of central government authority leading to a social anarchy, the majority of intellectuals look to the internal power of the CCP as being able to rectify the present critical situation. Those who argue that the Party has the capacity and skills to control the current situation are basing their judgement on what I would call the “fire-brigade theory.” Namely that the government is similar to a highly efficient, well-drilled and integrated “fire brigade,” fully-equipped with the latest “fire-fighting gear” and armed with a “fire prevention system” that includes control over the media and public opinion, a high degree of political repression, squadrons of riot police, and an entire state security apparatus appointed with the task of upholding social stability. But in China, the fire hazards are not simply the outcome of random areas being covered by dry firewood. The sources of danger are the underground fires that are already raging out-of-control, and are likely to erupt to the surface in any place and at any time. Even the most technically advanced fire-fighting equipment has its limits when faced with such hazards. Or, to put it another way, the day will eventually dawn when the Chinese Communist Party will not be able to control the fires it has lit. Moreover, the net result of a collapse of its long rule in a “one party state” will possibly signal the disintegration of China itself. The experience of Communist Party rule will leave us with constrictions that were absent after the fall of past dictatorships. The unprecedented growth in China’s population, widespread ecological and environmental destruction and the total collapse of social morality are just some of the factors that will make the already enormous task of reconstructing China even more difficult. Perhaps more difficult than any previous period of reconstruction. ————————————————– \[1\] For example, Municipal Committee Secretary of Dongfang City, Hainan Province,Wei Huogui, Mayor and Municipal Committee Vice Secretary of Anyang City, Henan Province, Yang Hanxiu, Zhoukou Regional Administrative Office Expert and Regional Vice Secretary Zeng Jincheng, Hebi City Mayor and Municipal Vice Secretary Zhu Zhenjiang, etc, who carried out large-scale trading of official posts and titles. See Southern Daily Weekend Edition, .4.24.1998. \[2\]Yang Haipeng, “A Power-crazed Village Sorcerer”, Shenzhen Fazhi Bao (Shenzhen Legal Newspaper), .12.16.1999. \[3\] Jin Yan: “Wang Xuebing’s Dream of a Big Banking Family”, Sanlian Shenghuo Weekly, .8.17.2002 \[4\] “Chinese car tycoon disappears”, The Times, .8.26.2002 \[5\] Shenzhen Commercial Daily, Section A3, .11.12.2000. \[6\] China Business Times, ..6.19.1998, fifth edition. \[7\] Southern Daily Weekend Edition, .3.22.2001, “Defying the Anshan Iron and Steel Company Charter: How much lost to corruption? Rmb 1,000 billion every year”. \[8\] Yan Jianhong is the wife of Guizhou Provincial Committee Secretary \[Wang Jianye\], whose case was given detailed coverage in many mainland journals. The earliest long editorial on the case appeared in China Market Economy, 1.26.1995. Since 1994, the case of Wang Jianye was covered extensively in Shenzhen newspapers. After Wang Jianye’s sentencing and execution on 12.28.1995, Shenzhen Legal News featured detailed serialized coverage of the case from 28 to 30 December. \[9\] Zhongxin Network, Guangzhou News, 12.13.2001 “Wantonly Using Female Family Connections to Amass his Illegal Fortune: Exposing the Case of Former Shenzhen Mayor Wang Ju”. \[10\] Reform magazine, Issue 2, 1997: “Beihai Real Estate Speculation Scandal Exposed”. \[11\] Southern Daily Weekend Edition, 8.23.2002. \[12\] Guangdong-Hong Kong Information Daily, 7.2.1996 \[13\] China Economic Times, 8.10.1999, eighth edition \[14\] Zhongxin News Agency broadcast, Beijing, 6.10.2001, reported in World Daily, 6.11.2001, Section A7. \[15\] Legal Daily News, 1.23.1996. \[16\] Southern Daily Weekend Edition, 10.25.1996, “The inner sanctum of an independent financial empire.” \[17\] Finance and Economics, Issue 9, 2002. \[18\] “Profits may drop again: appropriately tight fiscal measures will remain in place”, data from article and conversations with Dai Xianglong, China Business Times, 7.16.1996 \[19\] China Youth Daily, .3.10.1995. \[20\] Shenzhen Business News, 8.16.1998, eighth edition \[21\] Shenzhen Business News, 6.8.2001, eighth edition \[22\] Zhongguo Jianbao (China Clippings), .6.25.1999, first edition \[23\] Xinhua News Agency TV broadcast, Beijing, .1.18.2001. \[24\] Reform magazine, Volume 5, 1996, Wang Ku: “Analysis of Volume and Composition of China’s Capital Outflow”. \[25\] Britain’s Financial Times, 12.27.1996: “China becoming a major source of the world’s capital”, by Mr. Wool (Wo Ke). From an extract in China’s Reference News, 1.8.1997. \[26\] Chinese News Net broadcast 5.30.2001 \[27\] Nanfeng Chuang (South Wind Window), March 2003, Volume 1 \[28\] Nanfang Zhou Mo (Southern Daily Weekend Edition),.6.13.2002. \[29\] Chinese Township and Village Enterprise Journal, 2.8.2001 \[30\] Zhongxin Network News, Ningbo, 4.27.2001, “The Final Confession of Zhang Wei, the Notorious ‘Black Gang’ Boss of Wenling, Zhejiang Province” \[31\] Southern Daily Weekend Edition, 9.28.2000, “Exposing the Triad Bosses in the Police Force” \[32\] Sanlian Shenghuo Zhou Kan (Sanlian Life Weekly), 3.9.2001, Shenyang: “The Declining Fortunes of Despotic Gambling Mayors and ‘Black Gang’ Agents”. \[33\] Xinhua News Agency Special Report: “Crazy Evildoers Finally Get Their Comeuppance – Guangxi’s First Case in the “Smash the “Black Gang” Campaign”, eye-witness report by Xinhua News Agency reporter Cheng Yifeng, Nanyang News Network, .5.17.2001 \[34\] South Wind Window, April 2001, Volume 2. \[35\] South Wind Window, April 2002, Volume 2. \[36\] “Fraudulent Fake Suicide Comes Back to Life: How do Statistics Become Just a Numbers Game?”, Liaowang (Outlook) Volume 15,1998. \[37\] Zhongxin Network News, Beijing 12.15.2001 \[38\] Beijing Youth Daily, 12.22.2000. \[39\] China Business Times, 9.2.1999. \[40\] China Business Times, .8.11.1998 “Effects of the Reorganization of the Chartered Accountancy Industry”. \[41\] Far Eastern Economic Review, 6.14.1996. \[42\] Labour Health and Safety, January Issue, 1996, “Occupational Hazards in China — Overview and Countermeasures” \[43\] Labour Health and Safety, January Issue, 1996, “Occupational Hazards in China — Overview and Countermeasures” \[44\] Labour Protection, September 1997 \[45\] South Wind Window, June 2002 (first part), “Solving the Riddle of the Nandanren Disaster” \[46\] Nanfang Urban News, .6.9.2001, Section A18 \[47\] China Economic Times, .6.3.1998, third edition: “Why are disasters so frequent in township and village coal mines?”; China Mining News, 12.02.1998 : “Corruption: The Foundation of Small Coalpits” \[48\] Yangcheng News Weekly, 5.15.2000. \[49\] Amnesty International Appeal for Three Gorges Dam Protesters, .4.23.2001, issued by Amnesty International’s London headquarters. \[50\] “Flooding the Land, Warming the Earth: Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Dams”, http://www.irn.org/wcd/IRNGHGsfromDams.pdf \[51\] “Problems Emerging in Three Gorges Project: Trying to Make Water Flow Uphill”, Hong Kong’s Sun newspaper, .4.24.2002. \[52\] Xinhua Network Chongqing Channel .2.1.2002: “Spring Festival Garbage Mountain Polluting Yangtze River”. \[53\] “Problems Emerging in Three Gorges Project, Making Water Run Uphill”, Hong Kong’s Sun newspaper, .4.24.2002.
何清涟2025-11-09 00:03👍 0💬 0左派为何在澳洲失败
前天（21日），澳大利亚进行了有史以来最激烈竞争的国会改选，结果两大政党都没拿到多数席位（要76席），但执政的左派工党明显是输家，因从原来的83席降至72席，而保守派联盟（自由党和国家党）则从原63席增至73席。今後几天，左、右两大党，谁能拉到独立派议员（四席），谁就可组阁。独立派的四个议员中，有三位原从保守派联盟出走，在理念方面，应说跟保守派更近，所以澳洲很可能像不久前的英国大选一样（也是两党平分秋色，国会没产生多数党），最後是保守派联合小党议员而组阁出任总理。 近三年前，工党打败了连续执政11年的保守派霍华德政府，气势如虹，工党领袖陆克文的支持率高达七成。但为什麽只有两年多，这只腾空的陆总理，就像流星一样陨落著陆？ 首先，陆克文在竞选中的改变全球气候过热的夸口，根本无法兑现。因它不仅涉及全球，并是一个假议题，根本不是哪个国家可解决的。而为气候过暖而限制企业发展，等於人为制造经济困境。陆克文是两头不讨好∶环保绿党及支持者愤怒，重视经济发展的企业界和民众也不满。 其次，陆克文上台後，推行社会主义经济政策，用国家资金大手笔“救市”，结果债台高筑。上届霍华德政府留下的172亿财政盈馀，被陆克文的救市计划花掉，还出现321亿的财政赤字。为补漏洞，陆克文要对矿业增收40％的税，结果怨声载道，民调暴跌。 曾学中文，会说流利汉语的陆克文，上台後全面亲近北京，希望依赖中国市场扭转澳洲经济，但并无效果。结果导致原来支持者反感。例如前台湾总统府顾问、澳洲昆士兰大学教授邱垂亮，曾多年支持老友陆克文，但这次选前就撰文反戈，称陆克文“大概是世界民主国家中最亲近专制中国的国家领袖”。 第三，看到陆克文民调暴跌，工党急中生“蠢”，临阵换将，以密谋方式把陆克文拉下马，陆的副手吉拉德接任，并提前大选。此举在陆的家乡昆士兰省引起强烈反弹，结果工党在这个票仓（第二大省）的支持率降至三成。吉拉德为权力而无情出手、政治刺杀，导致愤怒的昆省选民要用选票为同乡打抱不平。 第四，在野党领袖亚伯特虽去年底才出任自由党主席，但他目标清晰，理念坚定，选战策略得当，以三大诉求赢得了选民共鸣∶制止住涌入澳洲的非法移民；削减赤字；减税，以市场经济再创繁荣。另外这位前橄榄球运动员性格直率、作风质朴，“在选民心目中更像一位普通澳大利亚人，更具亲和力。” 如保守派组阁，将再创澳洲记录，因过去79年，澳洲从没出现仅维持一届的政府。吉拉德的首位女性总理梦不仅破碎，也成为工党历史的噩梦。而从全球角度，G7加澳洲，八个西方主要国家，出现英国、法国、德国、意大利、加拿大、澳大利亚等六国都是保守派执政的局面，左翼政府只剩下美国和日本。而日本的菅直人内阁，经上次参院选举惨败，已是势如危卵。而美国两个月後就国会改选，民调显示，奥巴马的民主党将是输家。现在五个美国人，就有一个认为奥巴马是穆斯林（虽然他自称基督徒）；近半美国人不清楚奥巴马到底信仰什麽。这在美国历史上，是从来没有过的。如现在美国选总统，在野的共和党不论谁出来，都会打败奥巴马。看来，干预经济、试图垄断人们生活的大政府，在哪个国家都会短命；人们用选票教训那些走社会主义的政客。 ——原载《自由时报》2010年8月23日“曹长青专栏” 2010-08-23 http://www.caochangqing.com （转载请指明出处）
曹长青2025-11-01 04:30👍 0💬 0